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ARTICLE 
 
A Comparative Legal Approach for the Risks 
of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Existing Laws 
and Conventions 
ROY ANDREW PARTAIN* 
 
This article provides a review of the existing laws and 
conventions that might be applied to the development of offshore 
methane hydrates. Offshore methane hydrates are an exciting 
emerging new energy resource; one with great potential to 
provide vast energy supplies, and also one with substantially 
novel risks and hazards to the environment, marine flora and 
fauna, and adjacent human communities. Some of these new 
risks include cataclysmic levels of greenhouse gas emissions, 
subsea landslides, and tsunamis. As such, it is important to take 
a survey of the existing laws and conventions that could be 
applied to such risks, examine them for their ability to efficiently 
govern those risks, and take account of where risks from offshore 
methane hydrates are insufficiently addressed by current laws 
and conventions. This article undertakes that task in order to 
compare and contrast existing rules against recommended legal 
policies, and to offer potential solutions to existing shortfalls. 
The first section of this article provides an introduction and 
review of the potential impacts from the development of offshore 
methane hydrates. It will discuss the potential economic and 
public welfare improvements to be gained from the development 
of offshore methane hydrates. It will also provide an exposition of 
the risks posed by that same development. 
 
* Reader of Energy Law, University of Aberdeen School of Law. The author 
is most grateful to Prof. Dr. Michael Faure (Erasmus & Maastricht), Prof. Dr. 
Louis Visscher (Erasmus), Dr. Stefan Weishaar (Groningen), and Dr. 
Alessandra Arcuri (Erasmus) for all of their guidance and suggestions with this 
study. 
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The second section of this article will demonstrate the 
application of law and economics theory to the choice of risk 
governance mechanisms. Within the rules of civil liability, a rule 
of strict liability is found to better fit the facts and circumstances 
of offshore methane hydrates, and would thus be more robust in 
the efficient governance of its risks compared against a rule of 
negligence. Arguments for the application of both public and 
private regulations will be provided. The resultant risk 
governance strategy is a mechanism of complementary 
implementation of strict liability, public regulations, and private 
regulations. 
The third section provides a review of the major international 
laws and conventions that have a nexus to the development of 
offshore methane hydrates as well as the federal laws of the 
United States and the legal instruments of the European Union. 
Because so many laws or conventions might have some minimal 
application to the governance of offshore methane hydrates, only 
those with the greatest a priori expected nexus are reviewed. For 
each law or convention, two levels of analysis are provided: an 
examination of the nexus and potential applicability of the law, 
and an examination of the law’s risk governance mechanisms. 
Thus, each law is examined for both applicability and for 
alignment with the recommended three-prong risk governance 
strategy. 
Conclusions are provided on the state of the existing laws 
and conventions to address the potential risks and harms from 
the development of offshore methane hydrates. Potential 
improvements to the existing laws and conventions and efficient 
means to that end are discussed. 
Finally, looking at the whole article: are the world’s laws and 
conventions ready for the development of offshore methane 
hydrates? No, not quite yet, but they could readily be amended 
and extended to better provide for the efficient protection of the 
environment, marine biota, and impacted human communities. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5
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I. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF OFFSHORE 
METHANE HYDRATES 
The most important facts about methane hydrates can be 
summarized quickly.1  Offshore methane hydrates offer abundant 
energy and fresh water supplies to practically every coastal state 
in the world, and the commercial development of offshore 
methane hydrates could substantially impact both developed and 
developing economies. Offshore methane hydrates offer the 
means to provide those benefits, while also serving as substantial 
sinks for climate change policy makers. It is a policy trio of 
substantial benefits: water policy, energy policy, and climate 
change policy. But, the downside is that the commercial 
development of offshore methane hydrates could unleash both 
cataclysmic and non-cataclysmic risks and harms. 
A.   Benefits of Offshore Methane Hydrates 
Methane hydrates are a potential source of both methane and 
fresh water.2  After the methane volumes are extracted, the 
methane can be converted expeditiously into routine natural gas 
for use in both industrial and residential energy supplies.3  
Extracted water can be used for both consumer and agricultural 
purposes. As the methane volumes are extracted from the 
hydrate deposits, streams of carbon dioxide can be injected into 
the same hydrate structures to provide carbon capture and 
storage (CCS).4  It also appears that the costs of extracting and 
producing offshore methane hydrates are dropping, and may 
become price competitive with other energy sources in the near 
 
 1. For a detailed exposition of the scientific and engineering circumstances 
of offshore methane hydrates, of the potential benefits from the commercial 
development of offshore methane hydrates, and of the potential risks and 
hazards from that development, see Roy Andrew Partain, Primer on Methane 
Hydrates, in MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE: CIVIL LIABILITY AND 
REGULATIONS FOR THE EFFICIENT GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 
FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS (forthcoming 2015), available  
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465612 [hereinafter 
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE]. 
 2. Id. at ch. 2, § 2, n.18. 
 3. Id. at ch. 3, § 3. 
 4. See id. at ch.3, § 5.1, n.141. 
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future, and it may already be price competitive with certain 
liquid natural gas (LNG) prices.5 
In the alternative, the methane can be combusted on-site to 
generate electricity, and the exhaust therefrom can be re-injected 
into the hydrate deposits for CCS storage. Or, the methane can be 
reformed with steam (created with extracted fresh water and 
heated with methane) to create hydrogen fuel.6  From methane 
fuels, to carbon-neutral electricity, to hydrogen fuel options, the 
commercial development of offshore methane hydrates could 
enable a wide array of green and greener energy options.7  In an 
era concerned with anthropogenic climate change, these are 
potentially exciting options. 
Methane hydrates exist abundantly in many locations, 
including locations found onshore in arctic permafrost. Almost 
every coastal country is expected to possess methane hydrate 
reserves,8 and those countries with onshore methane hydrates 
also possess offshore methane hydrates.9  Developed countries, 
such as Japan and South Korea, that do not currently possess 
strategic volumes of domestic energy supplies, do possess 
substantial offshore methane hydrate supplies.10  Many 
developing countries with no domestic energy supply are expected 
to possess substantial offshore methane hydrate reserves; many 
of those countries might also be interested in the freshwater co-
produced with methane hydrates to assist in their agricultural 
development and consumer freshwater needs. 
The world has faced critical energy supply shortages since 
the dawn of the fossil fuel era of industrialization. While not a 
perfect cure to that problem, the commercial development of 
offshore methane hydrates could enable local access to energy 
supplies, and level the geo-political playing field of energy 
markets. The potential benefit of both lowering energy costs and 
 
 5. See id. at ch.3, § 2, n.16. The LNG comparison here is to spot prices seen 
in the recent decade in northeast Asia. 
 6. See id. at ch.3, § 5.2, nn.150-52. 
 7. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 1. 
 8.  Id. at ch. 2, § 1. 
 9. See id. at ch. 2, § 3, nn. 78-79. 
 10. Id. at ch. 3, §§ 4.1, 4.2. 
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the potential stability of supplies could assist in global economic 
development. 
B.   Hazards of Offshore Methane Hydrates 
The extraction and production of offshore methane hydrates 
is a “new thing under the sun.”11  Innovative technologies and 
new risks heretofore untouched in offshore energy extraction are 
required to extract energy supplies from under subsea mud 
layers.12  Previously, offshore operators feared methane hydrates 
as one of the most dangerous aspects of offshore drilling and in 
gas pipeline transportation. A lot of unlearning must be 
accomplished, as methane hydrates are increasingly seen as 
valuable energy resources. 
Methane hydrates collect under mud layers in the ocean.13  
The icy crystals are endothermically stable, as they need extra 
energy to be added to their reservoir system before they will 
begin to disassociate and release methane volumes from the 
hydrate structures.14  Left alone, they are, and have been, stable 
for geologically long time frames.15 
But, scientists have found evidence that ancient earthquakes 
or landslides have added that necessary energy to ancient 
hydrate deposits.16  When that happened, earthquakes and 
tsunamis occurred, which resulted in massive impacts on coastal 
flora and fauna.17  For example, the Mesolithic-era Storegga 
event sent tsunami waves forty meters high directly into the 
coasts of Iceland and Norway; such an event in modern times 
might kill millions of coastal dwellers and severely impact a 
broader radius of coastal communities. 18 
Without tsunamis, major disruptions of the mud layer and of 
the underlying hydrate deposits could enable massive and sudden 
 
 11. With apologies to the author of Ecclesiastes 1:9. Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
 12. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 3. 
 13. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, § 1.  
 14. See id. at ch. 2, § 6. 
 15. Id. § 6. 
 16. Id. at ch. 4, § 4.2. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. at ch. 4. 
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disassociation of methane.19  If a sufficient amount of methane is 
released, a funnel or chimney can be created, which can enable 
the methane to be directly released into the atmosphere without 
first transmitting through the water column.20  Such a large 
emission of methane into the atmosphere could cause several 
problems. Methane itself is combustible and explosive; such an 
event would create a radius of danger preventing emergency 
crews from gaining immediate access to the damage area. Such 
volumes could also potentially asphyxiate first responders. 
Finally, the emission of methane into the atmosphere would be a 
grave accident in climate change consequences, as methane is 
considered substantially more dangerous than carbon dioxide for 
inducing climate change. 
Are cataclysmic events likely? Probably not; however, until 
more information is acquired from completely developed offshore 
extraction projects, the risk might remain difficult to ascertain. 
However, given that methane hydrates are endothermic, and 
given the potential to measure the amounts of energy injected or 
placed into the hydrate deposits, it should be feasible to 
substantially limit black swan type events by setting standards to 
ensure that cautious energy budgets are enforced to prevent 
overstimulation of the hydrate deposits. Yet, given the complexity 
of the hydrate structures, the limits of sub-mud-line surveillance, 
and the complex marine interactions that will continue to exist 
from natural processes, it would likely remain impossible to 
prevent all likelihood of cataclysmic events at offshore methane 
hydrate installations. Thus, whatever resulting standards emerge 
to address the risks and hazards of offshore hydrate accidents, 
there will remain a need to ensure that those standards 
contemplate how to address cataclysmic accidents. 
Gentler events also could make substantial impacts to the 
adjacent coastal communities and to the flora and fauna of the 
oceans wherein the offshore methane hydrate projects enable 
methane venting or seepage to occur.21  The preparation of fields 
 
 19. Id. at ch. 4, § 6. 
 20. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, § 
4.1.  
 21. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, § 
4.1.  
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5
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for production involves a variety of drilling and vibration 
inducing activities. Extraction may well include various heating 
injections and flooding techniques.22  The depletion of the 
methane or water volumes could cause hydrate bed collapses that 
in turn could lead to structural problems. 23  Both the 
development and on-going operation of offshore methane 
hydrates could lead to non-cataclysmic methane accidents. Given 
the many modes in which the hydrate deposit could become 
disturbed and begin to emit methane, the chance of non-
cataclysmic venting and seepage would not be expected to be 
slight; rather, one might reasonably conclude that minor events 
could reasonably occur in most fields. But, it would also be more 
likely than not, that such events would lose their energy source or 
be detected and addressed, and thus be events of limited duration 
and of limited impact. 
Methane itself is a greenhouse gas, and its constant seepage 
and emission could enable additional anthropogenic climate 
change to occur. Methane is also interactive with the biota of the 
ocean, both as a food stock for certain micro-biota and as a 
displacer of oxygen.24  Methane can be digested and converted 
metabolically into carbon dioxide, which is another critical 
greenhouse gas. 25  The nuisance of emitted methane and carbon 
dioxide gas volumes, the potential interference into marine 
economies, such as fishing and tourism, and the general anxiety 
of living near a field of risk, could all be considered part of the 
harms and hazards of living near offshore methane hydrate 
projects. 26 
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrate 
technologies would offer both risks and rewards. The needs of 
certain countries to achieve domestic energy supplies, to sustain 
economic development, and to potentially address parallel issues 
 
 22. See id. at ch. 4, § 4.2. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, 
§ 6. 
 25. Some marine biota can metabolize methane. There are also non-biotic 
chemical processes in the water column that can enable the decomposition of 
methane into carbon dioxide. See id. at ch. 4, § 6. 
 26. See id. 
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of freshwater supplies and of effective climate change policies 
could encourage an earlier timeframe for development. On the 
other hand, there are substantial risks and hazards that 
endanger both the local communities to methane hydrate 
accidents and global communities impacted by climate change 
events. The risks and benefits need to be balanced, and an 
efficient means of obtaining the optimal levels of safety and 
extraction activity are needed. 
II.   MODEL GOVERNANCE OF THE RISKS FROM 
OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES 
The primary tools available for the governance of accidental 
risk are both the public and private rules of civil liability and 
regulations. 
This section will summarize the overall circumstances of 
offshore methane hydrates. Literature from law and economics 
support an argument that it would be best governed under the 
rule of strict liability.27  However, there are certain circumstances 
that frustrate a rule of strict liability; in those cases public 
regulations were found to be an efficient means of risk 
governance for offshore methane hydrates.28  Additionally, 
private regulation can be integrated into a regulatory mechanism 
with public regulation.29 
 
 27. For a detailed, yet non-mathematical, discussion on the models and 
arguments supporting the application of a rule of strict liability to the risks and 
hazards of offshore methane hydrates, see Roy Andrew Partain, The Application 
of Civil Liability for the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 26(2) FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 225 (2015). For a summary of the mathematical models 
presented in the aforementioned article, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE 
FIERY ICE, supra note 1 (mathematical appendices). 
 28. For a detailed, yet non-mathematical, discussion on the models and 
arguments supporting the application of public and private regulations to the 
risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates, see Roy Andrew Partain, 
Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II – Public and Private 
Regulations (Rotterdam Inst. of Law & Econ., Working Paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466079 [hereinafter 
Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II]. For a summary of 
the mathematical models on regulatory mechanisms presented in the 
aforementioned article, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, 
supra note 1 (mathematical appendices). 
 29. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra 
note 27, § 5. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5
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Ergo, the recommendation of this article is a rule of strict 
liability, employed alongside public and private regulations. This 
will produce the optimal set of incentives to efficiently set the 
correct standards for safety and precaution and the correct levels 
of operational activity when offshore methane hydrates are 
installed.30 
A.   A Rule of Strict Liability Should Apply 
In the last fifty-plus years since Calabresi’s first foray in the 
law and economics of accident law,31 much advancement has been 
made. There is now a substantial body of literature to draw from, 
and a strong consensus has emerged on when certain rules of civil 
liability could be efficiently applied, and under what 
circumstances other rules might be efficiently applied.32  Of 
course much theoretical activity remains, and not all models 
agree, but there is a workable standard model that can be utilized 
for the present article. 
When accidents are primarily or exclusively under the 
control of a single actor, theory suggests that a rule of strict 
liability would be more efficient than a rule of negligence.33  
When accidents are a result of both the tortfeasor’s and the 
victim’s actions, but the tortfeasor’s acts are more critical to 
containing the risk of harm, again, theory suggests that a rule of 
strict liability would be more efficient.34  When the underlying 
activity creating the harm is abnormally hazardous, theory 
suggests that a rule of strict liability would be more efficient.35  
When particular uncertainties are to be encountered, theory 
suggests that a rule of strict liability would be more efficient.36  
And when it is important to prevent stress to a judicial system, 
 
 30. See Partain, supra note 27, at 316-18; see Governing the Risks of Offshore 
Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra note 28, § 6. 
 31. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
 32. See Partain, supra note 27, at 252-57. 
 33. See id. at 257. 
 34. See id. at 258. 
 35. See id. at 266. 
 36. See id. at 270. 
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theory suggests that a rule of strict liability would present fewer 
transaction costs on the path to justice.37 
The development of offshore methane hydrates contains the 
circumstances that advocate for a rule of strict liability.38  
Offshore methane hydrates projects would primarily be of a 
unilateral nature of activity and risk and the operator would be 
the primary, if not sole, determiner of which risky acts would be 
undertaken, when they would be undertaken, and how they 
would be undertaken, and thus a rule of strict liability would be 
the efficient policy choice.39  Even if there were a nexus between 
the operator and local community members in the acts leading to 
methane hydrate accidents, i.e., a bilateral accident model, the 
determinants of risk would still primarily sit with the operator, 
and thus a rule of strict liability would be the efficient policy 
choice.40  When the potential risks of cataclysmic events are 
considered, the development of offshore methane hydrates could 
reasonably be characterized as abnormally hazardous. 41  But, one 
need not rely on the risks of tsunamis and earthquakes, as the 
damages from non-cataclysmic accidents could also be 
characterized as abnormally hazardous in that the combined 
risks, both local and global, are neither normal nor safe, and thus 
a rule of strict liability would be the efficient policy choice.42  
Given the novelty of the nascent industry, many uncertainties are 
to be encountered, such as indeterminate ex ante duty of care, 
uncertainty of future harms, and complex interactions of 
precaution and activity levels.43  Therefore, a rule of strict 
liability would be the efficient policy choice. And given that many 
of the countries wherein methane hydrate deposits lay have 
developing legal institutions and may not be able to bear the full 
brunt of transaction costs from a major methane hydrate 
 
 37. See id. at 273. 
 38. See Partain, supra note 27, at 275-82. 
 39. See id. at 275. 
 40. See Partain, supra note 27, at 275. 
 41. See id. at 276-78. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 278-79. 
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accident, a rule of strict liability would again be the efficient 
policy choice.44 
A rule of negligence cannot be excluded from consideration,45 
but the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates strongly fall 
on the side of those favoring a rule of strict liability.46  However, 
if only a rule of strict liability were employed, a number of 
circumstances that would fail to provide the correct incentives to 
optimally set precautionary and activity levels would likely arise. 
To correct for these potential events, public regulations should 
complement strict liability.47 
B.   Public and Private Regulations Should be Engaged 
Public regulations can directly set standards ex ante of a 
tortfeasor’s engagement in a risky activity; as such, public 
regulations can enable the tortfeasor to make strategic decisions 
on activity levels and on care levels in alignment with the 
standards set by the regulatory body. This could facilitate the 
development of offshore methane hydrates by setting optimal 
standards before financial investment decisions would need to be 
made. Clear ex ante regulations could also communicate to the 
engineers and developers of the offshore hydrate installation, 
what standards and tolerances for safety their designs and plans 
should achieve. The establishment of optimal standards, under 
the deliberative process requirements as set out under the 
Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA) and Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directives, and under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),48 would also disclose 
to the public critical information about the risky activities 
undertaken at the installations, and enable many groups to 
engage in the development of those standards. 
 
 44. See id. at 282. 
 45. See id. at 281-82. 
 46. See Partain, supra note 27, at 275-82.  
 47. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra 
note 28, §§ 5-6. 
 48. See discussions of the EIA, SEA, and NEPA deliberative procedures to 
develop correct institutional responses to novel harms and hazards, infra 
Parts III(D)(1), III(D)(2), and III(E)(1), respectively. 
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Public regulations can be usefully applied to cure certain 
circumstances so that routine economic decisions can be properly 
performed, as these regulations can cure or at least ameliorate 
missing markets or market failures.49  The consensus view holds 
that regulations could be efficient at achieving optimal levels of 
precaution and activity levels when civil liability rules are 
stymied by: (i) informational asymmetries, (ii) insolvency, (iii) 
problems of underdeterrence, and (iv) of institutional juridical 
capacity.50 
The development of offshore methane hydrates demonstrates 
aspects from each of the above concerns. Informational 
symmetries would likely be a concern as offshore methane 
hydrates projects are developed and operated.51  For example, 
while the development of the technologies and science related to 
offshore methane hydrate operations has been greatly fostered by 
public investments, the ability to continually monitor on-going 
events would be dangerous and prohibitive if extended to all of 
the potential victims. Thus, there is an efficient role for a 
regulatory body to play to enable both a quality collection of data 
to be obtained and made publicly available while limiting the 
overall impact to the safe operations of the hydrate fields. Public 
regulations could be the efficient policy choice for methane 
hydrates to address these informational asymmetries. 
While one would hope that the revenues from the sales 
associated with commercially operated offshore methane hydrates 
projects would ensure solvency, there are a variety of reasons 
that policy vigilance should be maintained to ensure that the 
potential insolvency of operators does not diminish the 
effectiveness of public safety planning.52 Whereas a strict liability 
rule begins to falter when the operator becomes insulated from 
the informational incentives of potential damages, regulations 
can provide policy tools to incentivize the operator to both stay 
solvent and to provide non-monetary behavioral incentives. 
 
 49. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra 
note 28, § 2. 
 50. See id. §§ 3.2.1-3.2.4. 
 51. See id. § 3.2.1. 
 52. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra 
note 28, § 3.2.2. 
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Public regulations could be the efficient policy choice for methane 
hydrates to address insolvency. 
Underdeterrence can result when various plaintiffs fail to 
plead their injuries and receive judicially determined damages. In 
the event of offshore methane hydrate accidents, there are a 
variety of means in which victims might fail to plead their 
injuries.53  For example, in non-cataclysmic methane leakages 
and venting, plaintiffs might not have sufficient evidence of the 
leakage events, or they might not be able to directly connect their 
injury to the leakage event, or their incidental harm might not 
cost-justify litigation on an individual basis. In such scenarios, a 
regulatory body might be able to collect a superior set of evidence, 
be able to connect more points of causation, and be able to 
integrate many injury claims into a cost-justifiable set. In other 
considerations, potential victims may be missing; it might be due 
to the long timeframes of some injuries or the results of a 
cataclysmic accident that swept victims away. Public regulations 
could be the efficient policy choice for methane hydrates to 
address underdeterrence. 
Private regulations enable those closest to the activity and its 
risks to develop the optimal standards.54  Because the technology 
of developing and operating offshore methane hydrate fields is 
likely to continue to advance, and because the risks and hazards 
will become better understood as more experience is gained, it 
would be advantageous to have those parties closest to those 
learning engaged in setting the optimal standards.55  
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that private regulations 
can be developed to function alongside of public regulation; such a 
mechanism is called an integrated regulatory mechanism.56 This 
article recommends that regulation should be developed in 
harmony with public regulation to ensure that all of the 
advantageously informed parties could participate in standards 
setting efforts.57 
 
 53. See id. § 3.2.3. 
 54. See id. § 4.1. 
 55. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra 
note 28, § 4.4. 
 56. See id. § 4.4. 
 57. See id. § 6. 
13
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
804 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
Finally, in consideration of certain legal systems, not all 
jurisdictions have court systems that can support the litigious 
demands that a major methane hydrate accident event might 
entail.58  A regulatory or administrative body might be better 
equipped to gather and handle legal claims than a singular 
litigant with a rule of strict liability. The presence of private 
regulations could also assist with these concerns. 
C.   Application of Civil Liability, Public Regulations, and 
Private Regulations 
Thus, public regulations and private regulations would be 
efficient in certain circumstances. But, so was the rule of strict 
liability. Might they well be implemented in a complementary 
fashion? Yes, they would.59 
Rules of civil liability can help to protect the effectiveness of 
public regulations when such regulations or regulatory bodies 
would be affected by agency costs and lobby capture.60  
Regulations can help to provide critical information to lower 
transaction costs and to better ensure the function of a strict 
liability rule in court.61  When it is difficult to determine ex ante 
safety standards, regulations can serve as a floor beneath which 
potential tortfeasors are incentivized to stay above.62  In this 
article, other reasons for complementary implementation were 
reviewed, and few reasons were found to support a contrary 
result.63 
Thus, this article supports the combined approach of both 
public regulation and rules of civil liability. This article further 
supports the choice of a rule of strict liability for the civil liability 
system. 
 
 58. See id. § 5.8. 
 59. See id. §§ 5-6. 
 60. See id. § 5.1. 
 61. See id. § 5.8. 
 62. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra 
note 28, § 5.2. 
 63. See id. §§ 5.4-5.7. 
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III.  STATE OF EXISTING GOVERNANCE FOR 
OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE RISKS 
There is a wide array of international, regional, and national 
legal frameworks that address situations analogous to offshore 
methane hydrate operations. Some of the governance directly 
addresses oil spills and related emissions into the ocean; others 
address various environmental liabilities or climate change 
concerns. Some of these legal systems appear to apply as 
currently enacted to offshore methane hydrates, but few properly 
provide sufficient attention to the particular needs of offshore 
methane hydrate accidents. It would appear that the lack of 
historical examples has prevented a more complete drafting of the 
existing laws; this is not a critique, as laws need not regulate 
what is not yet in existence. 
A.   Laws of the United Nations 
The international legal community has taken dramatic steps 
in the last several decades towards clarifying a common 
perspective on international environmental law. 
Within the United Nations’ (UN) umbra, there are three 
major conventions that would likely govern or coordinate with the 
domestic governance of offshore methane hydrates. Other 
conventions might have limited nexus or applicability. 
First, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
would provide jurisdiction over the waters and subsea lands that 
contain methane hydrates.64  While UNCLOS does not apply to 
every country in the world, its paradigm of Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ) does appear globally recognized, either by 
ratification of the Convention, by functioning opinio juris, or, as 
with the U.S., by presidential declaration. UNCLOS calls for 
comprehensive “rules, regulations and procedures” to protect the 
ocean and its environment.65  Also, to the extent that methane 
hydrates were found further offshore than the EEZ, UNCLOS 
provides that the International Seabed Authority (ISA) would 
 
 64. See infra Part III(A)(1). 
 65. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 151, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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become the regulatory body to both establish the relevant 
regulations, and to provide for the leasing of such methane 
hydrates.66 
Second, the UN Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents (UNCTEIA) provides a per se exclusion to 
offshore hydrocarbon accidents with the understanding that oil 
pollution has been dealt with by separate international efforts;67 
many conventions make similar provisions and assumptions. 
However, UNCTEIA does establish what is likely an expectation 
for ratifying states to adopt strict liability type rules in their civil 
liability or regulatory systems. When states do develop those 
regulations, they are “to protect human beings and the 
environment against industrial accidents by preventing such 
accidents as far as possible,” by reducing the frequency and 
severity of those accidents that do occur, and by mitigating the 
effects of the accidents that do occur. 68 Further, UNCTEIA does 
list methane and hydrogen as hazardous substances that might 
be within its ambit of regulation were it not otherwise specifically 
excluded for offshore oil and gas operations. So while UNCTEIA 
would not directly apply to the development of offshore methane 
hydrates, it does strongly suggest an approach to take in 
governing such risks. 
Third, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), and its Kyoto Protocol do not provide a liability 
framework for accidental greenhouse gas emissions, but they do 
set absolute limits on emissions for a certain sub-class of 
signatories.69  Those countries that have assumed obligation 
emission limits are required to enforce those obligations with 
domestic law; the EU, its Member States, and Japan are such 
parties, but the U.S. and Canada are not. The EU has a 
sophisticated mechanism to ensure compliance, see infra at 
Section 3.3, but many other countries with methane hydrate 
assets have not assumed emissions obligations. As such, the 
 
 66. Id. at art. 156. 
 67. See infra Part III(A)(2). 
 68. United Nations Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents, art. 3.1, Mar. 17, 1992, 2105 U.N.T.S. 457 [hereinafter UNCTEIA] 
(emphasis added); see infra Part III(A)(2). 
 69. See infra Part III(A)(3). 
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UNFCCC will be challenged by the development of offshore 
methane hydrates, and further developments would be needed. 
Thereafter, both the Espoo EIA Convention and the Rio 
Declaration should be examined, as they guide the development 
of other future conventions and domestic governance systems. 
While much work remains in order to develop complete and 
comprehensive international regulations, a set of Kelsian norms 
have been established. 
1.   UNCLOS 
The 1982 UNCLOS70 is one of the most comprehensive 
international law conventions functioning in environmental 
law.71  UNCLOS governs many aspects of activities that occur 
within coastal, marine, and oceanic locations. 
a. Rules on Mineral Exploitation 
UNCLOS establishes the oceanic boundary lines for coastal 
states. The “Zone” is defined as that area of the oceans and seas 
that is beyond national jurisdiction.72  The territorial limits of 
coastal states are set at twelve miles offshore, as measured 
against the baseline of its coastal geography.73  For the twelve 
miles beyond the territorial waters, coastal states are given rights 
to their contiguous zones, which are intended to enable them to 
enforce their territorial waters.74  Within these areas, the coastal 
states retain comprehensive sovereignty. 
For the exploitation of minerals, coastal states’ EEZs extend 
far beyond their territorial waters. EEZs are limited to stretch no 
further than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline that 
determines their territorial waters.75  Additional details are 
provided on the definition of the continental shelf, which is 
 
 70. UNCLOS, supra note 65. 
 71. Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International 
Law Issues in Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservation and Management, 13 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 586 (2001). 
 72. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 55. 
 73. Id. at art. 3. 
 74. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 33. 
 75. Id. at art. 57. 
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similarly defined at 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline, in the 
base case, but there are more concerns about the actual 
underlying geography and geology, which may enable a coastal 
country to claim up to 350 nautical miles beyond its baseline.76 
Coastal states enjoy full sovereignty over the minerals 
contained in the sea, seabed, and its subsoil in both the EEZ and 
the continental shelf areas. Coastal states retain their: 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living 
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the 
sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds.77 
And coastal states exercise:  
over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. . . . The natural 
resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other 
non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together.”78  
Coastal states “have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate 
drilling on the continental shelf[,]” and thus within their EEZs, 
“for all purposes.79 
There are economic differences for minerals further out 
offshore. For minerals extracted from within the EEZs’ 200 
nautical mile limits, the coastal states retain all of the economic 
benefits of produced minerals. The coastal states are required to 
make payments, or payments in kind, to the ISA against the net 
value of minerals with mineral extraction that occurs beyond the 
200 nautical miles.80  The ISA is to redistribute those funds “to 
States Parties to this Convention, on the basis of equitable 
 
 76. Id. at art. 76. 
 77. Id. at art. 56(1)(a). 
 78. Id. at art. 77. 
 79. Id. at art. 81. 
 80. The first five years are free of payments; then in year six, a one percent 
payment is required; every year thereafter increases the toll by one percent until 
the toll rate equals seven percent. All subsequent years pay a toll rate of seven 
percent. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 82(2). 
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sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of 
developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-
locked among them.”81 
b. Protection of the Environment 
In addition, the coastal states retain the jurisdiction and 
duty to handle “protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.”82 
UNCLOS provides guidance as to where coastal states retain 
certain aspects of sovereignty at different points in the ocean to 
define and delimit the Zone, which is the area of the ocean beyond 
any national jurisdiction. Within the Zone, all minerals and 
resources, living and non-living, as said to belong to “the common 
heritage of mankind.”83  Resources include methane hydrates, as 
resources are defined as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral 
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed.”84  So, 
within the Area, all methane hydrates belong to all of mankind, 
and therefore, their development and exploitation would be 
administered by the ISA.85 
UNCLOS takes a very clear line that environmental concerns 
should remain front and center with all activities taking place in 
the Area. The operation behavior of the Member States in the 
Area are controlled by UNCLOS. State parties are liable for the 
damages, including environmental damages, caused on their 
behalf within the Area.86 
Within all three locations, the EEZ, the continental shelf, and 
within the Area, “States have the obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.”87  Within the areas under 
their sovereignty, States have the “right to exploit their natural 
resources,” but only if “pursuant to their environmental policies 
 
 81. Id. at art. 82(4). 
 82. Id. at art. 56(1)(b)(iii). 
 83. Id. at art. 136. 
 84. Id.at art. 133(a). 
 85. Id. at art. 151(1)(a). 
 86. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 139. 
 87. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 192. 
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and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the 
marine environment.”88 
There are several requirements set out to establish the 
manner in which the ocean and its associated ecologies must be 
protected.89  Those subsections most relevant to the commercial 
development of methane hydrates are listed hereunder: 
i. “States shall take . . . all measures consistent with this 
Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment from any 
source, using for this purpose the best practicable means 
at their disposal.”90 
ii. “States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that 
activities under their jurisdiction or control are so 
conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other 
States and their environment, and that pollution arising 
from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or 
control does not spread beyond the areas where they 
exercise sovereign rights.”91 
iii. “These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed 
to minimize to the fullest possible extent: (c) pollution 
from installations and devices used in exploration or 
exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and 
subsoil, in particular measures for preventing accidents 
and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of 
operations at sea, and regulating the design, 
construction, equipment, operation and manning of such 
installations or devices.”92 
Within the Area wherein states lack sovereignty or 
jurisdiction, State Parties are liable for their own behavior, as 
well as “state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which 
possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively 
controlled by them or their nationals.”93 
 
 88. Id. at art. 193. 
 89. Id. at art. 194. 
 90. Id. at art. 194(1). 
 91. Id. at art. 194(2). 
 92. Id. at art. 194(3)(c). 
 93. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 139(1). 
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The Area shall only be used for the “benefit of mankind as a 
whole.”94 
(a) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other 
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and 
of interference with the ecological balance of the marine 
environment, particular attention being paid to the need for 
protection from harmful effects of such activities as drilling, 
dredging, excavation, disposal of waste, construction and 
operation or maintenance of installations, pipelines and other 
devices related to such activities.95 
Article 145 further clarifies the environmental duty of care: 
“(b) the protection and conservation of the natural resources of 
the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of 
the marine environment.”96 
Similar to how UNCLOS provides operational details of how 
environmental safety should be guarded and preserved with 
precautionary behaviors,97 Annex III of UNCLOS also provides a 
full set of operation guidelines for the ISA to manage the 
exploitation of minerals within the Area. Key among the concerns 
enumerated are: 
(i) Given that the extraction and production of methane hydrates 
are regulated by UNCLOS, the selection of qualified operators is 
to be determined by the rules, regulations, and procedures of the 
ISA.98 
(ii) To be qualified, the Annex requires both financial and 
technical competence to be established.99 
(iii) Additionally, the applicant operator must be sponsored by a 
Member State and the Member State must be able to 
demonstrate that they have the capacity to “ensure, within their 
legal system” that the applicant operator will be required to 
operate to the environmental protection standards of the ISA. 
 
 94. Id. at art. 140(1). 
 95. Id. at art. 145(a) (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. at art. 145(b). 
 97. Id. at art. 147. 
 98. Id. at Annex III, art. 4(1). 
 99. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 4(2) (emphasis added). 
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That said, if the Member State has sufficient regulations and 
institutions to “reasonably appropriate for securing compliance” 
from the applicant operator, and that operator later fails its 
duties under the Member State’s laws, then the Member State 
itself will not be liable for any harms caused by the sponsored 
operator.100 Thus, in the event that extraction from methane 
hydrates becomes operationally commercial in nature, then 
Member States have a strong incentive to provide sound 
regulatory regimes and institutions to better defend themselves 
under UNCLOS. 
c. Risk Governance Under UNCLOS 
UNCLOS requires the development of regulatory systems 
prior to the commercial development of methane hydrates. 
“Rules, regulations and procedures shall be drawn up in order to 
secure effective protection of the marine environment from 
harmful effects directly resulting from activities in the Area” if 
undertaken with regards to the exploitation of minerals, such as 
methane hydrates.101 
Should an operator cause harm, they will be liable for the 
actual amount of damage; on the other hand, if the damage was 
caused by a failure of the ISA to operate correctly under 
UNCLOS, then it shall be liable for the actual amount of 
damages.102  It does not appear that there is any provision for a 
prescriptive level of care or prevention that would exclude the 
“cautious tortfeasor” from damages; thus it appears that 
UNCLOS contemplates a strict liability rule if civil liability rules 
were to be employed by the coastal state. 
While there are requirements for the operators to 
demonstrate their financial capacity to respond to the harms they 
might create, nowhere in UNCLOS is it explained where the ISA 
or the UN more broadly might receive sufficient revenues to 
handle the burdens of a major methane hydrate catastrophe. But, 
the requirement for a regulatory body to address insolvency is 
 
 100. Id. at Annex III, art. 4(4). 
 101. Id. at Annex III, art. 17(2)(f). 
 102. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at Annex III, art. 22. 
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reassuringly close to the model of governance suggested in this 
article, supra, at Section II. 
Also intriguing under UNCLOS is the idea that all 
technology developed to operate within the Area should be shared 
and distributed as part of the “common heritage” paradigm of 
UNCLOS.103  The data from activities in the Area is required to 
be shared and transferred inter-members.104  This type of 
arrangement would normally assume a regulatory body is 
involved; perhaps the ISA would coordinate, but it is not clear if 
other regulatory bodies could lead, or if the ISA and the UN could 
coordinate a “methane hydrate data clearinghouse registry.” 
In conclusion, UNCLOS has a sufficient ambit to regulate the 
development of methane hydrates. If the extraction of methane 
hydrates happened within the Area, the environmental 
regulations would apply and there would need to be a new set of 
regulations and rules to establish proper safety practices and 
methods of handling environmental damages. Such rules and 
regulations do not currently exist. 
2.   UNCTEIA 
UNCTEIA would not likely apply to the development of 
offshore methane hydrate projects.105  But, the Convention might 
apply to the onshore facilities related to the processing and 
marketing of natural gas and hydrogen. 
a. Exclusion of Certain Hydrocarbon 
Accidents 
UNCTEIA applies to “the prevention of, preparedness for and 
response to industrial accidents capable of causing transboundary 
effects, including the effects of such accidents caused by natural 
disasters.”106  However, UNCTEIA provides a seven-point list of 
exceptions to the Convention.107  Within that list, accidents that 
 
 103. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 65, at Annex III, art. 5. 
 104. Id. at Annex III, art. 14. 
 105. UNCTEIA, supra note 68. 
 106. Id. at art. 2(1). 
 107. Id. at art. 2(2)(a)-(g). 
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occur in the marine environment, including seabed exploration 
and exploitation, are excluded from UNCTEIA.108  Similarly, 
leakages into the sea, such as oil or other harmful substances, are 
excluded from UNCTEIA coverage.109 Thus, any accidents related 
to the seeping, leakage, or venting of methane from an offshore 
methane hydrate project is excluded from the coverage of 
UNCTEIA. 
b. Application to Onshore Facilities of 
Offshore Installations 
If a project had onshore facilities that were otherwise related 
to the offshore activities, but an accident arose onshore from 
those onshore facilities, without direct causation to the offshore 
activities, then UNCTEIA might apply. Such events might be the 
leakage of a gas transportation pipeline or the rupture and 
conflagration of an onshore methane storage facility. 
UNCTEIA provides that industrial accidents result from the 
loss of control during hazardous activities over hazardous 
substances either during the processing or storing within an 
installation, or when such hazardous substances are in 
transport.110  Hazardous activities are those activities that use 
hazardous substances and are capable of transboundary 
effects.111 
Transboundary effects are those serious effects that occur 
within one jurisdiction as a result of industrial accidents in other 
jurisdictions, as long as both jurisdictions are under the 
sovereignty of signatories to UNCTEIA.112  Also, the industrial 
accident needs to qualify as such and also not be listed as an 
exception to UNCTEIA; e.g., onshore methane processing, 
storage, and transportation are not per se excluded.113 
Methane and hydrogen gases are reasonably characterized as 
hazardous substances under UNCTEIA. A substance is a 
 
 108. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at art. 2(2)(f). 
 109. Id. at art. 2(2)(g). 
 110. Id. at art. 1(a)(i), (ii). 
 111. Id. at art. 1(b). 
 112. Id. at art. 1(d)-(f). 
 113. Id. at art. 2(1)-(2). 
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hazardous substance if it is listed under Annex I, either as a 
named substance or as a chemical that meets certain minimum 
quantities.114  Methane, as natural gas, is included under Annex 
I, either as regular gaseous methane or as a cryogenic liquid, 
such as LNG.115  To the extent that hydrogen is extracted,116 or 
otherwise associated with the onshore activities, it would also be 
a named substance under Annex I.117 
c. Risk Governance Under UNCTEIA 
Once the character of a hazardous activity has been 
identified, such as an onshore methane processing facility or a 
hydrogen generation facility, then the obligations of UNCTEIA 
are binding upon the parties.118  Foremost among the obligations 
is “to protect human beings and the environment against 
industrial accidents by preventing accidents as far as possible,” 
by reducing the frequency and severity of those accidents that do 
occur, and by mitigating the effects of the accidents that do 
occur.119 
UNCTEIA establishes a very high duty of care to prevent 
accidents “as far as possible;”120 but it does not appear to be an 
unlimited demand, but rather the highest reasonable level of due 
care, which implies a balancing of social benefits and costs. The 
Parties are to “take appropriate measures for the prevention of 
industrial accidents.”121  In addition, the Parties are to “take 
appropriate measures to establish and maintain adequate 
emergency preparedness”122 and “the Parties shall support 
 
 114. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, Annex I, pts. I, II. 
 115. Id. at Annex I, pt. II, § 11 (minimum quantity of 200 metric tons, a 
functionally tiny amount of methane for a methane producing facility). 
 116. For a more complete discussion on producing hydrogen from methane 
hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 5.2. 
 117. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at Annex I, pt. II, § 5. The minimum amount 
required is fifty metric tons. If the daily production of hydrogen were assumed, 
to provide a green fuel stock, then this volume would be readily met. Id. 
 118. Id. at art. 3. 
 119. Id. at art. 3(1) (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at art. 6, § 1. 
 122. Id. at art. 8, § 1. 
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appropriate international efforts to elaborate rules, criteria, and 
procedures in the field of responsibility and liability.”123 
Does the requirement for “as far as possible” require a strict 
liability rule, or a rule of negligence? It is likely that the drafters 
had a strict liability rule in mind, but left sufficient flexibility to 
the Parties to determine the details.124  The overall semantic 
character of the UNCTEIA reasonably appears to support and 
suggest the development of a rule of strict liability, or a unique 
form of a negligence rule with the duties of care set at the highest 
feasible levels. 
Indeed, one might be able to comply with a combination of 
regulations and civil liability rules. For example,  UNCTEIA 
takes care to highlight the type of minimal goals of safety that 
should be addressed by the implementing state; Annex IV 
provides a non-binding, non-obligatory listing of methods to 
prevent industrial accidents.125  Yet, precisely because of this 
non-binding, non-obligatory character of these rules, no 
particular duty level is prescribed therein. Thus, there is little 
evidence for the duty of care needed for a rule of negligence; yet, 
the means to attain decentralization under a rule of strict 
liability has been left unblocked by the regulatory suggestions. 
Thus, a combined regulatory and strict liability framework would 
coordinate with UNCTEIA. 
UNCTEIA engages in such discussions with regard to 
sufficient or fitting levels of precaution, and the drafters 
expectations suggest that a regulatory approach would be taken 
by many, and therefore, parties would benefit from some sort of 
template to facilitate later coordination intra-parties. 
3.   UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The UNFCCC126 addresses the problems posed by 
anthropogenic climate change; it is particularly focused on the 
 
 123. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at art. 13. 
 124. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at art. 13. 
 125. See id. at art. 6(1) (“[s]uch measures may include, but are not limited to”); 
id. at Annex IV, pmbl. (“the following measures may be carried out”). 
 126. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
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issues related to the emissions of greenhouse gases.127  Additional 
details necessary for the effective administration of the UNFCCC 
were developed and adopted as the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC 
(Kyoto Protocol).128 
a. Governance of Anthropogenic Climate 
Change 
The UNFCCC defines greenhouse gases in a scientific frame, 
“gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and 
anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.”129  
The Kyoto Protocol provides an enumerated list of greenhouse 
gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorcarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.130  Thus, methane and 
methane hydrates are potentially regulated by the UNFCCC. 
The UNFCCC recognizes two determinants of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases, emissions, and sinks. Emissions are the 
release of greenhouse gases “into the atmosphere over a specified 
area and period of time.”131  Emissions arise from a source of 
greenhouse gases; a source is any process or activity that releases 
greenhouse gases or their precursors to the atmosphere.132  Sinks 
are those processes, activities, or methods that remove 
greenhouse gases or their precursors from the atmosphere.133 
The anthropogenic venting and seeping of methane to the 
atmosphere from offshore methane hydrate installations qualify 
as emissions under the UNFCCC because methane is a listed 
greenhouse gas, and the transmission to the atmosphere would 
qualify as an emission. Likewise, there is a reasonable argument 
to be made that the release of carbon dioxide from interactions of 
vented or seeped methane volumes could also qualify as 
emissions; however, there is an intermediate role played by 
 
 127. Id. at pmbl. 
 128. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter 
Kyoto Protocol] (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005). 
 129. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 1, § 5. 
 130. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at Annex A (greenhouse gases). 
 131. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 1(4). 
 132. Id. at art. 1(9). 
 133. Id. at art. 1(8). 
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nature in converting that methane into carbon dioxide, and thus 
the emission is indirectly anthropogenic in character. 
The absorption of carbon dioxide back into the hydrate beds 
in replacement of the extracted methane volumes would likely 
qualify as a sink under the UNFCCC.134  Many of the promoted 
means of developing offshore methane hydrate installations have 
included the option of CCS alongside methane production in part 
to facilitate minimizing the net impact of offshore methane 
hydrate installations under the UNFCCC. Thus, offshore 
methane hydrate installations might qualify as both emitters and 
sinks, and therefore, need netting under the UNFCCC accounting 
procedures. 
b. Governance of Regulatory Character 
The UNFCCC requires its Contracting Parties to employ the 
precautionary principle, which states that they should “take 
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the 
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.”135  
However, the UNFCCC takes a measured approach to which 
strategies should be undertaken, in that it requires the 
“measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so 
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”136 
Additionally, the UNFCCC is sensitive to the fact that each 
country or culture may face different determinants of cost-
effectiveness and that each country is enabled to take its unique 
circumstances into account.137  Thus, the potential for methane 
hydrate projects to both emit and sink greenhouse gases needs to 
be integrated within the framework of the precautionary 
principle. However, the UNFCCC does not particularly determine 
 
 134. E.g., Japan has expressed interest in a plan that would extract the 
methane in order to fuel offshore electrical generation coordinated with re-
injection of the exhaust carbon dioxide volumes back into the hydrate reservoirs. 
Also, Germany has a research interest in offshore CCS that coordinates with 
methane hydrate reservoirs. Projekt SUGAR and Eco2 lead those efforts. See 
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, ch. 3, § 5.1, for a more 
complete discussion. 
 135. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 3(3). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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how a particular country might utilize its methane hydrate 
resources, this depends on the unique “socio-economic contexts” of 
each Contracting Party. Thus, the UNFCCC has preserved to its 
Contracting Parties the decisions of regulations or rules of civil 
liability. These burdens are imposed at the state-level and not 
lower. 
While all of the Contracting Parties are obligated to 
undertake broad responsibilities to ameliorate and reduce the 
threat of anthropogenic climate change,138 the UNFCCC 
distinguishes between Annex I Parties and Annex II Parties. 
Annex I Parties are developed countries, and are expected to lead 
the UNFCCC’s Parties by establishing national policies and 
measures to limit anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
and to protect and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs.139  The Annex I Parties are obligated to provide 
measurements and metrics on their progress in achieving those 
goals.140  The Kyoto Protocol took the next step to make those 
requirements functional.141  The Protocol set an aspirational goal 
to limit anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.142  There is 
a new list of Parties so committed at Annex B to the Protocol. 143  
The goals, as drafted within the Protocol, are percentage targets 
against an estimated level of emissions from the year 1990; e.g. 
the United States committed to reduce its emissions to ninety-
three percent of its 1990 emission levels.144  The overall changes 
to emissions are reduced by increases to sinks and reservoirs;145 
thus the use of methane hydrate deposits as both an energy 
resource and as a CCS facility could be tallied on both sides of the 
emissions target. 
Groupings of Annex I Parties can agree to achieve their 
targets as an aggregate;146 this could assist methane hydrate 
 
 138. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 4(1)(a)-(j). 
 139. Id. at art. 4(2)(a). 
 140. Id. at art. 4(2)(b), (c). 
 141. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at art. 2(1)(a) (list of specific 
obligations). 
 142. Id. at art. 3(1). 
 143. Id. at art. 3(1); id. at Annex B. 
 144. Id. at art. 3(1)-(3); id. at Annex B. 
 145. Id. at art. 3(3); id. at Annex A. 
 146. Id. at art. 4(1). 
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projects by including a transboundary perspective on the 
combined emissions and sink planning related to the project. 
Additionally, Parties may volitionally transfer or acquire 
emission reduction units by engaging in projects that reduce 
anthropogenic emissions or enhance their removal by sinks.147  
The Protocol also provides for a Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which enables Parties outside of Annex I to engage in 
sustainable development in line with the UNFCCC.148  The CDM 
enables developed countries to sponsor efforts within the 
developing countries that would assist the attainment of 
UNFCCC targets by enabling the Annex I Parties to receive some 
emission reduction units for their own accounts.149  Also, more 
broadly the Annex II Parties and other developed Parties are 
obligated to provide new financing mechanisms to support the 
attainment of the UNFCCC targets by assisting in the financing 
of projects that would limit emissions and enhance sinks.150  
Thus, there are several means for the financing and development 
of methane hydrate projects if they are characterized as green 
energy projects that reduce emissions and enhance sinks. 
Annex II countries undertook additional financial, 
technological, and burden-sharing obligations to assist developing 
countries to reduce and mitigate their own anthropogenic 
emissions.151  The developed parties have special obligations to 
assist those countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of 
the effects of climate change due to anthropogenic emissions.152  
There are particular concerns raised for a limited number of 
critical situations: 
(a) Small island countries; 
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas; 
(c)  Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and 
areas liable to forest decay; 
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters; 
(e)  Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification; 
 
 147. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at art. 6. 
 148. Id. at art. 12(2). 
 149. Id. at art. 12(3)(a), (b). 
 150. Id. at art. 11. 
 151. UNFCCC, supra note 126, art. 4(3). 
 152. Id. at art. 4(4). 
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(f)  Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution; 
(g)  Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including 
 mountainous ecosystems; 
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income 
generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on 
consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive 
products.153 
Subsections (a), (b), (d), and (g) could be adversely affected by 
the potential harms and hazards of methane hydrate projects. 
Subsections (c), (e), and (f) might benefit from the potential 
freshwater reserves associated with methane hydrates or the 
pollution abatement that methane hydrates might offer over 
existing energy resources. Finally, subsection (h) raises a query 
on the potential impact on those countries highly dependent on 
other non-methane hydrate, fossil fuel industries from the 
development of methane hydrate technologies. For if methane 
hydrates are developed as a form of green energy under the 
UNFCCC, this surely would affect the revenues of those countries 
previously benefiting from coal and crude oil industries. 
c. Risk Governance Under the UNFCCC 
The approach to risk governance taken under the UNFCCC 
is best described as regulatory in nature. What discipline that 
exists is to coordinate at the state level of international law and 
not below to lesser actors, thus rules of civil liability are not 
engaged in directly by the UNFCCC. The previous paragraphs, 
supra section III(A)(3)(b), demonstrated a variety of requirements 
that could only be properly undertaken by regulatory bodies at 
both the UNFCCC level and within its Party States. 
To the extent that ratifying states opt to facilitate their own 
domestic obligations under the UNFCCC by enacting domestic 
regulation or civil liabilities to limit the risks of unplanned 
emission accidents is not explicitly addressed within the 
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. Some countries have taken 
 
 153. UNFCCC, supra note 126, art. 4(8)(a)-(h). 
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stricter discipline into account,154 but others countries have 
not.155 
In conclusion, the UNFCCC does support a regulatory body’s 
oversight of the data and operations of offshore methane hydrate 
installations. To the extent that a Contracting Party needs to 
monitor its overall levels of emissions and sinks, the offshore 
installations could fit within that regulatory rubric. To the extent 
that such observation data overlaps with similar data needs for 
accident awareness and prevention, that regulatory framework 
could both directly improve precautionary efforts and could also 
provide secondary support to reducing the various transaction 
costs of implementing a strict liability regime. 
4.   Espoo EIA Convention 
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context functions as the UN’s equivalent to the 
EU’s EIA Directive.156  When a proposed activity emerges that 
would be likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary 
impact, then the Contracting Parties have a duty to notify those 
other Contracting Parties that would be affected by the 
activity.157 
Appendix I provides a list of activities that are likely to have 
transboundary effects.158  Offshore hydrocarbon production is a 
listed activity under the Appendix; it is defined to include the 
extraction of natural gas if the installation extracts more than 
500,000 cubic meters (m3) of methane a day.159  However, as of 
 
 154. See infra Part III(D)(7) (discussing the EU efforts to limit greenhouse 
gases, which established fiscal discipline for Member States falling short of their 
greenhouse gas emissions-reduction commitments). 
 155. Several key developed countries, including the United States, who are 
significant emitters, have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol despite their 
ratification of the underlying UNFCCC. 
 156. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, adopted Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter 
Espoo EIA Convention] (entered into force Sept. 10, 1997). 
 157. Id. at art. 3(1). 
 158. Id. at Appendix I. See id. at art. 3(1). 
 159. Id. at Appendix I, § 15. “Offshore hydrocarbon production. Extraction of 
petroleum and natural gas for commercial purposes where the amount extracted 
exceeds 500 metric tons/day in the case of petroleum and 500,000 cubic 
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January 2014, Appendix I was not in effect as an insufficient 
number of Contracting Parties had ratified the Appendix.160 
Because the commercial development of a methane hydrate 
project would have the potential to make an impact “on the 
environment including human health and safety, flora, fauna, 
soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments or 
other physical structures or the interaction among these factors” 
there is no requirement for adverse effects.161  To the extent that 
such impacts could cross from one jurisdiction to another 
jurisdiction, such an impact would qualify as a transboundary 
impact.162  In that sense, the awareness of an impending 
methane hydrate project that would have a transboundary impact 
would raise the requirement to provide notification to the other 
impacted Contracting Parties. 
This system of notifications would be primarily a regulatory 
action that collects information but provides for no judicial 
damages, and thus the Convention provides no explicit form of ex 
ante anticipation of ex post costs to provide incentives in the 
manner that civil liability systems provide. But, the Convention 
would clearly be an information-clearing house that would 
complement a strict liability system. 
5. Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development 
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
was held in 1992; it has been described as one of “the most 
 
meters/day in the case of gas.” Decision III/7 Second Amendment to the ESPOO 
Convention, UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., 
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/about/amendment2.html (last visited Nov. 30, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GU8K-T6ML. 
 160. Only twenty-one Parties had ratified the Appendix as part of the second 
amendments as of January 26, 2014. The underlying Convention has forty-five 
Parties, so a total of thirty-four Parties need to ratify the Appendix (i.e., thirteen 
more Parties). Amendment to the Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION 
(June 4, 2004), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
4-c&chapter=27&lang=en, archived at https://perma.cc/8Z7A-3EBZ. 
 161. Espoo EIA Convention, supra note 156, art. 1(vii). 
 162. Id. at art. 1(viii). 
33
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
824 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
ambitious international environmental conferences of the 
twentieth century.”163  Both binding conventions, such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the UNFCCC, and soft 
law documents, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, were accomplished at the UNCED.164  The 
Conference effectively shifted international customary law 
towards a paradigm of precautionary law and a broader notion of 
protecting whole eco-systems, as contrasted against earlier 
paradigms of limited numbers of specifically targeted species. 
The Rio Declaration is akin to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in that it is aspirational in character. Unlike the 
previous discussed matters, the Rio Declaration is not binding 
law. It might reflect developing opinio juris, but it is a relatively 
recent source of soft law. 
The document lists twenty-seven specific principles and 
guidelines for future efforts to better coordinate economic growth 
and ecological conservation.165  Several of those principles have 
direct application to the development of methane hydrates. 
Principle 2:  States maintain their sovereign rights to exploit 
their own resources, but they have a 
corresponding duty to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
transboundary damage to the environment. 
Principle 4:  Requires that planning and actions to mitigate 
potential environmental harms are included 
within all developmental efforts. 
Principle 10: Calls for all states to engage their citizens in 
the due and deliberative processes of 
engagement and decision making on matters 
that could affect the environment. Information 
 
 163. See Allen, supra note 71, at 599. 
 164. Id. at 599-600. 
 165. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992), 
available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&Art
icleID=1163&l=en, archived at http://perma.cc/5T3D-U6AF. 
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sharing and awareness building are also called 
for. 
Principle 11: Calls, amongst other targets, for recognition 
that different states have different legal 
institutions and stages of economic development, 
and as such the regulatory standards applied by 
some countries may be inappropriate and of 
unwarranted economic and social cost to other 
countries. 
Principle 13: Calls for the development of national laws 
regarding liability and compensation for the 
victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage. States should also cooperate to develop 
international law regarding liability and 
compensation for adverse effects of 
environmental damage caused by activities 
within their jurisdiction or control to areas 
beyond their jurisdiction. 
Principle 15: Calls for states to protect the environment by 
widely adopting the use of the precautionary 
approach, limited only according to their 
capabilities. 
Principle 16: Calls for the international adoption of the 
polluter pays principle into domestic and 
international laws. 
Principle 17: Calls for Environmental impact assessments to 
become a standard activity for all activities that 
might endanger or harm the environment.166 
Thus, the Rio Declaration establishes norms of comportment 
with regards to prospective acts of commercialization, and the 
aspirational goals of the international legal community for the 
prospective protection of the environment. 
a. Risk Governance Under Rio Declaration 
Perhaps the most important risk governance issues with the 
Declarations are the recognition of: (i) the necessity to establish 
 
 166. See id. 
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liability systems to address environmental protection concerns, 
(ii) both regulatory and civil liability systems could be engaged, 
(iii) different countries and cultures might need different 
manners of liability and regulations implementations, (iv) 
precautionary principles should be applied, and (v) the polluter 
pays principle should be applied. 
The general call for liability rules reflects a growing 
recognition that polluters or tortfeasors need to know ex ante that 
they will be held accountable for their decisions. The Declaration 
enables the retention of legal flexibility, particularly for jointly 
and complementarily implementing civil liability rules and 
regulations as circumstances fit. The precautionary principle sets 
a Coasian right to the general public, that they have a right to 
retain their current enjoyment of nature and to their way of life; 
it places the burden on the tortfeasor to prevent harm even if it is 
unclear that harm would result. The polluter pays principle, 
without additional clarification, appears to prefer a rule akin to 
strict liability. Put together, it would appear that the Declaration 
on the whole is more closely aligned with a strict liability 
perspective, or a very stringent regulatory system, and not with a 
rule of negligence or permissive regulatory framework. 
B.   Regional Marine Conventions 
The rise of oceanic transportation of fuel and other 
potentially hazardous materials gave cause to the development of 
a group of regional marine pacts and international oil spill pacts. 
The two groups of conventions are somewhat interwoven, as they 
both address the potential leakage of hazardous elements into the 
ocean. 
Both of these legal paradigms provide for the development of 
risk governance schemes with historical perspectives and 
insights. At large, the international maritime conventions and oil 
spill conventions are in alignment with strict liability and the 
coordinated implementation of regulations. They all either 
explicitly or implicitly call for the implementation of strict 
liability; not a single convention in the collection below advocates 
or supports a rule of negligence. None of them disavow the useful 
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role of regulation, and most provide frameworks of the 
regulations that they expect to be put into place.167 
Yet, it will be seen that both sets of conventions are likely to 
apply only indirectly to the potential risks and hazards of offshore 
methane hydrates. As will be explored, some of the disconnection 
stems from the ocean going vessel paradigm underlying the 
conventions, and some of the disconnection arises from linguistic 
word choices that leave methane and related concerns out of the 
domain of the conventions. 
The challenges of responding to oil spills resulted in multiple 
international conventions. The problems of transboundary oil 
spills, particularly in the waters off of Europe, led to a collection 
of regional marine pacts. Herein is provided a review of four of 
the major regional marine conventions: 
i. the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) 
(North East Atlantic Ocean),168 
ii. the Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea),169 
iii. the Bonn Agreement (North Sea),170 and  
iv. the Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea).171 
The regional marine pacts, taken as a group, call for the 
adoption of two key legal principles: (i) the polluter pays principle, 
and (ii) the precautionary principle.172  As such, the fundamental 
tone of the regional marine pacts is to support rules of strict 
liability.173  The regional marine pacts also call for the 
implementation of certain measures to ensure high safety 
standards are maintained; it is most likely that such measures 
would be carried out as public regulations.174  These measures 
 
 167. The main goals of those regulations are to both provide a certain 
standard of sufficient breadth and coverage of contracting states’ resultant 
regulations and to provide for better intercommunication and cooperation on the 
eventual need to work together to address transboundary problems associated 
with oil spills and other marine pollutants. 
 168. See infra Part III(B)(1). 
 169. See infra Part III(B)(3). 
 170. See infra Part III(B)(2). 
 171. See infra Part III(B)(4). 
 172. See infra Part III(B)(5). 
 173. See infra Part III(B)(5). 
 174. See infra Part III(B)(5). 
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should include those measures that could eliminate and 
remediate pollution from the exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf, the seabed, and its subsoil; such measures 
would be applicable to offshore methane hydrates and any 
potential methane venting or seepage. Several of the pacts, such 
as the Barcelona Convention, have additional protocols to 
specifically address the risks associated with the operations of 
offshore facilities, such as would be needed to extract methane 
hydrates.175 
However, a fundamental disconnect remains in that most of 
the aforementioned conventions would barely be applicable to the 
risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates. Not that the 
conventions are in any form structurally opposed to such, but 
rather, it appears that need for such coverage was not foreseeable 
at the time the conventions were drafted and implemented. 
Indeed, much of the language and vocabulary of the conventions 
could readily be extended to coordinate with the particular 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. 
Because the existing international maritime and oil spill 
conventions do reflect both a history of diplomatic draftings and 
accumulated practical experiences, it might be wise to build upon 
their foundations in addressing the risks and hazards of offshore 
methane hydrates. 
The employment of standards, such as requirements to 
maintain “best available techniques” and “best environmental 
practices,” are clearly relevant in providing the standards for 
offshore methane hydrates. Many of the functional definitions 
from these conventions, such as “offshore activities” and “offshore 
installations” can readily be extended to cover similar or identical 
concepts related to offshore methane hydrates. Other definitions, 
e.g., such as “pollution” within OSPAR, already might be 
interpretable as applicable to methane hydrates, as they include 
all “substances or energy” that could result in hazard to human 
health or the marine ecosystem.176  However, more clear 
standards could be set by a provision of explicit terms that make 
 
 175. See infra Part III(B)(3). 
 176. The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic, art. 1(d), opened for signature Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 
U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter OSPAR] (entered into force Mar. 25, 1998). 
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clear that emissions, seeps, and ventings from methane hydrates 
should be included within that definition when introduced by 
human activities. 
The international maritime and oil spill conventions have 
histories of textual evolution.177  Thus, it is a reasonable option to 
consider that the existing international maritime and oil spill 
conventions might be amendable to include the circumstances 
related to the events of offshore methane hydrates that could lead 
to risk and harms of the oceanic domains that those conventions 
currently protect. 
1.   OSPAR Convention (North East Atlantic Ocean) 
OSPAR stands for Oslo and Paris, and the acronym refers to 
the documentary history of the Convention in that it conjoined 
the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, “Oslo Convention” (1972), 
against at-sea dumping of wastes with the Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, “Paris 
Convention” (1974), against land-based sea pollution and oil 
pollution.178  OSPAR was founded under Article 197 of UNCLOS 
for global and regional cooperation.179 
OSPAR requires the Contacting Parties to take all possible 
steps to prevent and eliminate pollution to protect the maritime 
area.180  OSPAR requires the Contracting States to adopt 
programs and measures and to cross-harmonize their policies.181  
OSPAR states that nothing in OSPAR is to be taken to prevent 
Contracting States from undertaking more stringent measures 
than that required within OSPAR, both substantively and 
 
 177. For example, OSPAR’s Annex III addresses novel concerns related to CCS 
events. Id. at Annex III. The Barcelona Convention’s Offshore Protocol 
addresses offshore exploitation events more directly. Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean, adopted June 10, 1995, 1102 U.N.T.S. 27 [hereinafter Barcelona 
Convention] (entered into force July 9, 2004). 
 178. OSPAR supra note 176. 
 179. Id. at pmbl. See discussion on UNCLOS supra Part III(A)(1). 
 180. OSPAR supra note 176, at art. 2(1)(a). 
 181. Id. at art. 2(1)(b). 
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procedurally, to protect the maritime area.182  OSPAR requires 
application of both the polluter pays principle183 and the 
precautionary principle184 in the design of the program and 
measures to be adopted by the Contacting Parties. 
OSPAR mandates the best available techniques and the best 
environmental practices.185  The term “best available techniques” 
requires the use of the latest stage of development or state of the 
art processes or methods of operation.186  Economic feasibility is 
to be taken in account when determining the best available 
technique.187  The best available technique should be based on 
those recently successful comparable processes or methods of 
operation and up-to-date technological advances and changes in 
scientific knowledge and understanding.188  Given the inputs of 
economic feasibility, advancing science and newly successful 
comparable processes and methods, the best available techniques 
should be expected to change over time.189 
The phrase of ‘“best environmental practices’ means the 
application of the most appropriate combination of controls and 
strategies.”190  In developing the combination of measures, seven 
key factors are taken into consideration.191  The environmental 
hazard of the product and its production is considered.192  The 
social and economic implications of the measures should be 
integrated with the analysis.193  The potential for substitution 
and the scale of use should both be considered, as well as the 
potential environmental benefit or penalty of substitute.194  
Advances in scientific knowledge and understanding should be 
 
 182. Id. at art. 2(5). 
 183. Id. at art. 2(2)(b). 
 184. Id. at art. 2(2)(a). 
 185. Id. at art. 2(3)(b)(i). See id. at Annex III, art. 2 (explicit requirements for 
offshore sources). 
 186. OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 2. 
 187. Id. at Appendix I, § 2(c). 
 188. OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 2(a), (b). 
 189. Id. at Appendix I, § 3. 
 190. Id. at Appendix I, § 6. 
 191. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(a)-(g). 
 192. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(a). 
 193. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(g). 
 194. OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 7(b)-(d). 
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taken into account.195  Finally, the time limits for implementation 
of the measures should be considered.196 
The Contracting Parties are required to undertake all 
possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution from offshore 
sources, as guided by the OSPAR’s Annex III.197  “Offshore 
sources” are defined to include both offshore installations and 
offshore pipelines.198  An offshore installation is any “man-made 
structure, plant or vessel or parts thereof, whether floating or 
fixed to the seabed, placed within the maritime area for the 
purpose of offshore activities.”199  Pollution is defined as 
“introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy into the maritime area which results, or is likely to result, 
in hazards to human health, harm to living resources, and marine 
ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other 
legitimate uses of the sea.”200  However, vessels and aircrafts, 
and wastes therefrom, are exempt from inclusion under offshore 
sources.201  Vessels include any water-borne crafts, including “air-
cushion craft, floating craft whether self-propelled or not, and 
other man-made structures in the maritime area,” but excludes 
offshore installations.202 The critical definition is that of offshore 
activities: those activities undertaken for “exploration, appraisal 
or exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons.”203 
All potential discharges or emissions from the offshore 
installations and activities must be authorized and regulated by 
“competent authorities of the Contacting Parties.”204  Accidental 
venting or seeping of methane is not considered dumping, as 
dumping requires the deliberate act of disposal.205  Thus, 
accidental venting and seeping of methane is not regulated under 
 
 195. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(e). 
 196. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(f). 
 197. Id. at art. 5. 
 198. Id. at art. 1(k). 
 199. Id. at art. 1(l). 
 200. OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 1(d). 
 201. Id. at Annex III, art. 1(a)-(b). 
 202. Id. at art. 1(n). 
 203. Id. at art. 1(j). 
 204. Id. at Annex III, art. 4(1). 
 205. Id. at art. 1(f)(i)-(ii). 
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Annex III’s Article 3.206  Thus, the exclusion of weather and other 
cause-based force majeure does not apply to accidental venting 
and seeping, unless so granted under the domestic laws of the 
Contracting State.207 
OSPAR Annex III has already addressed the offshore 
sequestration of carbon dioxide, in that such carbon dioxide is not 
considered a dumping of waste for OSPAR.208  So, offshore 
sources of pollution basically arise from offshore installations, 
vessels, and pipelines associated with the exploration, appraisal 
or exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons (such as 
methane from offshore methane hydrate deposits). If the 
development of methane hydrate projects offers risks of harm and 
hazards from offshore installations that may potentially emit 
pollution, then OSPAR’s Contracting Parties would be obligated 
to prevent and eliminate hazards to human health, harm to living 
resources, and marine ecosystems from those potential methane 
hydrate projects. 
2.   Bonn Agreement (North Sea) 
The Bonn Agreement covers the North Sea and attempts to 
protect it from pollution by oil and other harmful substances.209  
The Agreement is fairly brief and leaves out much in the way of 
detail, as opposed to the details seen in OSPAR or in the 
Barcelona Convention.210  The Agreement serves primarily to 
coordinate national level efforts to respond to specific pollution 
events.211  Additionally, the Bonn Agreement coordinates within 
the OSPAR Convention’s shadow. 
The Agreement is to be invoked whenever a Contracting 
Party is presented with either the actual presence or the 
 
 206. Compare OSPAR supra note 176, at Annex III, art. 3(2)., with id. at 
Annex III, art. 4(1). 
 207. Id. at Annex III art. 4(2), (6). 
 208. Id. at Annex III art. 3(3)(a)-(d). 
 209. Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea 
by Oil and Other Harmful Substances, Sept. 13, 1983, 1984 O.J. (L 188) 9 
[hereinafter Bonn Agreement]. 
 210. See infra Part III(B)(3). 
 211. See Bonn Agreement, supra note 209. 
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prospective presence of oil or other harmful substances.212  The 
phrases “oil” and “harmful substances” are not defined nor 
detailed within the Agreement. 
The Agreement was not intended to alter in any form the 
underlying laws or civil liability rules that affect the prevention 
and combat of marine pollution.213  While the Agreement itself 
coordinates international action and facilitates cost-recovery 
between the Contracting Parties,214 nothing in the Agreement 
limits further pursuit by the Contracting Parties against third 
parties.215 
Where the Bonn Agreement lacks substantive details, its 
affiliated Manual provides some details.216  The chapter 
addressing oil pollution clearly is focused on persistent crude oils 
and liquid petroleums.217  Natural gas and methane are 
addressed as flammable and exploding gases within the chapter 
on hazardous materials; however the operatic paradigm is vessel-
transported gases.218  Hazardous chemicals are sorted into four 
classes: evaporators, floaters, dissolvers, and sinkers.219  
Evaporators are sub-sorted into three response modes: toxic gas 
cloud, toxic and explosive gas cloud, and explosive gas cloud.220 
Methane is listed as being both a health risk gas, for 
distances within 200 meters of the gas cloud, and as an explosion 
risk for distances within 200 meters of the gas cloud.221 
 
 212. Id. at art. 1(1). 
 213. Id. at art. 8(1). 
 214. Id. at arts. 9-10. 
 215. Id. at art. 11. 
 216. BONN AGREEMENT SECRETARIAT, BONN AGREEMENT COUNTER POLLUTION 
MANUAL, available at 
http://www.bonnagreement.org/site/assets/files/3946/bonn_agreement_counter_p
ollution_manual.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2KXM-5NN5 [hereinafter 
COUNTER POLLUTION MANUAL].
 
 217. See COUNTER POLLUTION MANUAL, supra note 216, at ch. 22 (the 
frequency and dominant use of the phrase “oil slick” to describe oil pollution). 
 218. See id. at ch. 26 (specifically, the discussion on how harmful substances 
leak from vessels). 
 219. Id. at ch. 26, § 1.4. 
 220. Id. at ch. 26, § 1.8. 
 221. Id. at Annex I (“Intervention on Gases and Evaporators: Card Number 
F1.1, F1.2, F1.3”). It is important to recall that the risk stated therein is related 
to leaks of methane from LNG-type containers at sea, not methane vented or 
leaked from the ocean at any low or high rate. 
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It is perhaps noteworthy that the development of offshore 
windmill farms has been included within the coverage of the 
Bonn Agreement.222  The installations associated with offshore 
windfarms are seen as novel risks for shipping and the 
installations could also complicate oil pollution recovery and 
abatement efforts.223  To the extent that methane hydrate 
projects are foreseen in the North Seas area, it would probably be 
reasonable to assume that a similar chapter might be drafted to 
take the particular harms and hazards of subsea methane 
extraction into the greater Bonn Agreement framework. 
3.   Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea) 
The Barcelona Convention and its associated documents are 
designed to provide protection to the Mediterranean both within 
and without the EU.224  It applied general concepts of 
transboundary coordination and of monitoring.225 
Pollution is defined as “the introduction by man, [both] 
directly and indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment” that could cause a variety of harms to both the 
marine environment and human use and enjoyment thereof.226 
The Barcelona Convention implements several key 
environmental law policies. It requires the application of the 
precautionary principle: a lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures.227  
All appropriate means should be undertaken to preserve 
biological diversity.228  This implementation of the precautionary 
principle balances the prevention of environmental degradation 
against the costs-effectiveness of such measures.229  The best 
available techniques and the best environmental practices are 
called for within the Convention;230 this clarifies the 
 
 222. See id. at ch 8. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177. 
 225. Id. at arts. 9-12. 
 226. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 2(a). 
 227. Id. at art. 4(3). 
 228. Id. at art. 10. 
 229. Id. at art. 4(3)(a). 
 230. Id. at art. 4(4)(b). 
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precautionary principle, but also requires data sharing among 
both competent authorities and operators. Finally, the means to 
be undertaken are to reflect the reality of the social, economic, 
and technological conditions of the signatories.231 
While the Convention calls for early implementation of 
potentially effective measures, it constrains its call to cost 
effective socially balanced measures; it does not call for any and 
all measures at all costs. 
The Convention applies the polluter pays principle.232  The 
costs of pollution are to be borne by those individuals that 
introduce the pollution to the environment.233  The Convention 
calls for the contracting parties to formulate and adopt 
appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of 
liability and compensation resulting from harms to the 
Mediterranean region.234 
The Convention requires the signatories to take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate and remediate pollution from 
the “exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the 
seabed and its subsoil.”235  These requirements make no 
reference to hydrocarbons, instead they apply to any and all 
minerals, including hydrocarbons, and potentially methane 
hydrates. 
The Convention expands the concepts from the EU’s EIA 
Directive to the broader Mediterranean region.236  Functionally, 
the Convention supports the development and adoption of 
Protocols to expand, and details the objectives of the 
Convention.237  For the purposes of this article, the most 
important protocol to the Convention is the “Offshore Protocol.”238 
 
 231. Id. at art. 4(4)(b). 
 232. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 4(3)(b). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at art. 12. 
 235. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 7. 
 236. Id. at art. 4(3)(c). 
 237. Id. at arts. 21, 22. 
 238. Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution 
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the 
Seabed and Its Subsoil, Oct. 14, 1994, 13 I.L.M. 976 [hereinafter Offshore 
Protocol]. 
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The stated goal of the Protocol is: “[t]he Parties shall take, 
individually or through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, all 
appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat and control 
pollution in the Protocol Area resulting from activities, inter alia, 
by ensuring that the best available techniques, environmentally 
effective and economically appropriate, are used for this 
purpose.”239 
The Protocol does not designate a rule of civil liability, but 
requires that such be employed by the signatories to ensure that 
the polluter pays, i.e. the operator, and the polluter pays prompt 
and adequate compensation.240  Also, the Protocol requires each 
signatory to ensure sanctions exist to punish violators; the 
character of the requirements appear to be more regulatory than 
civil liability in design: “[e]ach Party shall prescribe sanctions to 
be imposed for breach of obligations arising out of this Protocol, or 
for non-observance of the national laws or regulations 
implementing this Protocol, or for non-fulfillment of the specific 
conditions attached to the authorization.”241 
Additionally, the Protocol requires the operators to maintain 
insurance or other financial securities to ensure that the 
problems of insolvency do not arise at the time of 
compensation.242 The Protocol provides for certain limited 
applications of force majeure and certain public welfare 
justifications.243  But those exceptions are terminated if “intent to 
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage will 
probably result.”244 
Methane hydrate projects broadly appear to qualify for 
regulation under the Offshore Protocol. “Activities” are defined to 
include scientific activities, exploration activities, and 
exploitation activities that would include the development and 
production stages of a methane hydrate project, but apparently 
not the abandonment and sequestration period.245  Removal of 
 
 239. Id. at art. 3(1). 
 240. Id. at art. 27(1), (2)(a). 
 241. Id. at art. 7. 
 242. Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at art. 27(2)(b). 
 243. Id. at art. 14(1)(a). 
 244. Id. at art. 14(2). 
 245. Id. at art. 1(d). 
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Installations, otherwise known as sequestration and 
abandonment within oil and gas, are defined and addressed 
within the Protocol;246 similar EIA and authorizations 
requirements are found.247  Installations are defined as floating, 
mobile, or fixed; they include drilling units, production units, 
storage units, and loading and transporting units.248  Operators 
include both those authorized or licensed to operate offshore 
facilities or those in de facto control of such facilities.249  Article 5 
of the Protocol essentially requires the performance of an EIA, 
and strictly does so for EU waters.250 
The Offshore Protocol does not list methane or natural gas as 
“oil.”251  Oil is defined as “petroleum in any form including crude 
oil, fuel oil, oily sludge, oil refuse and refined products.”252  Crude 
oils, and various refinery products, are listed as harmful or 
noxious substances.253  But, the Protocol integrates the definition 
of pollution from the Convention; methane or natural gas might 
qualify as a form of a substance that could be deleterious to the 
environment.254  Additionally, the venting or seeping of methane 
into the water column may be seen as adding energy, and thus 
qualify as pollution in that sense.255 
The Protocol addresses both the support of developing 
countries within the region, and the support of transboundary 
concerns.256 
 
 246. Id. at art. 20. 
 247. Id. at art. 20(1)-(2). 
 248. Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at art. 1(f)(i)-(v). 
 249. Id. at art. 1(g)(i)-(ii). A literal reading suggests that even non-normal 
personnel might be included within this scope; e.g. a pirate or terrorist of an 
offshore facility might be classified as a de facto operator. 
 250. Id. at art. 5. 
 251. Id. at art. 1(l). See id. at Annex V, App. But, the Appendix title carries a 
footnote that states, “the list of oils should not necessarily be considered as 
exhaustive.” Nevertheless, nothing in the list, or in the nomenclature of oil and 
refining, suggests that methane should be included within the category of oil 
under the Protocol. 
 252. Id. at art. 1(l). 
 253. Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at Annex I., Part A(6). 
 254. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 2(a). 
 255. See id. 
 256. Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at arts. 24, 26. 
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4.   Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea) 
The Helsinki Convention serves a similar role to OSPAR and 
the Barcelona Convention: to protect a marine region from 
environmental harms.257  Overall, the Helsinki Convention is 
drafted similarly to other regional marine conventions. 
The Helenski Convention carries the same definition of 
pollution as seen in other regional marine documents, the 
“introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy into the sea . . . which are liable to create hazards to 
human health, to harm living resources and marine 
ecosystems.”258  The Convention has a similar definition of 
dumping as OSPAR.259  Oil is narrowly defined as oils, refinery 
products, or sludge260; definitely exclusive of natural gas or 
methane. Harmful substance is defined as any substance that 
could cause marine pollution.261 
The Helsinki Convention mandates that the Contracting 
Parties take all appropriate legislative, administrative, or other 
relevant measures to prevent and eliminate pollution in the 
region.262  The Convention requires the application of the 
precautionary principle.263  It requires the application of the best 
available technology264 and of the best environmental practice.265  
Specifically, the Contracting Parties are required to apply the 
polluter pays principle.266  The Convention requires the 
prevention of the introduction of harmful substances267 and 
 
 257. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea Area, adopted Apr. 9, 1992, 1507 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Helsinki 
Convention] (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000). 
 258. Id. at art. 2(1). 
 259. See id. at art. 2(4); compare id. at art. 2(4)(a), with OSPAR, supra note 
171, at art. 1(f). 
 260. Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at art. 2(6). 
 261. Id. at art. 2(7). Methane, hydrogen, or even potentially freshwater, or 
mud might qualify. 
 262. Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at art. 3(1). 
 263. Id. at art. 3(2). 
 264. Id. at art. 3(3). 
 265. Id. at art. 3(3). 
 266. Id. at art. 3(4). 
 267. Id. at art. 5. 
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pollution from ships,268 including waste dumping.269  The 
Convention requires the Contracting Parties to take all 
appropriate action to conserve natural habitats and biological 
diversity and to protect ecological processes.270  Broadly speaking, 
the Helsinki Convention is well aligned with both other regional 
marine conventions and UN environmental policies. 
The exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil 
require both the prevention of pollution and the precautionary 
preparation to ensure adequate preparedness is maintained in 
order to provide immediate action to respond to accidental 
pollution when it occurs.271  Annex VI to the Convention provides 
additional guidelines for offshore oil and gas activities.272  
Offshore activity is defined to be any exploration or exploitation 
of oil and gas by either fixed or floating installations.273  An 
offshore unit is any particular installation engaged in oil or gas 
exploration, exploitation or production activities, including 
transportation.274  EIAs are required before any licensing can 
occur within the marine region.275  A compositional analysis of 
the deposit zone, its sediments, hydrocarbon content, and 
potentially hazardous substances or hazards should be among the 
items investigated during the EIA assessment.276  On-going and 
subsequent studies should be made on the deposit zone to ensure 
the prevention of pollution and the emission of harmful 
substances.277  Finally, each offshore unit should have a pollution 
emergency plan to ensure quick and appropriate responses to 
accidents.278 
 
 268. Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at art. 8. 
 269. Id. at art. 11. 
 270. Id. at art. 15. 
 271. Id. at art. 12, § 1. 
 272. Id. at Annex VI. 
 273. Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 1, § 1. 
 274. Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at Annex VI, Regulation 1, § 2. 
 275. Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 3, § 1. 
 276. Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at Annex VI, Regulation 3, § 2(d). 
 277. Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 3, §§ 3, 4. 
 278. Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 7. 
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5. Risk Governance Under the Regional Marine 
Conventions 
The regional marine conventions are very similar in design 
with regards to risk governance. While they are all high level 
international agreements that leave specific implementation to 
the signatory states, the conventions provide clear guidance on 
the types of governance needed to both attain the policy goals and 
to enable coordination across parties. 
They all call for the contracting states to implement liability 
rules that function in harmony with the polluter pays principle. 
The polluter pays principle does not provide for a duty of care that 
would indemnify tortfeasors as a rule of negligence would. The 
polluter pays principle at its core would be opposed to the idea 
that victims of environmental pollution would need to bear the 
costs of damage simply because the tortfeasor operated 
reasonably; the quintessence of the polluter pays principle is that 
the polluter always pays; this is the spirit of the rule of strict 
liability. The polluter pays principle could be implemented in 
regulations, but the overall spirit that the victims are not to 
blame and not to pay would remain the same. 
There is clearly support within the conventions for the use of 
regulations to govern risk. There are many items to be achieved 
and confirmed, and it would be very inefficient to allow private 
civil liability claims to pursue that level of investigation; 
additionally, no rule of civil liability would be able to enforce or 
perform those investigations until an actionable cause arose, 
thus, the purpose and function to provide on-going safety 
monitoring would be defeated. A regulatory body would be far 
better suited to the needs of on-going monitoring and procedural 
assurances. 
Another aspect is that the conventions require an 
undertaking of active steps to prevent and eliminate pollution; 
again, a regulatory body could act daily and currently without the 
need of actionable causes so long as the regulations receive a 
sufficient delegation of power to act. 
Further, the conventions heavily discuss permits and 
licensing, which remains the exclusive territory of regulatory 
bodies. 
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There are also many scientific and other specialized 
knowledge sets required to implement the obligation of the 
conventions. It would be more efficient to train and maintain a 
dedicated pool of experts instead of the stop and start of civil 
liability lawsuits. 
In conclusion, the conventions set high standards and 
provide a framework for contracting states to base their domestic 
enactments upon. Both regulations and rules of civil liability are 
encouraged, but it would appear that more attention has been 
given to the development of the regulatory framework. If a rule of 
civil liability were employed by a contracting state, it would likely 
need to be a rule of strict liability. 
C.   International Oil Spill Conventions 
This section follows the discussion on the history, 
paradigmatic aims, and risk governance mechanisms as 
presented in the introduction in Section B, supra. The oil spill 
conventions mirror the regional marine conventions in many 
ways, key is their common pre-occupation on surface oil spills, 
but they operate beyond regional limits. 
The international oil spill conventions address liability. They 
call for the implementation of strict liability regimes; limited 
defences of force majeure-type events and limited defences from 
grossly or recklessly negligent victims are also provided. 
The conventions also assume that many procedural aspects of 
oil pollution prevention, detection, and remediation can be 
coordinated internationally. It is hard to imagine how that might 
be coordinated without manifestations tantamount to regulations. 
Indeed, a common regulatory body, the International Maritime 
Organization under the UN, oversees several of these 
conventions. 
Thus, the international oil spill conventions are broadly in 
alignment with the recommendations of Section 2. 
1.   A Brief History of Marine Oil Spill Conventions 
The current oil spill regimes were developed primarily as a 
reaction to several significant spills, all from seagoing vessels. 
The paradigm of oil spills as currently understood by existing oil 
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spill regimes is the broken tanker or leaking crude oil well in 
shallow waters paradigm.279  That the laws and conventions 
responding to catastrophic oil spills respond primarily to this 
paradigm made practical sense. Historically, this type of oil 
spillage in shallow waters has been the most common type of 
offshore-based oil spill, as documented in governmental 
records.280  A recent Congressional Research Service report 
documented that only approximately one percent of all oil spill 
incidents were from extraction activities.281 
The original spill of concern was the Torrey Canyon spill of 
1967,282 which contaminated eighty kilometers (km) of French 
coastlines and 190 km of Cornish shorelines in the United 
Kingdom. This spill leaked 119,000 tons of crude oil into the 
 
 279. The marine oil spill paradigm assumes that crude oil is spilled near or at 
the ocean surface, for the oil to collect at the surface, or very near the surface, 
and that the oil is likely to be spilled sufficiently close to shore to quickly 
threaten the shoreline and coastal areas with persistent crude oil 
contamination. The paradigm assumes that only certain heavy crudes will yield 
persistent crude contamination removing lighter fuels, such as gasoline or 
natural gas, from substantial focus of the damages. 
 280. This is not to say that offshore well-based leaks were unknown; however, 
these well-based catastrophes were “the exceptions that proved the rule” until 
recently. Two well-known examples are the Union Oil event offshore Santa 
Barbara, CA, and the Ixtoc event offshore the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico. 
Both of these events pre-date the 1990 Oil Pollution Act and the International 
Convention of 1992. The Santa Barbara offshore blowout and seeps began on 
January 28, 1969. Keith C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara 
Oil Spill: A Retrospective, UNIV. OF CAL. SANTA BARBARA (2001), http://www2. 
bren.ucsb.edu/~dhardy/1969_Santa_Barbara_Oil_Spill/Essays.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/KX79-NFWZ. It was the third largest oil leak in U.S. history, 
ranked behind only the BP Macondo explosion and the Exxon Valdez shipwreck. 
The oil leak occurred in only fifty-seven meters of water, so the effects were 
largely similar to a vessel leak. The Ixtoc was an offshore drilling catastrophe 
that began on June 3, 1979. Tim Johnson, Mexico’s Ixtoc 1 Oil Spill a Distant 
Mirror to BP Disaster, SEATTLE TIMES (May 22, 2010), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/mexicos-ixtoc-1-oil-spill-a-distant-
mirror-to-bp-disaster/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y8VW-WU9P. It too was in 
fifty meters of water, so its leak, while massive and long lasting, functionally 
resembled a massive vessel leak in many ways. 
 281. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL SPILLS IN US 
COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 
(2010). 
 282. Michael G. Faure & Hui Wang, The International Regimes for the 
Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. CMTY. 
& INT’L ENVTL. L. 242, 242 (2003). 
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sea.283  That spill resulted in several legal regimes and 
conventions: the Civil Liability Convention of 1969,284 the Fund 
Convention,285 the Tanker Owners’ Voluntary Agreement 
concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP),286 and the 
Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability 
for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL).287 
These four conventions were revealed for their weaknesses 
under the Amoco Cadiz spill of 1978. The Amoco Cadiz spilled 
223,000 tons of crude oil onto the shores of Brittany, France, 
nearly double the amount spilled in the earlier Torrey Canyon 
spill. That accident led to updates to the Civil Liability 
Convention of 1969/1992 (CLC) and the Fund Convention.288  The 
updates were entitled the “Protocols.”  The two protocols were the 
Protocol of 1984 to amend the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, and the Protocol of 1984 
to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, 
1971.289 
 
 283. Oil Tanker Spill Statistics 2013, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N 
LTD., http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/VK2X-Y7FR. 
 284. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC], available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5AGS-EGE3. The CLC was updated in 1992, and is still 
currently in force. See also International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989. 
 285. International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to Amend the 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted Nov. 27, 1992, 1953 U.N.T.S. 
373 [hereinafter Fund Convention] (entered into force May 30, 1996). 
 286. TOVALOP was originally intended as a stop-gap measure by the owners 
and operators of oil-transporting vessels until the adoption of the CLC in 1975. 
Since February 20, 1997, TOVALOP is no longer operational as an industrial 
convention. See History of ITOPF, ITOPF, 
http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/Company_Lit/HistoryofITOPF.p
df (last visited Oct. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y6P8-J6RR. 
 287. CRISTAL was originally intended as a stop-gap measure by the 
producers and refiners of petroleum until the adoption of the Fund Convention 
in 1975. Since February 20, 1997, CRISTAL is no longer operational. See id. 
 288. See infra Part III(C)(2). 
 289. See Faure & Wang, supra note 282, at 245. 
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Despite the public support for the international conventions, 
the U.S. did not join as a signatory to those conventions. After the 
Exxon Valdez spill of 1989, again a large sea-going vessel leak,290 
the U.S. finally responded with the enactment of the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 (OPA).291  In responding to the Exxon Valdez 
incident, OPA primarily targeted the shipment of oil in tankers 
and the types of harm caused by those previous spills discussed 
herein. Global awareness to the Exxon Valdez spill resulted in 
additional updates to the CLC and Fund Convention; those 
updates are known as the 1992 Conventions.292 
The OPA does apply to offshore oil and gas facilities, and 
thus would now apply in some contexts to offshore methane 
hydrate facilities; the mineral lessee is the deemed tortfeasor, 
and the liability for offshore facilities is distinct from other 
sources of oil pollution. 293  The OPA also provides a “limited 
liability” version of strict liability due to certain caps placed on 
the maximum amount of assessable damages.294  However, OPA 
is substantively distinguishable from several important sections 
of the CLC and Fund Convention, so their legal responses to oil 
spills are significantly different from each other.295 
There are doubts on the ability of the crude oil spill regimes 
to address major spills from deep-sea wells, such as the BP 
Deepwater Horizon, and by extension, methane hydrate 
extraction projects. An extensive review and critique of the 
 
 290. Interestingly, the Exxon Valdez spill only released 37,000 tons of crude 
oil, significantly less than the earlier volumes, 223,000 tons for the Amoco Cadiz 
and 119,000 tons at the Torrey Canyon spill, which drove reform efforts in 
Europe. 
 291. For more information on OPA, see infra Part III(E)(3). 
 292. See discussion on CLC, infra Part II(B). 
 293. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(C) (2012) (defining “responsible party” ). See also 
id. § 2704(a)(3) (providing the limitations on liability for “offshore facility”). 
 294. OPA provides for routine strict liability up to certain maximum limits 
and below those limits there are no “duty of care” protections for the tortfeasor. 
See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). The types of damages are limited to certain categories 
of damages. See id. § 2702(b)(2). And there are defenses of force majeure, see id. 
§ 2703(a), and limited defenses of contributory gross negligence on the part of 
the victims, see id. § 2703(b). 
 295. See relevant discussions, infra Part III(C). 
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overall liability system of U.S. oil spill law has recently been 
provided by Faure and Wang.296 
2.   Civil Liability Convention of 1969/1992 
The CLC derives from an earlier sequence of agreements 
originally designed to respond to crude oil spills from vessels and 
boats and was later extended to include other hazardous 
substances.297  It would not likely apply to damages resultant 
from methane hydrate harms, but it is guiding in its approach to 
liability management. 
The CLC defines oil as “any persistent hydrocarbon,” and 
provides examples of crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil, and lubricating 
oil.298  However, nothing in this definition appears to include 
methane or any of the lighter alkanes that might be found in 
methane hydrate deposits. Pollution damage is defined as, “loss 
or damage outside the ship by contamination resulting from the 
escape or discharge of oil from the ship.”299  While the definition 
provides extensions of damage to include the environment, it does 
not appear to include any pollution caused by forces or substances 
other than oil. Because the CLC provides exclusively for pollution 
damage within the territories of the Contracting States,300 it 
 
 296. Michael G. Faure & Hui Wang, Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Marine Pollution - Lessons to Be Learned for Offshore Oil Spills, 8 OIL, GAS & 
ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE 1 (2010). 
 297. CLC, supra note 284. The CLC is still in force as updated by the CLC of 
1992. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC), INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/R6VW-MMZS. See also International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 
2989; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 
2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL]. The latter, when combined with 
its 1978 Annex, creates MARPOL. 
 298. CLC, supra note 284, at art. I(5). For the additional language defining 
crude oil and fuel oil, see Fund Convention, supra note 285 at art. I(3)(a), (b). 
Crude oils are defined as liquid hydrocarbons, apparently in distinguishing 
them from gases, and fuel oils are heavy distillates or residues. Neither 
definitional refinement appears to include any light alkanes, especially not 
methane. 
 299. CLC, supra note 284, at art. I(6)(a). 
 300. Id. at art. II(a). 
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would be difficult to connect the hazards and harms of methane 
hydrates to the CLC. 
The owner of a ship is to be held liable for any pollution 
damage caused or associated with that ship.301  Owner’s liability 
is extinguished if: (i) damage resulted from war or hostilities,302 
(ii) damage resulted from exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible 
natural phenomena,303 (iii) “wholly caused by” undertaking by a 
third party’s act or omission,304 (iv) caused by Governmental 
negligence or wrongful act,305 (v) and if in partial or whole 
causation by the victim of the pollution damage.306  As such, the 
rule employed is essentially a rule of strict liability. 
Liability is limited to a fixed amount determined by the 
tonnage of the ship.307  However, that limit to liability is not 
preserved if the act that resulted in pollution was committed with 
the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with the 
knowledge that it would probably result in pollution damage.308  
The availability of limited liability is predicated on the 
establishment of a fund capable of making such payments in 
presentation to the court before which liabilities are 
established.309  Expenses undertaken by the owner to prevent or 
remediate the pollution damage are equally ranked for 
 
 301. Id. at art. III(1). See also id. at art. IV (describing where that liability is 
extended to joint and severable liability if multiple ships are involved in joint 
causation of pollution damage). 
 302. CLC, supra note 284, at art. III(2)(a). 
 303. Id. at art. III(2)(a). 
 304. Id. at art. III(2)(b). 
 305. Id. at art. III(2)(c). 
 306. Id. at art. III(3). If the victim is wholly and solely responsible for the acts 
that caused the pollution damage, then no liability attaches to the owner; if the 
victim is partially at cause, then the owner’s liability is limited to that extent 
covered by the victim. 
 307. The maximum amount of liability was set at 89,770,000 accounting units. 
Id. at art. V(1). The accounting unit is defined to be the Special Drawing Rights 
unit of the International Monetary Fund. See id. at art. V(9)(a). 
 308. CLC, supra note 284, at art. V(2). 
 309. Id. at art. V(3). See Fund Convention, supra note 285, for the details of 
the fund and its stewardship. It is because of the advancements in the funding 
under this Convention that other earlier funds, such as CRISTAL and 
TOVALOP, have since been abandoned or folded into the International Fund. 
See also WILLIAM TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AND ADMIRALTY LAW 454 
(Yvon Blais ed., 2002). 
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recompense under the fund with other pollution damage 
claims.310 
The assignment of liability under the CLC displays liability 
channeling to the owner, a form of strict liability in that no 
excuse of reasonable care is provided, multiple defenses to the 
strict liability rendering it close to a functional negligence rule, 
and that the idea of strict liability must be tempered with the 
recognition of limited liability. 
As the primary focus of the “Civil Liability Convention” is on 
civil liability, its text is primarily focused on establishing strict 
liability as the agreed to rule and the means of coordinating civil 
liability across affected jurisdictions.311 
3. International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 
MARPOL312 was designed to address marine pollution and 
contamination from crude oil and noxious liquids. MARPOL 
follows the CLC in establishing strict liability for accidental 
emissions. But, because exploitation of subsea minerals is exempt 
from MARPOL, because methane is excluded from consideration 
as an oil, and because methane is not a defined liquid or noxious 
liquid, MARPOL would not likely apply to methane hydrate 
projects. However, methane might qualify as a hazardous 
substance, and if discharged apart from the “exploration, 
exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral 
resources,” then MARPOL might be applicable.313 
MARPOL’s definition of harmful substances is very broad; if 
the substance might harm human life, marine life or the local 
ecology, then it is a harmful substance, and therefore, methane 
might qualify as a harmful substance.314 
 
 310. CLC, supra note 284, at art. V(8). 
 311. There is insufficient material to draw conclusions on regulations. 
 312. MARPOL, supra note 297. 
 313. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 21. 
 314. Id. at art. 2(2) (“Harmful substance means any substance which, if 
introduced into the sea, is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm 
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other 
legitimate uses of the sea, and includes any substance subject to control by the 
present Convention.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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MARPOL could apply to offshore facilities. Oil tanker is 
defined as a ship that primarily carries oil;315 similarly, a 
combination carrier is a ship designed to carry a combination of 
oil and solid freight.316  Furthermore, the regulation primarily 
applies to ships;317 but offshore structures engaged in the 
“exploration, exploitation and associated offshore processing of 
sea-bed mineral resources,” whether floating or fixed, will be 
treated as legally equivalent to ships of 400 tons gross tonnage.318  
Additionally, MARPOL’s definition of ships includes all sea-going 
vessels and platforms that might be related to an offshore 
methane hydrate installation.319 
MARPOL defines discharge as the release by any cause of 
harmful substances from a ship into the oceanic environment;320 
however, events arising from the “exploration, exploitation and 
associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources,” are 
exempted from the definition of discharge.321  Thus, to the extent 
that methane hydrates or methane were held to be harmful 
substances, if they were released, e.g. vented or seeped, from 
activities associated with a methane hydrate project, then that 
situation would not be a discharge and not a reportable incident 
of a discharge of harmful substances.322 
Annex I of MARPOL 73/78,323 hereinafter Annex I, provides 
extensive rules on the handling, disposal, and leaking of oil from 
ships and platforms. However, it would not apply to methane 
hydrate accidents. Annex I defines oil as “petroleum in any form 
including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products 
. . . and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes 
 
 315. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 1, § 4. 
 316. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 1, § 5. 
 317. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 2, § 1. 
 318. MARPOL, supra note 297, at Annex I, Regulation 21. 
 319. Id. at art. 2(4) (“Ship means a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in 
the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, 
submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 320. Id. at art. 2(3)(a). 
 321. Id. at art. 2(3)(b)(ii). 
 322. Id. at art. 2(6). 
 323. Id. at Annex I. 
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
2015] OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES 849 
 
the substances listed in appendix I to this Annex.”324  The listed 
chemicals at Appendix I include the classes of Asphalt solutions, 
Gasoline blending stocks, Gasolines, Oils, Jet Fuels, Distillates, 
Naphthas, and Gas Oils, but nowhere in the listings are light 
alkanes nor methane products.325  Thus, Annex I would not apply 
to the types of harms and hazards contemplated by this article. 
Annex II responds to noxious liquids other than oils.326  
Methane will not likely be present as a liquid in Nature, nor is it 
technically a liquid within hydrate structures;327 it would also not 
qualify under the Annex II definition of liquid.328  Thus, the 
concerns on noxious liquids do not relate to the harms and 
hazards of methane hydrate projects. 
4. International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation 
(OPRC) 
The 1990 OPRC focuses on the actual events and incidents of 
oil pollution.329  The focus, though, is tightly on oil. Oil is defined 
as “petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil 
refuse and refined products;” thus methane hydrates and 
methane are excluded from the category of oil.330  Oil pollution 
incidents are defined as situations wherein oil is discharged,331 
thus methane hydrate events would not normally lead to an oil 
pollution incident. 
 
 324. MARPOL, supra note 297, at Annex I, Regulation 1, § 1. 
 325. Id. at Annex I, Appendix I. 
 326. Id. at Annex II. 
 327. For a more complete discussion on the chemistry of methane hydrates, see 
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, § 2. 
 328. “Liquid substances are those having a vapour pressure not exceeding 2.8 
kp/cm2 at a temperature of 37.88C” (internal quotations omitted). MARPOL, 
supra note 297, at Annex II, Reg. 1, § 5. 
 329. “Parties undertake, individually or jointly, to take all appropriate 
measures in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and the Annex 
thereto to prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident.”  1990 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 51, art. 1 [hereinafter OPRC]. 
 330. Id. at art. 2(1). 
 331. Id. at art. 2(2). 
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However, methane hydrate project installations might 
qualify as offshore units, which are defined to include offshore 
natural gas installations.332  And, the 2000 Protocol333 adopted 
the term hazardous and noxious substances, which could include 
methane and methane hydrates.334  Thus, it is feasible that the 
OPRC would apply to pollution incidents from methane hydrate 
projects under the 2000 Protocol, whereas it would not have 
found an oil pollution incident under the original OPRC. 
Should methane hydrates qualify as hazardous and noxious 
substances, OPRC would require every nation engaged in 
methane hydrate activities to establish a national system for 
responding promptly and effectively to pollution incidents.335  The 
2000 Protocol requires extensive pre-planning and preparation 
for potential pollution incidents, and strongly encourages the 
cooperation of the Contracting Parties to coordinate where 
possible on response capability and research into precautionary 
technologies and strategies.336  But, for most countries in Europe 
and North America, the requirements are parallel to other 
similar commitments.337 
D.   Laws of the EU 
The laws of the EU are more recently drafted, on the whole, 
than their counterparts in the U.S. As such, many of them reflect 
more recent trends in legal theory. Generally speaking, the EU 
directives support the application of strict liability; this is in part 
 
 332. “Offshore unit means any fixed or floating offshore installation or 
structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities” 
(internal quotations omitted). Id. at art. 2(4). 
 333. Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution 
Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, Mar. 15, 2000, London 
[hereinafter 2000 Protocol]. 
 334. Id. at art. 2, § 2 (“Hazardous and noxious substances means any 
substance other than oil which, if introduced into the marine environment is 
likely to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine 
life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”). 
 335. 2000 Protocol, supra note 333, at art. 4(1). 
 336. See generally id. 
 337. The OPRC does not explicitly discuss liability beyond the recovery of 
costs to the parties; the assumption is liability is dealt within separate 
proceedings beyond this convention. 
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due to the direct enactment of the polluter pays principle into the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). 
The EU has a wide variety of legal instruments that address 
environmental protections and related industrial torts. An effort 
has been made to select those directives or frameworks more 
likely to be engaged in the governance of risks and hazards from 
offshore methane hydrate installations. The most relevant 
directives are the EIA and SEA Directives, the Offshore 
Directive, the CCS Directive, and the Marine Framework 
collection of directives. 
The EIA Directive and the SEA Directive provide for the 
cautious and public review of upcoming projects and plans that 
might substantially impact the environment.338  They call for 
exhaustive studies to be completed in advance of the granting of 
approvals or licenses, so that specific causes of harms or hazards 
could be addressed in full prior to the acceptance of such risks.339  
While not providing specific requirements on how to implement 
civil liability or regulatory governance beyond the collection and 
review of environmental precautionary data, by the very 
collection of that data they do provide for many cures that would 
otherwise befall both rules of civil liability and public regulation 
of offshore methane hydrate projects and of the policies and plans 
to facilitate their development. As such, they function as meta-
rules on the rules applicable to offshore methane hydrates. 340 
Several directives have been selected because they touch on 
the regulation and liabilities attending to industrial accidents. 
The ELD was selected due to its role in providing oversight of the 
legal issues related to environmental damages.341  The ELD 
extends legal protection to aspects of nature that might not 
otherwise be protected under more traditional rules of injury and 
damages. Seveso provides for the prevention and control of events 
surrounding industrial accidents.342 
 
 338. See infra Parts III(D)(1), III(D)(2).   
 339. See infra Part III(D)(3). 
 340. A review of the EU’s EIA and SEA Directives also provides some 
perspective on the U.S.’s NEPA, which is similar, but was drafted earlier. See 
infra Part III(E)(1).  
 341. See infra Part III(D)(3)(a).  
 342. See infra Part III(D)(3)(b).  
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The Offshore Directive provides for the regulation of offshore 
oil and gas installations.343  As such, to the extent that offshore 
methane hydrate installations would be viewed as a type of 
unconventional natural gas project, the Offshore Directive would 
apply to their development and operations. The Offshore 
Directive provides both broad and deep requirements on 
precautionary planning related to offshore hydrocarbon 
operations. But, a review of the Offshore Directive reveals that it 
is primarily focused on historical modes of offshore accidents and 
does not yet include provisions that would better address the 
needs of an offshore methane hydrate industry. 
The CCS Directive reflects the other half of the coin from the 
Offshore Directive, as it could regulate the injection of carbon 
dioxide into offshore reservoirs.344  As has been discussed, 
offshore methane hydrates can be extracted in conjunction with 
CCS injection activity; in fact, due to the economic uplifts from 
facilitating methane extraction and Kyoto Protocol concerns, most 
suggested commercialization studies have included some form of 
CCS-type injections in the extraction process. Similar ideas have 
been floated within the EU; for example, Germany’s SUGAR 
Projekt would seek to inject carbon dioxide into offshore methane 
hydrate reserves.345  As such, it is likely that within EU waters 
the CCS Directive would regulate the development of offshore 
methane hydrates. But, the CCS Directive, even if applicable, 
would address only a slice of the operations related to the 
development, production, and abandonment and sequestration of 
the methane hydrates. The CCS Directive would probably be 
most important, and most centrally applied, during the 
abandonment and sequestration phases, as it might govern long-
term liability and post-production ownership of the methane 
hydrate fields. 
 
 343. See infra Part III(D)(4).  
 344. See infra Part IV. In some ways, it is not unreasonable to imagine that a 
hypothetical Offshore Methane Hydrate Directive would be an amalgam of the 
Offshore Directive and the CCS Directive. 
 345. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 5.1. 
See SUGAR Project, GEOMAR, http://www.geomar.de/en/research/fb2/fb2-
mg/projects/sugar-2-phase/ (last updated Jan. 15, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3296-MQF8. 
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The Water and Marine Frameworks draw in a large number 
of marine, coastal, and riparian protecting directives, decisions, 
and regulations.346  They function in coordination to protect the 
biota and human communities that need their ecosystems and 
environments to continue to be healthy and vibrant.347  All 
marine projects, while still in the planning and pre-development 
stages, need to provide programs of measures to achieve and 
maintain good environmental status, and when the hydrates 
overlay transboundary marine ecosystems, plans for regional 
cooperation must also be provided. The various international 
regional marine conventions are called on by the Frameworks to 
extend this planning and cooperation. The Frameworks track a 
variety of hazardous activities, including chemicals transported 
through the water columns, to prevent accidental damages to 
those ecosystems. The Frameworks present a selection of known 
fragile environmental areas and endangered biota to specifically 
protect. However, while the presence of methane is known to 
affect marine biota in several substantial pathways, the marine 
locations and biota adjacent to those areas do not currently 
appear to be specifically protected under the Frameworks. 
Finally, the EU is fully engaged with the goals and 
obligations of the UNFCCC. As such, it has developed a 
Greenhouse Gas Mechanism to enable it and its Member States 
to set and coordinate greenhouse gas emissions targets.348  The 
methane that could directly be emitted and the resultant carbon 
dioxide from metabolized or combusted methane are both listed 
as greenhouse gases within the Kyoto Protocol, and are thus 
governed within the Greenhouse Gas Mechanism. 
1. The EIA Directive 
Two central directives guide the laws and regulations on 
environmental harms and hazards: the EIA349 Directive and the 
 
 346. See infra Parts III(D)(6), III(D)(6)(C).  
 347. See infra Parts III(D)(6), III(D)(6)(C).  
 348. See id. § 7. 
 349. Directive 2011/92, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private 
Projects on the Environment, 2011 O.J. (L 26) 1 [hereinafter EIA Directive]. The 
EIA Directive reflects the codification of the original Council Directive 
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SEA350 Directive. These two directives require the ex ante review 
of projects, programs, and plans that might in some manner have 
an impact on the environment. 
The EIA and SEA Directives are elements that are invoked 
in a wide array of EU laws; they are used to ensure that 
consistent review and forethought are applied to environmental 
issues across the EU and its Member States. In addition to their 
role as positive law within the EU matrix, the EIA and SEA 
provide foundational legal norms for similar review efforts within 
both EU Member States, and for countries and associations 
beyond the EU. As such, their influence is often guiding on 
activities at the earliest stage of drafting and development. 
The EIA Directive applies to any project, public or private in 
nature, prior to the issuance of a permit for the onset of the 
project’s development.351 A project includes the execution of 
construction projects (including installations) and “other 
interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape[,]” 
including extractive efforts such as mineral resources.352  The 
developer is the person held responsible for drafting the EIA 
report, and is the applicant who initiates a project by requesting 
authorization, or development consent, for the project.353 Member 
States may elect to apply the EIA to projects related to their 
national defense on a case-by-case basis.354  The EIA Directive 
allows projects that are designed through legislative processes 
and adopted by specific acts of national legislation to be exempt 
 
85/337/EEC and its subsequent amendments: Directives 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC, 
and 2009/31/EC. The EIA Directive is currently undergoing review for an 
amendment to streamline the procedures, and to improve cross member state 
consistency. See Review of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Directive, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/review.htm (last 
updated Aug. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y6LJ-8ZGA; see also 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain 
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, COM (2012) 628 final (Oct. 26, 
2012). 
 350. Directive 2001/42, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
June 2001 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes 
on the Environment, 2001 O.J. (L 197) 30 [hereinafter SEA Directive]. 
 351. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 1(1). 
 352. Id. at art. 1(2)(a). 
 353. Id. at art. 1(2)(b)-(c). 
 354. Id. at art. 1(3). 
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from the EIA Directive; the Directive holds out that similar due 
diligence reviews are assumed of the legislatures as guided by the 
EIA Directive.355  Member States are required to integrate the 
designs of the EIA Directive into their national laws to ensure 
that prior to consent for development, all projects likely to have 
significant effects are properly assessed.356 
a. Offshore Methane Hydrates Qualified 
Under Annex I 
Methane hydrates projects would require the completion of 
an EIA review. The EIA Directive provides two manners of 
determining when a project should be reviewed under this 
Directive. There is a specific list of project types that must 
complete an EIA review at Annex I; these reviews are not 
optional.357  There is a secondary list of activities at Annex II that 
may need review; Member States can either review those projects 
on a case-by-case basis or provide ex ante threshold guidelines.358 
Annex I has multiple activities that would characterize 
offshore methane hydrate projects. It is almost certain that a 
methane hydrate project would qualify as an Annex I project, as 
it per se qualifies under several listed categories and arguably 
could be included under several other Annex I categories. Or, 
depending on how the process of project development was 
managed and how the Member State(s) in question decide how to 
handle such a review process, there are potentially several 
different aspects of a methane hydrate project that might need 
their own EIA review procedures. 
So long as the methane hydrate project is designed to 
produce in excess of 500,000 m3 of methane daily,359 then the 
project would certainly qualify as an Article 4(1) - Annex I project 
 
 355. Id. at art. 1(4). 
 356. Id. at art. 2(1). 
 357. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 4(1). 
 358. Id. at art. 4(2)(a)-(b). 
 359. The equivalent of 17,700,000 cf/d (17,700 mcf/d). See Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=45&t=8 (last visited Dec. 1, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/5QXT-G7CK. 
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requiring a full EIA process.360 The methane extracted from 
methane hydrates is the same chemical as the term natural gas, 
thus methane extraction is per se natural gas extraction.361  It is 
fairly unlikely that methane hydrate reservoirs contain 
substantial quantities of petroleum as distinct from natural gas; 
to the extent that any hydrocarbon liquids are recovered, it is 
very reasonable to assume that they would fall below the “500 
tonnes/day” minimum requirement.362 
Several ancillary aspects of methane hydrate projects would 
also likely qualify under Annex I. To the extent that CCS 
technologies are engaged to offset the extract volumes of methane 
with carbon dioxide, the project would be a storage site pursuant 
to Directive 2009/31 (The CCS Directive).363  Depending on the 
location of the methane hydrate project and the gathering and 
transportation needs to move the methane and relate fluids from 
the wellsites to the platforms to onshore facilities, the project may 
qualify as a pipeline.364  Assuming that methane qualifies as 
natural gas and if the pipelines involved in its transport were 
wider than eighty centimeters (cm) and longer than forty km, 
then the pipelines of the project would qualify.365  If similar 
pipelines were utilized to transport carbon dioxide to the wellsites 
for sequestration, then those pipelines would also qualify under 
Annex I.366 
Methane hydrate projects could be characterized as an 
integrated chemical installation for the production of basic 
organic chemicals.367 Methane is an organic chemical; its 
extraction involves “chemical conversion processes” to convert 
 
 360. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 14. 
 361. For a discussion on the chemistry of methane hydrates and their 
methane-character, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at 
ch. 2, § 2. 
 362. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 14. For a discussion on the 
chemistry of methane hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra 
note 1, at ch. 2, § 2. 
 363. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 22. For a discussion on the 
nexus of CCS and methane hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, 
supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 5.1. 
 364. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 16. 
 365. Id. at Annex I, § 16(a). 
 366. Id. at Annex I, § 16(b). 
 367. Id. at Annex I, § 6(a). 
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methane hydrates to methane and other components.368  One 
would reasonably assume that the scale of investment required to 
construct methane hydrate projects presumes chemical product 
volumes sufficient to qualify as “on an industrial scale.”369  To the 
extent that the project is engaged in the conversion of the 
methane and water volumes into steam and hydrogen, the project 
might qualify as in the “production of basic inorganic 
chemicals.”370  In that case, the chemical processes to convert 
methane to hydrogen would better satisfy the “chemical 
conversion processes” requirement.371 
Methane hydrate projects might be characterized as 
groundwater abstraction schemes to the extent that the water 
volumes associated with the methane in the hydrate formations is 
produced alongside the methane.372 
It is possible that methane hydrate projects could be 
characterized as “trading ports, piers for loading and unloading,” 
if the offshore structures are built in such a manner to facilitate 
transport of produced methane, water, or hydrogen volumes.373 
Methane hydrate projects should not be characterized as 
crude-oil refineries nor as gasification/liquefaction installations of 
coal or bituminous shales.374  Methane hydrate projects would lift 
negligible amounts of crude oil, if at all, and no volumes of coal or 
shale would be extracted nor processed. To the extent that any 
hydrocarbon liquids would be produced coincidentally at a 
methane hydrate project, it would be very unlikely for those 
chemicals to be processed or refined onsite; more likely they 
would be relocated to a regular refinery location for disposition. 
 
 368. Id. at Annex I, §§ 6, 6(a). For details on the chemical processes involved, 
see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at chs. 2-3. 
 369. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 6. 
 370. Id. at Annex I, § 6(b). 
 371. Id. at Annex I, § 6. 
 372. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 11. For a discussion on the 
chemistry of methane hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra 
note 1, at ch. 2, § 2. 
 373. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 8(b). 
 374. Id. at Annex I, § 1. 
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b. Offshore Methane Hydrates Qualified 
Under Annex II 
Given that the EIA procedures will almost certainly be 
invoked by the Annex I analyses, it is still worthy to review the 
Annex II categories because there are several additional 
categories of activities that are not present in the Annex I list 
that might also merit review under a methane hydrate project. 
Under the category of “Energy Industry,” there are several 
subcategories that might be involved as support systems to a 
methane hydrate project. Industrial installations for carrying gas, 
steam, or water may be involved in both offshore efforts to extract 
the methane, or as part of onshore support systems.375  To the 
extent that the methane hydrate project is producing substantial 
volumes of natural gas that will need translation into an onshore 
distribution network, it is likely that the facilities will need 
storage facilities to provide safe and reliable delivery of the 
natural gas into the distribution pipelines. As such, the methane 
hydrate project may include the sub-categories of surface storage 
of natural gas, underground storage of combustible gases, and 
surface storage of fossil fuels.376 
As the methane hydrates are in a solid form prior to removal 
from the deposit, it would be reasonable to describe their 
extraction as an extractive industry category. First, the surface 
industrial installations for the extraction of natural gas that will 
be associated with a methane hydrate project would likely 
independently qualify as an Annex II category project.377  As the 
hydrates are underground, they potentially involve underground 
mining.378  While not immediately foreseeable, it is not 
impossible to imagine that marine or fluvial dredging may be 
involved in either the direct extraction of methane hydrates or 
utilized as a means of facilitating the removal of methane 
hydrates.379  While the phrasing of deep drilling is left unclarified 
in Annex II, it is conceivable that fresh water can be produced 
 
 375. Id. at Annex II, § 3(b). 
 376. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex II, §§ 3(c)-(e). 
 377. Id. at Annex II, § 2(e). 
 378. Id. at Annex II, § 2(b). 
 379. Id. at Annex II, § 2(c). 
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from the hydrate deposits and then positioned as potable water 
for human or livestock consumption.380 
Certain aspects, or sub-projects, of a methane hydrate project 
are likely to fit within several of the sub-categories of 
Infrastructure Projects. Depending on the overall footprint of the 
project and its associated co-projects, e.g. electrical power 
generation, it might be engaged in the development of an 
industrial estate project.381  To the extent that carbon dioxide 
sequestration is involved in the methane hydrate project, it would 
likely involve gas pipeline installations and pipelines for the 
transport of the to-be-injected carbon dioxide.382  And without 
regard to the use of hydrate waters as potable waters, if the 
project plans to remove those waters from the deposit, then the 
project could be seen as engaged in the abstraction of 
groundwater.383 
It is not likely that the products from a methane hydrate 
project would qualify as petroleum, petrochemicals, or as 
chemical products.384 Nor is it likely that a methane hydrate 
project or its products would be considered as part of a chemical 
industry category.385  Nor would the methane hydrate project fit 
any of the categories under Annex II’s Mineral Industry, as the 
listed items are fairly specific and exclude any of the materials 
involved in a methane hydrate project.386 
Qualification under Annex II requires a determination from 
the relevant Member State on whether the project needs an EIA 
assessment.387 The requirements for the determination are 
detailed in Annex III;388 they are broad and detailed in scope. 
Annex III requires the detailing of the project’s characteristics; of 
note are the use of natural resources, the production of waste, the 
associated pollution and nuisances, and the risk of major 
 
 380. Id. at Annex II, § 2(d)(iii). 
 381. Id. at Annex II, § 10(a). 
 382. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex II, § 10(i). 
 383. Id. at Annex II, § 10(l). 
 384. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex II, § 6(c). 
 385. Id. at Annex II, § 6. 
 386. Id. at Annex II, § 5. 
 387. Id. at art. 4(2). 
 388. Id. at art. 4(3). 
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accidents with particular regard to the substances or technologies 
involved in the project.389  The location of the project is critical, 
especially with regards to the existing use of the area, the 
regenerative capacity of the project’s surroundings, and the 
impacts on wetlands, coastal zones, nature reserves, and 
parks.390  Finally the characteristics of the potential impact must 
be detailed.391  All of the issues previously addressed in Annex III 
must also be addressed with regards to the extent of the impact 
on populations and the geographical area, on the trans-frontier 
nature of the project, the magnitude and complexity of the impact 
from the project, the probability of the impact, and of the 
duration, frequency, and reversibility of the impact.392 
i. Risk Governance Within the EIA 
Directive 
The collection of data provided at the early stage of pre-
development is of focused interest to efficient governance of the 
risks and harms from methane hydrate projects. The risks of the 
project need to be clearly enumerated and stated,393 the 
probability of the impact needs to be forecast,394 and the duration 
and frequency of potential accidents needs to be squarely 
addressed.395  The actual nature of the impact, of the potential 
harms and hazards, needs to be surveyed; the potential for 
reversibility also needs to be evaluated.396 
There is value to this Annex II and III process, even if the 
Member States decide to exempt the project from an EIA review. 
All of this data is collected prior to the onset of the EIA 
assessment itself, and then provided to the public.397  
Additionally, the public (which one assumes would include both 
the impacted communities and specialized public interest groups) 
 
 389. Id. at Annex III, § 1(c)-(f). 
 390. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex III, § 2(a)-(c)(i), (ii), (iv). 
 391. Id. at Annex III, § 3. 
 392. Id. at Annex III, § 3(a)-(f). 
 393. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex III, § 1(f). 
 394. Id. at Annex III, § 3(e). 
 395. Id. at Annex III, § 3(f). 
 396. Id.; see generally id. Annex III, §§ 2(c), 3(a), (e). 
 397. Id. at art. 4(4), (5). 
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has an opportunity to engage in the determination process, 
enabling it to request information and explanations that the 
competent authorities might not have requested.398  Thus, from a 
negligence rule point of view, the awareness of a duty to act with 
care is made manifest, and the type of information that a judge 
might need to evaluate the level of care undertaken is made 
publicly available; even if the Member State decides to not 
require an EIA, this data would greatly reduce the transaction 
costs of litigation and enable both regulators and private parties 
to bring lawsuits if harm does in fact result from the project. 
Once a project qualifies for assessment,399 the EIA Directive 
requires application of Articles 5 through 10 in the completion of 
the assessment.400  Article 5 requires the assessment include all 
of the information as directed under Annex IV.401  Additionally, 
the developer may request clarification on what types of 
information are to be included in the assessment from the specific 
competent authority for the relevant member state.402 At a 
minimum, the developer should submit to the competent 
authorities: 
(a) a description of the project comprising information on the site, 
design and size of the project; 
(b) a description of the main effects which the project is likely to 
have on the environment; 
(c)  a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, 
reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse effects; 
(d) an outline of the main alternatives studied by the developer, 
and an indication of the main reasons for his choice, taking into 
account the environmental effects; 
(e)  a non-technical summary of the information referred to in 
points (a) to (d).403 
 
 398. Id. at art. 6(1). This form of public interaction is parallel to more discrete 
means of engagement, such as privately lobbying the competent authorities and 
other branches of the Member State’s regulatory administration. 
 399. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 4(1) (with reference to Annex I). See 
also id. at art. 4(2), (3). 
 400. Id. at art. 4(1), (2) (for Annex I and II projects, respectfully). 
 401. Id. at art. 5(1)(f). 
 402. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 5(2). 
 403. Id. at art. 5(1). 
71
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
862 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
All five issues should address both their direct and indirect 
effects on: (i) human beings, fauna and flora, (ii) soil, water, air, 
climate and the landscape, (iii) material assets and cultural 
heritage, and (iv) the interaction between all of these factors.404  
The Annex IV requirements are stated simply, but they require 
both broad and detailed reports. The description of the project 
would need to explain both the production processes of the 
methane hydrate project, and estimates of the expected residues 
and emissions, which includes all forms of pollution.405  The 
breadth of the emissions definition, which includes such 
phenomena as vibrations, light, and heat, might include 
disturbances such as earthquakes or tsunamis in the case of a 
methane hydrate project.406  A review of the alternatives must be 
submitted; clearly such information provides documentary proof 
of both the options acknowledged to be known and tacit 
admissions of technologies unknown to the developer, if they 
cannot list them as an alternative one assumes that they are 
unaware.407  The developers are also responsible for explaining 
the choices made by the developer while taking into account the 
effects of those choices on the environment.408 In Annex IV, 
section three, there is a repeat of the requirements found within 
the EIA Directive itself to report on the impacts on life, cultural 
assets, and the environment.409  Annex IV also requires a study 
of the impacts, including potential harms, of the project’s simple 
existence in the environment, of its use of natural resources, and 
 
 404. Id. at art. 3(1)(a)-(d). 
 405. Id. at Annex IV, § 1. “A description of the project, including in particular: 
(a) a description of the location of the project; (b) a description of the physical 
characteristics of the whole project . . . and the land-use requirements during 
the construction and operational phases; (c) a description of the main 
characteristics of the operational phase of the project (in particular production 
process), for instance . . . the nature and quantity of the materials . . . used; (d) 
an estimate, by type and quantity, of expected residues and emissions (such as 
water, air, soil and subsoil pollution, noise, vibration, light, heat [and] radiation 
. . . produced during the construction and operation phases.” (emphasis added). 
 406. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex IV, § 1(d). 
 407. Id. at art. 5(1)(d). 
 408. Id. at art. 2. 
 409. Id. at art. 3(a)-(d). 
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of the potential of the project to emit pollution, create nuisances, 
and to eliminate, meaning discharge, waste products.410 
Once the various impacts and potential harms and hazards 
have been itemized, potential means of prevention, reduction, and 
offsetting measures should be provided in the assessment.411  To 
the extent that the developer can identify where shortfalls in 
knowledge or technology exist that would improve the assessment 
itself, they should ensure that such is provided in the report.412  
An explanation of the scientific methods and techniques used to 
develop the above forecasts is to be included in this assessment of 
potential impacts.413  Finally, there is a requirement to provide a 
non-technical version of the above reports within the 
assessment.414 
While that assessment is in drafting and undergoing review, 
there are several opportunities for non-developer parties to 
engage in the process. Member States are required to ensure that 
all of the relevant authorities are given opportunities to express 
their expertise on the assessment.415 The general public has 
extensive rights reserved within the EIA Directive.416 Most 
importantly, the public is to be informed when and where the 
information gathered for the assessment will be made public and 
when the public can participate in the assessment review.417  The 
EIA Directive itself does not explicitly provide means of control, 
approval, or veto to the public, but the Directive would allow each 
Member State to grant this to its own citizens under its own 
statutes.418  However, the public has a right reserved to either, 
receive a sufficient interest in the review and development of the 
assessment, or to have access to due process before a court of law 
or other independent and impartial body to challenge the 
 
 410. Id. at Annex IV, § 4. 
 411. Id. at art. 5(1)(c). 
 412. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex IV, § 8. 
 413. Id. at Annex IV, § 5. 
 414. Id. at art. 5(5)(e). 
 415. Id. at art. 6(1). 
 416. EIA Directive, supra note 349, art. 6(2)(a)-(g). 
 417. Id. at art. 6(2)(f), (g). 
 418. Id. at art. 2. 
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decision, acts, or omissions on substantive or procedural 
grounds.419 
The EIA Directive requires that the assessment review 
engage other Member States should they be discovered to be at a 
transboundary risk.420 Similarly, the transboundary-affected 
Member State, once engaged, shall provide to its authorities and 
the public the same access to the information as was afforded to 
the parties in the original Member State.421 
Critically important is the conclusion of the assessment 
process, at which time the Member State(s) need to release the 
reasons for the decision (and any attached conditional 
requirements), an explanation of the impact of the public’s 
participation on the decision process, and a description of the 
main measures necessary to avoid, reduce, and offset the major 
adverse effects of the approved project.422 
Because the rules provide for both the technical and non-
technical provision of the information, the public and other 
parties will face lower transaction costs in reviewing the 
materials. This would affect both the potential ex post litigation 
decisions made after an impact event, e.g., a harmful accident, or 
to better facilitate the ex ante drafting of necessary regulations. 
2.   The SEA Directive 
Whereas the EIA Directive applied to projects, the SEA 
Directive is targeted at plans and programs; in short, at legal or 
political policies.423 
Plans and programs, broadly speaking, are those plans and 
programs that are undertaken by authorities within Member 
States at local, regional, or national levels and are subject to 
legislative procedure by Parliament or Government.424 The 
 
 419. Id. art. 11(1), as limited by art. 11(2), (3). 
 420. Id. art. 7(1)(a). 
 421. Id. at art. 7(2), (3). 
 422. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 9(1). 
 423. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at art. 1. 
 424. Id. at art. 2(a). 
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overall character of the Directive is procedural in nature, not 
substantive.425 
The preamble of the SEA Directive explains that the 
precautionary principle was a central goal of the Directive, to 
preserve, protect, and improve the quality of the environment, 
the protection of human health, and the prudent and rational 
utilization of natural resources.426 
A SEA is required for every plan or program that is likely to 
have significant environmental effects.427  There are specific 
explicit requirements for SEAs to be drawn for any plan or 
program prepared for energy, industry, transport, waste 
management, and water management, among others, if those 
plans or programs would set the framework for future 
development of those areas of interest listed within Annex I and 
II of the EIA Directive.428 
Additionally, Member States should identify if other plans or 
projects would have significant environmental effect beyond those 
identified if review is undertaken, and if a SEA is found 
unwarranted, then the authorities need to make that analysis 
public.429  These SEAs are to be accomplished and completed 
prior to the submission or adoption of the plans or programs by a 
legislative process.430 
Due to the nature of the plans and programs being 
essentially of a political and legislative nature, there is inherently 
a certain amount of due process and democratic political process 
within the EU to support an assumption that the public 
ultimately does have a say on these plans and programs. The 
SEA Directive highlights the need and mandates the active 
participation of the public, and other authorities beyond the 
drafters of a SEA, to ensure that they have a chance to review the 
 
 425. Id. pmbl. § 9. 
 426. Id. pmbl. § 1. Plans or programs related to methane hydrate projects 
would most likely qualify under the categories of energy and industry, and 
potentially under the waste and water management categories. 
 427. Id. at art. 3(1). 
 428. Id. at art. 3(2)(a). 
 429. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at art. 3(4), (7). 
 430. Id. at art. 4(1). 
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findings of the SEA and to consult on the SEA.431  Furthermore, 
in the event of transboundary considerations, the SEA Directive 
has functionally similar mechanisms to the EIA Directive.432 
The information to be reviewed under a SEA assessment is 
detailed at Annex I to the SEA Directive.433  In an effort to be as 
inclusive as possible of relevant information, the Annex advises to 
include all information from its immediate implications, as well 
as its “secondary, cumulative, synergistic, short, medium, and 
long-term permanent and temporary, positive and negative 
effects.”434  It is clear that the assessment is to be drafted from as 
broad and inclusive a perspective as possibly feasible; if there are 
any harmful effects due to the plans or programs evaluated, 
however vague, they should identified, quantified, and 
probabilistically modeled for both benefits and costs.435 
The notion of plans and programs are not projects, more an 
art of law or policy building, and as such merit slightly different 
considerations than those listed under Annex IV of the EIA 
Directive.436  It should include an outline of the contents and 
main objectives of the plans or programs, as well as any 
interconnection(s) with other plans or programs.437  It should 
describe the current state of the target environmental settings 
and how they might evolve without the plans or programs.438  
The assessment should make clear what characteristics are likely 
to be impacted by the plans or programs and how the plans or 
programs are expected to protect those areas or characteristics.439 
The SEA Directive’s Annex I repeats the mantra of life from 
the EIA directive;440 it also requests specification of the measures 
envisaged to prevent, reduce, and offset any significant adverse 
 
 431. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at art. 6(1), (2). See id. art. 6(4) (NGOs); 
See also id. at pmbl., § 15. 
 432. Id. at art. 7. 
 433. Id. at Annex I. 
 434. Id. at Annex I, n.1. 
 435. See generally id. at Annex I. 
 436. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex IV. 
 437. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at Annex I(a). 
 438. Id. at Annex I(b). 
 439. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at Annex I(c), (d). 
 440. Id. at Annex I(f) (“human health, fauna, flora, soil, water, air ”). See EIA 
Directive, supra note 349, at art. 3; see also id. at Annex IV, art. 3. 
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effects of the plans or programs on such ecological and social 
concerns; this should include technical descriptions of the various 
monitoring methods necessary to achieve these goals.441  It also 
demands for the reasons why the particular plans or programs 
were selected, which options were eliminated and the reason for 
their elimination, and what limits in knowledge frustrated or 
limited a more complete review of the options.442  Finally, a non-
technical version of the above discussions is required.443 
3. Environmental Liability and Seveso III 
Directives 
The EU has provided two legal instruments to address the 
commercial and industrial activities that could result in 
environmental and social harms, the Environmental Liability 
Directive (ELD)444 and the Seveso III Directive (Seveso III).445  
These establish doctrines that then have broader applications in 
other areas of environmental regulation, such as the Birds and 
Habitats Directives,446 the MSF Directive,447 and the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD).448  The ELD is not likely to apply to 
 
 441. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at Annex I(f), (g), (i). 
 442. Id. at Annex I(h). 
 443. Id. at Annex I(j). 
 444. Directive 2004/35, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and 
Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 [hereinafter ELD]. 
 445. Directive 2012/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
July 2012 on the Control of Major-accident Hazards Involving Dangerous 
Substances, Amending and Subsequently Repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, 
2012 O.J. (L 197) 1 [hereinafter Seveso III]. 
 446. Directive 2009/147, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
November 2009 on the Conservation of Wild Birds, 2009 O.J. (L 20) 7 
[hereinafter Birds Directive]. See also Directive 92/43 of 21 May 1992 on the 
Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1992 O.J. (L 
206) 7 [hereinafter Habitats Directive]. 
 447. Directive 2008/56 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of 
Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), 2008 
O.J. (L 164) 19. 
 448. See Directive 2000/60 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 October 2000 on Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the 
Field of Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 [hereinafter Water Policy Directive] 
(example of one of the major directives within that framework). 
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the development of offshore methane hydrate projects, the Seveso 
III is per se not applicable to the offshore development of 
hydrocarbons such as methane hydrates. 
Beyond those, the Directive on Natural Habitats governs the 
impacts on special environment ecologies and on certain protected 
species.449 
a.   Environmental Liability Directive 
i. Unsure Applicability to Methane 
Hydrates 
The ELD was intended to address environmental harms and 
hazards generally. The Offshore Directive and the CCS Directive 
have also applied the ELD to address the liabilities from 
environmental harms from offshore activities and carbon 
sequestration activities.450  But, there are several reasons that 
the ELD is not likely to address the events associated with 
methane hydrate projects: (i) the ELD’s limited scope of 
environmental damages, (ii) the Lack of applicable Annex III 
activities, (iii) the difficulty of establishing potential non-Annex 
III activities, and (iv) the exclusion of certain international 
conventions on civil liability. 
The ELD governs environmental damages caused by 
occupational activities;451 its focus is squarely on damages to 
nature.452  However, the ELD does not apply to all sources of 
environmental hazards.453  It declares that it addresses only 
 
 449. See Habitats Directive, supra note 446. 
 450. It would at first appear that the ELD limits itself to waters closer to the 
shoreline than where methane hydrates are deposited. However, the adoption of 
the ELD methods by the Offshore and CCS Directives would extend this zone of 
application. 
 451. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 3(1)(a). 
 452. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(a)-(c). “This Directive should apply, as 
far as environmental damage is concerned, to occupational activities which 
present a risk for human health or the environment,” see id. at art. 2(8). Of 
course, environmental harm can impact humans and human health in many 
ways, but the ELD handles the human-related issues indirectly. The extent of 
land damage is limited to include those contaminations that create a significant 
risk of human health. See id. art. 2(1)(c). 
 453. See id. at art. 4. 
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those causes of harm that arise from a diffuse character wherein 
a causal link still functions to connect tortfeasor and accident.454  
There are also exceptions for various acts of God and force 
majeure that result in accidents otherwise covered within the 
ELD.455  The damage can be created by nature or pose an 
imminent threat456; an imminent threat requires a sufficient 
likelihood of the threat in the near future.457 
Environmental damage is defined as measurable adverse 
change in a natural resource, which worsens the environment 
against a baseline, unless permitted by relevant authorities from 
the Member States458: 
damage to protected species and natural habitats, which is any 
damage that has significant adverse effects on reaching or 
maintaining the favourable conservation status of such habitats 
or species. The significance of such effects is to be assessed with 
reference to the baseline condition, taking account of the criteria 
set out in Annex I; 
Damage to protected species and natural habitats does not 
include previously identified adverse effects which result from an 
act by an operator which was expressly authorised by the 
relevant authorities.459 
 
 454. Id. at art. 4(3). 
 455. Id. at art. 4(1)(a), (b). See also id. art. 4(6) (activities related to war or 
natural disasters). 
 456. Id. at art. 3(1)(a), (b). 
 457. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(9). 
 458. Id. at art. 2(2). Clearly this raises an immediate issue of metrics, 
measurements, observation, and detection. In many cases, these are not 
necessarily readily reduced to low-cost technologies, and thus might be seen as 
preventing recognition of certain damages that are less readily reduced to 
measurement or lack clear ex ante base lines against which to draw contrasts 
over time. Certain damages may have occurred in a location that ex ante to 
detection was not assumed to be a likely site of damage and so went unobserved 
at the beginning of the operations that ultimately led to the harm. Yet, this 
might also serve as an incentive to both protect the courts from the nuisance of 
unserviceable pleas and to encourage the development of baseline metrics by 
those interested in protecting their surroundings. Those best able to observe 
suggest the ELD have a duty to themselves to monitor and take measurements. 
 459. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(a). See also id. art. 2(3)(a)-(b) (definition 
of protected species and natural habitats). See generally Council Directive 
79/409, of 2 April 1979 on the Conservation of Wild Birds, art. 4(2), 1979 O.J. (L 
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Thus, the scope of damages under the ELD is primarily 
centered on those “parties” that would not otherwise be able to 
bring their own complaints to trial. This limits the potential 
applicability of the ELD to the various potential injuries and 
harms that might result from offshore methane hydrate 
accidents. 
The listed activities under Annex III do not appear to overlap 
with the general nature of methane hydrate projects. Annex III 
activities do not include activities that are substantially related 
to methane hydrate project related activities.460  Issues of waste 
management, water disposal management, and water abstraction 
might be relevant to a methane hydrate project, but it is not clear 
that the intent of the Annex III listings had such an offshore 
purpose in mind.461  It is also not clear that the operations at an 
offshore methane hydrate project would be seen as in the 
manufacture, use, storage, etc., of dangerous chemicals.462 
Given the lack of applicable activities under Annex III and 
the lack of clearly excludable conventions under Article 4, unless 
the environmental risks of methane hydrates are included within 
the scope of Annex III, those harms would likely only be found 
applicable under the “at fault” rule of Article 3, Section 1(b). 
Thus, some focus needs to be put on those non-Annex III 
occupational activities that could damage protected species and 
natural habitats. 
While one might expect to find broad definitions of water 
damages as provided within the U.S.’s Clean Water Act, such is 
not available under the ELD. Water damage, another form of 
environmental damage, includes any damage that “significantly 
adversely affects the ecological, chemical and/or quantitative 
status and/or ecological potential” of the waters addressed within 
the River Basin Water Directive.463 This is partially due to 
 
103) 1 (idea of protected species and natural habitats); see also Habitats 
Directive, supra note 446, at Annexes II, IV. 
 460. Id. at Annex III, arts. 1-12. 
 461. Id. at Annex III, arts. 2, 3, 4, 6. 
 462. Id. at Annex III, art. 7. 
 463. Habitats Directive, supra note 446, at art. 2(1)(b). See also Water Policy 
Directive, supra note 448, at art. 2(1) (definition of surface water upon which 
ELD relied). See also ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(5) (nominally limits waters 
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separate EU actions on the EU related seas and oceans.464  
However, this nuanced definition would appear to prevent the 
application of the ELD to the waters under which the vast bulk of 
methane hydrates are expected to lay, as methane hydrates lay 
offshore the coasts beyond the reach of the River Basin 
Frameworks.465 
It is also difficult to connect the onshore harms of cataclysmic 
methane hydrate accidents to application under the ELD. Land 
damage is defined in a fairly limited sense to impacts on human 
health: “significant risk of human health being adversely affected 
as a result of the direct or indirect introduction, in, on or under 
land, of substances, preparations, organisms or micro-
organisms.”466  Perhaps sudden inundation by water would 
qualify as an ‘introduction of a substance that could adversely 
affect human health,’ but it reads beyond the intent of the ELD. 
There is a potential argument to boot-strapping the ELD into 
regulating the development of methane hydrate projects, in that 
arguendo methane hydrates are themselves a natural resource 
deserving protection under Article 2.467  The definition of damage 
includes a reference to adverse change to a natural resource; to 
the extent that a methane hydrate project damaged the hydrate 
deposits, and the impairment of use and production for future 
generations, then the notion of environmental damage might 
reasonably apply.468  However, natural resource is a defined term 
within the ELD and appears to exclude natural resources such as 
methane hydrates, as they are not generally considered to be a 
“protected species and natural habitats, water and land,” 
especially as land damage is previously defined as that which 
causes adverse risks to human health by the introduction of 
substances, preparations, organisms, or micro-organisms.469 
 
to just those of the River Basin Frameworks). See generally Water Policy 
Directive, supra note 448. 
 464. See discussion on the various water protection frameworks within the 
EU. Infra Parts III(D)(6)(a), III(D)(6)(c).   
 465. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, §§ 4, 5, 
for discussions on geology and geography of methane hydrates. 
 466. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(c). 
 467. Id. at art. 2(12). 
 468. Id. at art. 2(2). 
 469. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(c), 2(12). 
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Finally, there may be some protected species and natural 
habitats in the vicinity of methane hydrate projects; but it is most 
likely that if protection of the species and habitats near methane 
hydrates are to be protected that they will need to be more 
explicitly detailed as a target under the relevant frameworks. 
Protected habitats could include methane hydrates, as “1180 
Submarine structures made by leaking gas” is a designated 
habitat under the Habitats Directive,470 but 1180 is not currently 
listed as a priority habitat and thus is not protected under the 
ELD.471 It is also not clear that the structures itemized at 1180 
are methane hydrate deposits versus other sources of subsea 
methane, such as a volcanic vent.472  The 1180 is neither a special 
habitat, nor is it occupied by specially protected species, so it is 
not an area currently protected by the Habitat’s Directive. As a 
result, it is not likely that the ELD’s damage to the natural 
resources clause would apply to methane hydrates unless 
amended or clarified. 
The ELD excludes a list of pre-existing conventions that are 
of a more specialized nature, and thus deemed better suited to 
the particular harms addressed within those conventions.473 Of 
the conventions listed at Annex IV, four of the five listed address 
oil pollution: 
i.   “International Convention of 27 November 1992 on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage;”474 
ii.   “International Convention of 27 November 1992 on 
the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage;”475 
 
 470. Habitats Directive, supra note 446, at Annex I. 
 471. EUR. COMM’N, INTERPRETATION MANUAL OF EUROPEAN UNION HABITATS 16 
(2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/docs/Int_ma
nual_eu28.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LU39-BRCK. 
 472. Id. The Manual describes structures of carbonate cement and is less 
focused on the underlying reservoirs from whence the methane originates; the 
Manual is focused on the locus of plants and animals near these structures. 
Usually there are no plants, but a large diversity of invertebrates is found in 
these areas. 
 473. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 4(2) (with reference to Annex IV). See also 
id. at art. 4(3) (with reference to certain maritime related conventions). 
 474. Id. at Annex IV(a). 
 475. ELD, supra note 444, at Annex IV(b). 
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iii.   “International Convention of 23 March 2001 on Civil 
Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage;”476  
iv.   “International Convention of 3 May 1996 on Liability 
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by 
Sea;”477 
Given this extensive exclusion of the oil spill paradigm from 
the ELD, one wonders to what extent events from a methane 
hydrate project might likewise become excluded from the ELD. A 
careful reading of the excluded conventions reveal that damages 
discussed in those conventions are unlikely to be coincident with 
a methane hydrate accident. Thus, the result is inconclusive. 
ii. Governance of Risk Within the ELD 
The ELD provides that the prevention and remedying of 
environmental damages should be developed through the polluter 
pays principle.478 Thus, operators of activities that create 
environmental damages should be required to be financially 
liable for those damages; this is explicitly intended to provide 
economic incentives to motivate operators to minimize the risks of 
such accidents so that their exposure to financial liabilities is 
reduced.479 
The ELD presents a mixed strategy with regards to liability; 
the ELD distinguishes between Annex III activities and non-
Annex III activities.480 The ELD applies to environmental 
damages caused by activities listed at Annex III and to any 
damage to protected species and natural habitats caused by 
occupation activities not on Annex III.481 Annex III activities are 
 
 476. Id. at Annex IV(c). 
 477. Id. at Annex IV(d). 
 478. Id. Annex IV(d)(2), (18) (explanation of ‘polluter-pays’ principle). See also 
id. at art. 1. 
 479. Id. at art. 1(2). 
 480. The ELD explicitly avoids engagement with rights of compensation for 
traditional damage under international agreements on civil liability. See id. at 
art. 1(11). 
 481. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 3(1)(a)-(b). 
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to be governed by a rule of strict liability.482  Non-Annex III 
activities are to be governed by “at fault” rules.483 
Should a competent authority find an operator nonresponsive 
and thus decide to undertake such measures by themselves, the 
competent authority is able to recover those expenditures from 
the operators.484  To avoid a pass-through tax burden to tax 
payers, competent authorities may charge the operators fees for 
the transaction costs of addressing the environmental hazards 
and harms.485 
The ELD is limited to addressing environmental damage, 
and per se, the ELD is categorically denied application to matters 
of personal injury, private property damages, and forms of 
economic loss.486  It also excludes several international 
conventions on civil liability.487  Additionally, the ELD yields no 
rights to private parties to make economic recoveries for damage 
to such protected species or habitats; its application remains on 
the public welfare.488 
b.   Seveso III Directive 
Seveso III applies to the prevention and control of major 
accidents that introduce dangerous substances to the 
environment; is it further stated inter alia that the accidents are 
generally industrial in nature.489 In that regard, it is similar to 
the perspective of the UNCTEIA and indeed Seveso III is the 
implementation of that Convention within the EU.490  Seveso III 
appears to take stronger language than the UNCTEIA. In 
contrast to the Convention’s repeated use of “appropriate,” Seveso 
III repeatedly relies on the phrase “all necessary measures.” 
“Operators should have a general obligation to take all necessary 
 
 482. Id. at art. 3(1)(a). 
 483. Id. at art. 3(1)(b). See also id. at pmbl., § 9. 
 484. Id. at pmbl., § 18. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. at pmbl., § 14. 
 487. ELD, supra note 444, at pmbl., § 11. 
 488. Id. at art. 3, § 3. 
 489. Seveso III, supra note 445, at art. 1. 
 490. Id. at pmbl., §§ 1, 2, 3, 5. 
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measures to prevent major accidents;”491 “the operator is obliged 
to take all necessary measures;”492 the Member States must 
inspect to ensure that “the operator has taken all necessary 
measures;”493 and the discussion of the duties of a Member State 
after an accident uses the term “necessary” three times 
throughout Article 17.494 
i. Inapplicability of Seveso III to 
Offshore Methane Hydrates 
Seveso III provides the rules for the prevention of major 
accidents involving dangerous substances.495  And Seveso III does 
include both hydrogen and natural gas as dangerous 
substances.496 
However, Seveso III does not apply to the offshore 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons such as methane 
hydrates.497  Seveso III, also does not apply to the exploration, 
exploitation, extraction, and processing of minerals from 
boreholes such as methane hydrates.498 
Seveso III does not cover underground storage of natural gas 
in conjunction with the exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons such as methane hydrates.499  And finally, Seveso 
III would not apply to the pipeline transport of methane, 
hydrogen, or other dangerous substances.500 
As such, there is very little potential for the development of 
methane hydrate projects to be regulated by Seveso III. 
 
 491. Seveso III, supra note 445, at pmbl., § 12. 
 492. Id. at art. 5(1). 
 493. Id. at art 5(2). 
 494. Id. at art. 17(a)-(c). 
 495. Id. at art. 1. 
 496. Id. at Annex I, Part 2, §§ 15 (hydrogen), 18 (liquefied flammable gases). 
 497. Seveso III, supra note 445, at art. 2(2)(f). 
 498. Id. at art. 2(2)(e). 
 499. Id. at art. 2(2)(g). 
 500. Id. at art. 2(2)(d). 
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ii.   Risk Governance Within Seveso III 
Seveso III lacks a specific discussion on liability, other than 
of the obligations of the Member States to ensure that operators 
undertake all necessary measures.501 However, the preamble 
makes clear that operator failed compliance should be met with 
penalties that should be effective, proportionate, and 
dissuasive.502 
Given the mandate to provide for penalties for compliance 
failures and the repeated phrasings of “all necessary measures,” 
there is a combined semantic sense of a duty that can be failed 
and that incentives should be provided to ensure that those 
duties are met. However, there is no discussion of what should 
occur if that duty is met and accidents still occur. 
Is a strict liability rule suggested in the requirement for the 
operator to undertake all measures necessary to “limit their 
consequences,”503 to the mandate that the “operator takes any 
necessary remedial actions?”504  It is difficult to ascertain because 
there is a paucity of financial responsibility clarifications with 
Seveso III;505 presumably the details rest within each Member 
State’s individualized implementation. It is perhaps more 
reasonable that Seveso III expects domestic regulations to be 
drafted and implemented as part of a command and control 
regulatory framework. 
4.   Offshore Directive 
As currently enacted, the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Operations Amending Directive (Offshore Directive) 506 would 
likely apply to the exploration, development, and production of 
 
 501. See generally Seveso III, supra note 445. 
 502. Id. at pmbl. § 29. 
 503. Id. at art. 5(1). 
 504. Id. at art. 17(c). 
 505. Neither Annex II nor Annex IV provide explicit requirements to detail 
whence financing is sourced for the remediation and compensation budgets. 
Annex II, § 5(c) does refer to “mobilizable resources.” Id. at Annex II. 
 506. Directive 2013/30, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
June 2013 on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations and Amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 178) 66 [hereinafter Offshore Directive]. 
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methane hydrates from offshore operations.507 However, this 
article will demonstrate that the Offshore Directive remains 
focused on viscous oil spill damage and could be in need of 
amending to better address the potential hazards of offshore 
methane hydrate operations.508 
a. Applicability to Offshore Methane 
Hydrates 
The subject and scope of the Offshore Directive is to ensure 
the provision of “minimum requirements for preventing major 
accidents in offshore oil and gas operations and limiting the 
consequences of such accidents.”509 
Major accidents are defined as incidents associated with 
installations that involve “explosion, fire, loss of well control, or 
release of oil, gas or dangerous substances” and could result in 
substantial human injuries.510 Other forms of major accidents 
include those that involve serious damage to the installation that 
also involve substantial human injuries,511 events that lead to the 
serious injury of five or more humans,512 or those events that 
 
 507. Exploration and production are defined terms of the Offshore Directive. 
Id. at art. 2(15), (16) respectively. The definition of exploration includes “drilling 
into a prospect and all related offshore oil and gas operations necessary prior to 
production-related operations.” Id. at art. 2(15). However, traditional oil and gas 
parlance distinguishes between “exploration,” the project phase focused on 
finding and identifying producible oil and gas volumes, and “development,” the 
project phase that occurs after the financial investment decision and includes all 
the construction, drilling, and preparations prior to the onset of production 
activities. 
 508. The Offshore Directive was adopted in response to the events of April 20, 
2010, when an oil and gas well broke near the production christmas tree valve 
stack, close to the seabed/ocean interface. The resulting accident brought 
awareness to the dangers of deep sea oil and gas exploration and production, as 
contrasted with the hazards of boat-based oil spills such as the Exxon Valdez of 
1989. See Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., § 5 (“Accidents relating 
to offshore oil and gas operations, in particular the accident in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010, have raised public awareness of the risks involved in offshore oil 
and gas operations and have prompted a review of policies aimed at ensuring 
the safety of such operations.”). 
 509. Id. at art. 1(1). 
 510. Id. at art. 2(1)(a). 
 511. Id. at art. 2(1)(b). 
 512. Id. at art. 2(1)(c). 
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could result in major environmental damages.513  Those major 
accidents need to occur offshore, which is defined as those areas 
within the territorial seas, EEZ, or continental shelves of member 
states.514  The definition of offshore parallels the zones of “marine 
waters” for the MSF Directive,515 thus the applicability of those 
regulations on the avoidance of environmental damages applies to 
offshore operations.516  Finally, offshore oil and gas operations 
include most regular aspects of oil and gas exploration, 
development and production, except for trans-coastal 
transportation of oil and gas.517 
As methane is natural gas, and assuming methane hydrate 
operations would require installation or infrastructure, the 
Offshore Directive applies to the exploration, development, and 
production of methane hydrates from the offshore waters of the 
Member States of the EU.518  Events resulting from the release of 
methane from methane hydrate fields would be considered major 
accidents if they also resulted in “significant potential to cause, 
fatalities or serious personal injury,” or if the methane ventings 
or seepages resulted in “any major environmental incident.”519  
The additional cases of major accident also apply to those 
involving damages to the installation with corresponding human 
injuries or other incidents that result in substantial injuries to 
five or more persons.520 
 
 513. Id. at art. 2(1)(d). 
 514. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 2(2). 
 515. Directive 2008/56, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of 
Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), art. 3, 
2008 O.J. (L 164) 19 [hereinafter Marine Strategy Framework Directive]. 
 516. Id. at art. 3(1)(a)-(b). See also Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at 
pmbl., § 58, which provides guidance that the “definition of water damage in 
Directive 2004/35/EC should be amended to ensure that the liability of licensees 
under that Directive applies to marine waters of Member States as defined in 
Directive 2008/56/EC.” 
 517. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 2(3). 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id. at art. 2(1)(a), (d). 
 520. Id. at art. 2(1)(b)-(c). 
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b. Risk Governance Within the Offshore 
Directive 
Member States are required to ensure that operators 
undertake all “suitable measures” of precaution, to provide that 
operators remain liable for the acts of their sub-contractors, and 
that operators undertake all “suitable measures” to limit 
consequences for human health and the environment.521  The 
Directive requires that the Member States ensure that operators 
and licensees comply with the Directive.522  The Member States 
are to provide penalties within their own legal systems for 
noncompliance.523  The penalties should be “effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive.”524 
Environmental damage and harm caused by offshore 
activities are to be regulated under the ELD.525  The definition of 
environmental damage is inherited from the ELD.526  Member 
States do a have an affirmative duty under the Offshore Directive 
to ensure that licensed operators are financially liable for both 
prevention and remediation of environmental harms from 
offshore activities; this is to be accomplished by domestic 
legislation.527 The phrasing suggests a rule in comport with the 
operations of a strict liability rule, but the requirement does not 
particularly require a rule of civil liability, regulatory guidance 
would appear to suffice.528 
While the Preamble to the Offshore Directive refers to a 
particular standard of care, “where the cost of further risk 
reduction would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of 
such reduction,”529 it does not appear that a rule of negligence 
 
 521. Id. at art. 3(1)-(3). 
 522. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 34. 
 523. Id. at art. 34. 
 524. Id. 
 525. Id. at art. 7. 
 526. Id. For a more complete discussion on the limitations of the ELD with 
regards to offshore methane hydrates, please see the discussion on the ELD, see 
infra Part III(D)(3)(a).   
 527. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 7. 
 528. Under the ELD, Annex III activities are per se under a strict liability 
rule, non-Annex III activities are under a “fault-based” rule. See ELD discussion 
supra Part III(D)(3)(a).  
 529. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., § 14. 
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was suggested. Rather, the whole of the Directive appears to 
reflect the polluter pays principle, and thus the rule of strict 
liability.530  The licensee, as determined by Directive 94/22,531 is 
to be held financially liable for both the prevention and 
remediation of major accidents and their consequences.532 
Additionally, the Offshore Directive is subordinated to the 
rules under the EIA Directive, SEA Directive, and 94/22.533 
i. Offshore Directive’s Call for a 
Regulatory Body 
Overall, the Offshore Directive provides for a deliberate and 
cautious review of offshore oil and gas projects prior to their 
licensing and throughout their operational periods. The Member 
States are required to allow for public participation during the 
review process.534  Prior to the issuance of a license for offshore 
oil and gas operations, the Member States must ensure that the 
applicant is technically and financially capable of meeting their 
responsibilities under the Offshore Directive.535  The Member 
States shall also ensure that the there are sustainable financial 
instruments made available to better provide for the financial 
needs of major accidents and their risk management.536 
Competent authorities are to be established by the Member 
States to be responsible for overseeing the study, evaluation, 
 
 530. All EU environmental laws need to be read with the guidance of article 
191(2) of TFEU, which states that the polluter pays principle is fundamental to 
all EU legislation. “Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of 
protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions 
of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the 
principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”  
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
art. 191, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 531. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., §12. See Directive 94/22, of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions 
for Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and 
Production of Hydrocarbons, 1994 O.J. (L 164) 3. 
 532. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 7. 
 533. Id. at art. 1(3). 
 534. Id. at art. 5(2)(a)-(f). 
 535. Id. at art. 4(2)(a). 
 536. Id. at art. 4(3). 
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regulatory compliance, and monitoring of major hazards.537  
Additional requirements are set out at Annex III. The competent 
authority is to remain independent and objective; it should not be 
involved in the revenue or economic development discussions 
related to the offshore projects it oversees.538 
The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) shall provide 
technical and scientific expertise to the Member States and the 
Commission, with special regards to the detection and monitoring 
of transboundary oil or gas spills.539  EMSA may also assist in the 
drafting and development of the Member States’ external 
emergency response plans, and may also develop a catalog of 
available emergency equipment and services.540  EMSA may also 
assist the Commission in reviewing the external emergency 
response plans of Member States to ensure that the plans are in 
compliance with the Offshore Directive.541  EMSA can also run 
review exercises to test the designed emergency mechanisms for 
major accidents.542  EMSA has a potentially major role to play in 
ensuring consistent safety levels are maintained Union-wide. 
ii.   Regulatory Actions 
Member States have to require that all suitable measures be 
undertaken to prevent major accidents.543  Suitable is defined as 
“right or fully appropriate,” in consideration of “proportionate 
effort and cost, for a given requirement or situation.”544 
The Member States should also require offshore oil and gas 
operations to be managed on the basis of systematic risk 
management so that any residual risks or hazards are 
acceptable.545  Acceptable is defined as a level of risk that the 
costs or efforts to further reduce its expected harms would be 
grossly disproportionate to the benefits received from such 
 
 537. Id. at art. 8(1)(a)-(f). 
 538. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 8(2), 8(3); id. at art. 9(a). 
 539. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 10(1), (10)(2)(a). 
 540. Id. at art. 10(2)(b)-(c). 
 541. Id. at art. 10(3)(a). 
 542. Id. at art. 10(3)(b). 
 543. Id. at art. 3(1). 
 544. Id. at art. 2(6). 
 545. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 3(4). 
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reduction.546  This is not a statement to halt efforts at risk 
reduction once marginal benefits exceed marginal costs, but 
rather a defense that not all technologically feasible measures 
need be undertaken if, on the whole, those resources might be put 
to better purposes for the impacted communities. 
In this process of review, the operator/licensee is to submit a 
variety of plans and procedural documents: 
i.   a corporate major accident prevention policy,547 
ii.   a safety and environmental management system 
applicable to the installation,548  
iii.   a design notification for a production installation,549 
iv.   a description of the scheme of independent 
verification,550 
v.   a report on major hazards for a production or non-
production installation,551 
vi.   an amended report on major hazards in the event of a 
material change or dismantling of an installation,552 
vii.   an internal emergency response plan,553 
viii.   a notification of well operation and information on that 
well operation,554 
ix.   a notification of combined operations,555 
x.   a relocation notification.556 
The application of these guidelines to methane hydrates is 
straightforward. They require the operator to demonstrate that 
the major hazards and potential accidents are well understood. 
Each and every potential major hazard resulting from the 
 
 546. Id. at art. 2(8). 
 547. Id. at art. 11(1)(a). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 8. 
 548. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1)(b). Detailed at id. at 
Annex I, § 9, Annex IV. 
 549. Id. at art. 11(1)(c). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 1. 
 550. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1)(d). Detailed at id. at 
Annex I, § 5, Annex V. 
 551. Id. at art. 11(1)(e). Detailed at id. at Annex I, §§ 2, 3. 
 552. Id. at art. 11(1)(f). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 6. 
 553. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1)(g). Detailed at id. at 
Annex I, § 10. 
 554. Id. at art. 11(1)(h). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 4, Annex II. 
 555. Id. at art. 11(1)(i). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 7. 
 556. Id. at art. 11(1)(j). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 1. 
92http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
2015] OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES 883 
 
exploration and production of methane hydrates needs to be 
identified and cataloged. Not only surface-related hazards, but 
also those subsea- and seabed-related should be thus identified. 
The potential environmental harms from venting or seeping 
methane and resultant metabolites, such as carbon dioxide, needs 
to be inventoried. If additional chemicals are involved in the 
production of methane hydrates, such as injected carbon dioxide 
or in-situ fuels and oxidizers, then their potential environmental 
harms also need to be included in that study. The interactive 
effects of multiple wells into a common deposit, the effects of 
various production stimulation efforts, the impacts of field 
deterioration, and all of the combination events that might 
impact major hazards or major accidents should be analyzed. 
With regard to methane hydrates, particular attention needs to 
be placed on subsea and seabed activities. The likelihood and 
consequences of all of the major hazards of methane hydrate 
exploration and production need to be determined. 
Environmental, meteorological and seabed limitations on safe 
operations need to be evaluated from the perspective of methane 
hydrate fields and not from traditional oil and gas well stability 
perspectives. Similarly, the environmental conditions for 
methane hydrates may need to include consequences from 
landslides, tsunamis, and oxygen-deprived atmospheres near the 
major accident sites. A list of operations and expected correlated 
major hazards will need to be drawn up for methane hydrate 
exploration and production. While an operator would need to 
report on the number of persons adjacent to the installation per 
the Offshore Directive, it might not suffice to stop there. 
Operators should probably advise on the number of people who, 
while not involved in the operations of the installation, may still 
be impacted as a “first wave” of injuries or deaths. Due to the 
tsunami, landslides, and atmospheric fire risks, those people 
might be some distance from the installation. 
The Member States will need to prepare their own SEAs as 
they develop their “plans and programs” in response to the 
Offshore Directive and each prospective operator will be expected 
to complete their own EIAs as they bring projects forward for 
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licensing and approvals; licensing authorities are required to 
consult with competent authorities.557 
Prior to the onset of well operations and the commencement 
of offshore exploration and production, the Member States are 
required to ensure that the operators have in place internal 
emergency response plans.558  The Member States are to ensure 
the operator retains and maintains appropriate expertise and 
equipment to perform its internal emergency response plans 
without delay whenever major hazards should emerge.559  The 
Member States are also required to bring forward their own 
external emergency response plans and acts of emergency 
preparedness.560  Annex VII and Annex VIII provide guidelines 
for the drafting of the external emergency response plans 
together with the operators;561 once drafted, the plans should be 
shared with the Commission and the general public for 
feedback.562 
Once operations commence, the Member States have the duty 
to require that the operator is taking all reasonable steps, in light 
of the definition of suitable, to carry out its functions and duties 
under the Offshore Directive.563  If a Member State ascertains 
that an operator no longer has the capacity to meet the relevant 
requirements, it should remove that operator and propose a 
replacement operator to the licensing authority.564  Amidst all of 
the EIA and similar risk and hazard studies that need to be 
presented, reviewed and enforced, the Member States need to 
enforce a variety of other measures as well. The Member States 
must ensure that only properly licensed parties are operators of 
installations within their jurisdictions.565  Member States are 
required to enforce safety zones around the approved and 
 
 557. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., § 16. See also id. at art. 4(2), 
art. 5(1). 
 558. Id. at art. 28(1). 
 559. Id. at art. 28(2). 
 560. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 29(1). 
 561. Id. at Annex VII, VIII. 
 562. Id. at art. 29(3). 
 563. Id. at art. 6(3). 
 564. Id. at art. 6(4). 
 565. Id. at art. 6(1), (2). 
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permitted installations.566  The Member States need to ensure 
that independent verification of the various risk and hazard 
studies is performed prior to the completion of design for 
production installations or prior to the onset of operations for 
non-production installations; the Member States must provide 
that the feedback from independent verifiers must be taken into 
consideration by the operators.567  The Member States are to 
ensure that both the plans and the equipment necessary to 
address major hazards or major accidents is constantly kept 
ready and in place by the operators.568  If the operator is also 
registered within their jurisdiction, Member States are also 
required to investigate major accidents outside of the EU.569 
The Offshore Directive provides for extensive research and 
investigation into the potential causes and concerns related to 
major hazards and accidents. Note the constellation of required 
documents focused on safe operation of offshore operations: the 
report on major hazards, a safety and environmental 
management system, a corporate major accident prevention 
policy, and the combination of internal and external emergency 
response plans.570  When combined, they present a host of 
obligations on the part of potential operators of offshore methane 
hydrate operations. 
The report on major hazards, for either production 
installations or non-production installations, should be developed 
by the operator in conjunction with its workers’ 
representatives.571  In addition to data on the companies and 
employees involved in the proposed installation, the report should 
include a complete description of the proposed installation.572 
 
 566. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 6(7). 
 567. Id. at art. 17. 
 568. Id. at art. 19. See id. at Annex IV for additional requirements. 
 569. Id. at art. 20. 
 570. See Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1). 
 571. Id. at arts. 12, 13. 
 572. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at Annex I, §§ 2(1), 2(2), 2(4). 
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5.   Carbon Capture and Sequestration Directive 
Directive 2009/31, the “CCS Directive,”573 provides for the 
regulation of geological storage of carbon dioxide. 
a.   Applicability to Offshore Methane 
Hydrates 
While the CCS Directive is intended to apply to the 
sequestration of carbon dioxide, as discussed in Chapter 3, many 
suggested plans for offshore methane hydrate projects include 
carbon dioxide injection and sequestration into the depleted 
methane hydrate reservoirs. In those cases, the CCS Directive 
would apply directly to those types of offshore methane hydrate 
projects. Also, the concerns with gas leakage from subsurface 
reservoirs parallel the risks of the offshore methane hydrate 
production stage and the abandonment and sequestration stage. 
The geological storage of carbon dioxide for the purposes of 
the CCS Directive is defined to be the injection of carbon dioxide 
streams into underground geological formations.574  The CCS 
Directive applies to all geological storage of carbon dioxide within 
the territory of the Member States, including within their EEZs 
and on their continental shelves per UNCLOS.575  If the methane 
hydrates from those offshore zones were developed in conjoined 
re-injection of carbon dioxide into the hydrate deposits, then the 
CCS Directive would apply to the methane hydrate project. The 
storage of carbon dioxide within the water column is 
prohibited.576 
 
 573. Directive 2009/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide and Amending Council 
Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 
1013/2006, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114 [hereinafter CCS Directive]. 
 574. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 3(1). 
 575. Id. at art. 2(1). See also id. at art. 2(2) (describing exclusions of certain 
research and testing projects from regulation under the Directive). 
 576. Id. at art. 2(4). This is parallel to the regulations in the Marine 
Framework, which do regulate the emission of carbon dioxide and methane 
gases into the water column. See infra Part IV. When methane is released at a 
depth into the water column with insufficient velocity, methane is likely to 
become metabolized by local biota into carbon dioxide. It is not reasonable that 
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b.   Risk Governance Within the CCS Directive 
The preamble to the CCS Directive indicated that the 
liability matters related to the operations of CCS facilities is to be 
broken up by the underlying character of the damages. 
Environmental harms and damages are to be governed by the 
ELD577 and climate change harms and damages by the Directive 
2003/87.578 
As was discussed, supra at Section 3.4.6, the ELD itself 
provides little foundation for governing the risks associated with 
offshore methane hydrates; so to the extent that environmental 
harms would result, the Offshore Directive would likely not 
provide sufficient incentives to the operators to employ optimal 
levels of precaution or activity. It is also unclear, due to the 
bifurcated liability rules of the ELD, if methane hydrate 
accidents would be governed under its strict liability rule for 
Annex III activities or under its article 3.1(b) “at fault” rules. 
Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended, provides for penalties in 
the case of unpermitted or excessive greenhouse gas emissions.579  
Violators are required to purchase and submit sufficient 
allowances, or to pay an excess emissions penalty.580  There is no 
provision for civil liability; the effort to govern greenhouse gases 
is solely regulatory in nature. This Directive would apply to 
vented or seeped methane from offshore methane hydrate 
projects, as methane is one of the listed greenhouse gases under 
Annex II of the Directive.581 
 
such transport of methane into the water column should be interpreted as 
water-storage of carbon dioxide. 
 577. See supra Part III(A) for a discussion of risk governance under the ELD. 
 578. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at pmbl., § 30. The directive that 
established the greenhouse gas emission trading systems within the EU is 
Directive 2003/87. See Directive 2003/87, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 October 2003 on Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 [hereinafter Greenhouse Gas 
Mechanism]. 
 579. Greenhouse Gas Mechanism, supra note 578, at art. 16. 
 580. Id. at art. 16(2), (3). 
 581. The list of chemicals denoted as greenhouse gases are: carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur 
hexafluoride. Id. at Annex II. 
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Member states are required to enact penalties for regulatory 
noncompliance within domestic law that are “effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive.”582 
i.   Assignments of Liability 
In the event of a “significant irregularity,” the competent 
authority must require the operator to take the necessary 
corrective measures. 583  If the operator fails to do so, then the 
competent authority is required to assume control and undertake 
the necessary corrective measures itself, with the operator 
remaining liable for the costs of such efforts.584  While the 
original version of Directive 2003/87/EC provided that greenhouse 
gas emissions related to force majeure events would be potentially 
excludable from penalty, the current enactment no longer 
contains that provision.585 
At the closing of the facility, the operator is to remain liable 
for the potential accidents from the storage facility until it has 
been deemed that the carbon dioxide will have been completely 
and permanently contained.586  After that point in time, the 
liabilities for the storage facility would be transferred to a 
competent authority.587 
ii.   Regulatory Actions 
When the CCS Directive is applicable, the operators will be 
required to complete EIAs. The selection of storage sites,588 the 
permitting of exploration permits,589 and the permitting of 
storage,590 are likely to be seen as part of a “private project . . . 
likely to have significant effects on the environment” and 
 
 582. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 28. See also id. at pmbl., § 42. 
 583. Id. at art. 16(1), (2). 
 584. Id. at art. 16(4), (5). 
 585. Greenhouse Gas Mechanism, supra note 578, at art. 29. 
 586. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 17(2). 
 587. Id. at art. 18(1). 
 588. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 4. 
 589. Id. at art. 5. 
 590. Id. at art. 6. 
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“involving the extraction of mineral resources,” and thus require 
the completion of an EIA.591 
If an EIA is required, then the CCS Directive provides clear 
guidance on safety planning with regards to overall geological 
stability and risk assessment.592  These safety regulations are 
also a strong model for regulating the field safety of methane 
hydrate projects. In many places, one could replace “storage 
complex” with “methane hydrate deposit” and have a good first 
approximation of draft methane hydrate regulations. 
Annex I to the CCS Directive provides detailed guidance on 
what data and analyses should be provided in evaluating the 
safety of the storage complex of the CCS project and its 
surrounding area.593  First, a wide array of scientific and 
engineering data must be collected. 594  Then, a variety of models 
must be produced to research potential future risks and hazards. 
595 
 
 591. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 1(1), (2). 
 592. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 7 (detailing the informational 
requirements for storage permits). An assessment of the expected reliability of 
the storage facility is required at article 7(3), the engineering details of expected 
field operations are required at article 7(4), and a description of the preventative 
measures on significant irregularities are required at article 7(5). Id. at art. 13 
requires an extensive monitoring capability prior to permitting. Ongoing 
comparisons between modeling expectations and observed data are required at 
article 13(1)(a); the detection of significant irregularities is required at article 
13(1)(b); the detection of migrating gas volumes is required at article 13(1)(c), 
the detection of leaking gas volumes is required at article 13(1)(d); the detection 
of significant adverse effects to the environment is required at article 13(1)(e); 
the assessment of the effectiveness of corrective measures is required at article 
13(1)(f); and the continual assessment of the overall safety and stability of the 
storage complex is required at article 13(1)(g). 
 593. Id. at Annex I, Steps 1, 2, 3. 
 594. Id. at Step 1. Steps 1(a) through (g) requires the collection of a wide 
variety of data types, including geology and geophysics, hydro-geology, reservoir 
engineering, geochemistry, geo-mechanics, and seismicity and surveillance on 
natural and man-made pathways that could provide leakage pathways. Steps 
1(h) through (l) require the collation of potential interactions with local flora, 
fauna, and habitats. 
 595. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at Steps 2, 3. Step 2 requires the building 
of a complicated three-dimensional geological earth model that can be used to 
forecast and understand likely stability and danger scenarios. Step 3 requires 
that the model developed in Step 2 be used to perform dynamic behavior models 
of the CCS activities. 
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The CCS Directive provides a detailed method for conducing 
risk assessments. There are three main components of that 
assessment, the exposure assessment, the effects assessment, and 
the risk characterization.596  The exposure assessment focuses on 
the “environment and the distribution and activities of the 
human population above the storage complex, and the potential 
behaviour and fate of leaking CO2 from potential pathways.”597  
This assessment demonstrates the nexus of the communities at 
risk versus the potential location of hazardous ventings and 
seepages. The effects assessment examines the particular risks 
and hazards of the venting and seeping gas on the various biota 
in the impacted communities, including on humans.598  The risk 
characterization is a combination of several reports on the short-
term and long-term expected safety, or lack thereof, from the 
proposed conditions of field usage.599  The risk characterization 
should also include analysis and modeling of worst-case 
scenarios.600 
6.   The Marine Framework 
a.   Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
The MSF Directive requires that Member States develop 
strategies to ensure the present health and future viability of EU 
marine ecosystems and that such plans are developed and in 
place by the year 2020.601 
To the extent that the “programme of measures” called for 
under the Directive qualify as “plans and programmes’” under the 
SEA Directive, then they should be coordinated with the 
requirements of the SEA Directive; as such, there are 
opportunities for the public to engage in the drafting of the MSF 
Directive’s “programme of measure.”602 
 
 596. Id. at Steps 3.3.2-3.3.4. 
 597. Id. at Step 3.3.2. 
 598. Id. at Step 3.3.3. 
 599. Id. at Step 3.3.4. 
 600. Id. 
 601. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 1(1). 
 602. See id. at art. 5(2)(b). See also SEA Directive, supra note 350, art. 2(a). 
100http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
2015] OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES 891 
 
The Member States are obligated under the Directive to 
implement marine strategies to: 
(a) protect and preserve the marine environment, prevent its 
deterioration or, where practicable, restore marine ecosystems in 
areas where they have been adversely affected;” 
“(b) prevent and reduce inputs in the marine environment, with a 
view to phasing out pollution . . . so as to ensure that there are no 
significant impacts on or risks to marine biodiversity, marine 
ecosystems, human health or legitimate uses of the sea.603 
The reference to “no significant impacts” clearly requires 
some rationalization of which harms are significant and which 
impacts are not; ergo, it recognizes that some impacts are indeed 
tolerable and acceptable. An ecosystem level perspective is an 
applied marine strategy, which also suggests a net-sum 
perspective and the legislative permission to make trade-offs for 
the greater social welfare, as the same section calls for the 
sustainable use of marine resources for future generations of 
human beings.604 
The MSF Directive has a broad definition of marine waters, 
which are defined as including the “waters, seabed and subsoil on 
the seaward side of the baseline” extending as far out as its 
Member States exercise jurisdiction under UNCLOS, to the EEZ 
or coastal shelf claims.605 Marine waters also include coastal 
waters, to the extent not already addressed by other EU 
Directives or legislation.606 Major marine areas already covered 
by separate conventions are also included within the scope of the 
MSF Directive’s purview.607 
Good environmental status is positively defined with the 
upbeat markers of ecological diversity, of clean, healthy, and 
productive oceans, and of sustainability for the future 
 
 603. Id. at art. 1(2)(a), (b). 
 604. Id. at art. 1(3). 
 605. Id. at art. 3(1)(a). See supra Part III(A)(1) for a discussion on UNCLOS, 
the EEZ, and other marine jurisdictions. 
 606. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 3(1)(b). 
 607. Id. at art. 4(1)-(2). For examples of pre-existing conventions, see 
Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, Bonn Agreement, supra note 209, and 
Helsinki Convention, supra note 257. 
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generations.608 The physiographic, geographic, geologic, climatic, 
hydro-morphological, physical, and chemical properties and 
characteristics of the ecosystems must be protected and 
preserved.609 Pollution is defined as the direct or indirect 
introduction into the marine waters of items that could cause 
harm to those marine water ecosystems.610 Sources of pollution 
can include human activity, substances, energy, and 
anthropogenic noise.611 
i. Applicability to Offshore Methane 
Hydrates 
The MSF Directive, would likely apply to the development of 
methane hydrate projects. 
The regulation of methane hydrate projects could be effected 
via the development of specific components of marine strategies 
applied to areas containing methane hydrate deposits. The MSF 
Directive requires its implementation in all of the marine areas of 
the EU and its Member States dependencies,612 thus it covers the 
areas that contain methane hydrates.613 
Each area containing methane hydrate deposits will need to 
address them within a program of measures to achieve and 
maintain good environmental status.614  When the hydrates 
overlay transboundary marine ecosystems, the Directive calls for 
a regional cooperative effort.615  If pre-existing regional 
 
 608. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 3(5). 
 609. Id. at art. 3(5)(a)-(b). 
 610. Id. at art. 3(8). 
 611. Id. Thus, the activities of the development and operation of a methane 
hydrate project would conceivably engage in multiple potential sources of 
pollution beyond just methane leakages and venting; they could introduce a 
variety of noises or energy sources into the marine waters. Additionally, there is 
potentially an argument to be made that the energy released into the ocean by 
methane hydrate related landslides or tsunamis could be seen as energy 
releases from the project, and thus be listed as a source of pollution under this 
Directive. 
 612. Id. at art. 4(1)-(2). 
 613. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, §§ 4-5, 
for a discussion on methane hydrate geography. 
 614. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 5(2)(b)(i). 
 615. Id. at art. 6(1)-(2). 
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conventions are already in place, then those conventions are 
called on to extend to adopt these measures and strategies.616 
The marine strategies would need to adopt a survey position 
on the targeted good environmental status, and the strategies are 
to be developed in alignment with the descriptor elements in the 
Directive’s Annex I, and the scientific factors at Annex III.617  The 
programs should itemize what actions need to be undertaken to 
ensure the achievement or maintenance of good environmental 
statuses for the targeted marine environments.618 The programs 
should establish a set of indicators and tests that can provide on-
going metrics for the observation of the programs once in place.619  
It is required that the programs of measures are cost-effective 
and technically feasible and that cost-benefit analyses are 
undertaken to affirm those requirements prior to the placement 
of those measures into service.620  The costs of the development of 
the plans and their placement into service are to be supported by 
EU funding due to the priority of the agenda to sustainably 
preserve the marine environment.621 
It is at that pre-activation stage of planning that methane 
hydrates and the potential for harms and hazards from the 
development of methane hydrates projects could be included 
within these marine strategies. Particular attention could be 
brought to the potential to affect sea-floor integrity,622 as seen 
with anthropogenic stressors leading to additional methane 
venting or seeping with its potential for subsea landslides. 
Similarly, the various activities and effects of methane hydrate 
exploration and extraction could lead to various introductions of 
noise and energy that could adversely affect the marine 
environment, these potential sources of pollution need to be 
discussed under the Directive. 623  The potential for the effects of 
vented or seeped methane to create eutrophication in the waters 
 
 616. Id. at art. 6. 
 617. Id. at art. 3(5). See also id. at art. 8(1)(a). 
 618. Id. at art. 13(1). 
 619. Id. at art. 10(1). 
 620. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 13(3). 
 621. Id. at art. 22(1)-(2). 
 622. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at Annex I, § 6. 
 623. Id. at Annex I, § 11. 
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and its potential adverse effects on marine biota could be another 
point of concern under the Directive.624  The observation of 
metrics on these concerns should be supported under the program 
of measures; if the above concerns are found covered by the 
Directive, effective monitoring programs should be put in 
place.625 
The Commission issued its Methodological Standards 
Decision to further implement the MSF Directive.626  The 
Decision provided an annex with greater depth on the 
environmental factors to consider when implementing the MSF 
Directive.627  There are substantial concerns raised on the overall 
chemical effects of emissions into the water columns, such as 
nutrient levels, nutrient enrichment, and the effects on oxygen 
levels, all of which could be impacted by the methane venting and 
seeping.628 Also, potential physical damages to the seabed and 
subsurface are detailed. “The main concern for management 
purposes is the magnitude of impacts of human activities on 
seafloor substrates structuring the benthic habitats. Among the 
substrate types, biogenic substrates, which are the most sensitive 
to physical disturbance, provide a range of functions that support 
benthic habitats and communities.”629 
Similarly at Descriptor 7, there are concerns on the geological 
and hydrographical impacts from marine activities: “Permanent 
alterations of the hydrographical conditions by human activities 
may consist for instance of changes in the tidal regime, sediment 
and freshwater transport, current or wave action, leading to 
modifications of the physical and chemicals characteristics set out 
 
 624. Id. at Annex I, § 5. 
 625. Id. at Annex V. See also id. at arts. 11(1), 24. 
 626. Commission Decision 2010/477, Commission Decision of 1 September 
2010 on Criteria and Methodological Standards on Good Environmental Status 
of Marine Waters, 2010 O.J. (L 232) 14 [hereinafter Methodological Standards 
Decision]. 
 627. See id. at Annex, pt. A. 
 628. Id. at pt. B, §§ 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. See also MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY 
ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, § 3 (discussing methane in water column). 
 629. Methodological Standards Decision, supra note 626, at Annex, pt. B, 
§ 6.1. See id. § 6.2. 
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in Table 1 of Annex III to Directive 2008/56/EC.”630  “Such 
changes may be particularly relevant whenever they have the 
potential to affect marine ecosystems at a broader scale and their 
assessment may provide an early warning of possible impacts on 
the ecosystem.”631 
The concerns within Descriptor 7 certainly fit the character 
of methane hydrate projects.632  The overall extraction of 
methane from the hydrate deposits will be substantially an 
exercise in sediment and freshwater transport. The potential for 
landslides or tsunamis from cascade events from methane 
venting or seeping could impact currents and wave action. These 
issues could certainly have the potential to affect marine 
ecosystems on a broader scale. Thus, methane hydrate projects 
would likely be regulated under this Decision, if they were 
regulated under the MSF Directive. 
ii. Risk Governance Within the MSF 
Directive 
Broadly speaking, the MSF Directive is not liability focused, 
but rather it is focused on the development of regulatory 
structures to ensure the maintenance of good marine 
environments; nowhere within the Directive does it provide for 
liability rules or regulatory punishments.633  The Directive does 
not interface with the behavior of private parties, except 
indirectly through the implementation of the marine strategies. 
While not a system of civil liability, it does assign both a duty 
to Member States to retain and maintain certain good 
environmental statuses within their marine waters and it 
clarifies that they are to do so with cost-effective and technically 
 
 630. Methodological Standards Decision, supra note 626, at Annex pt. B, 
Descriptor 7. 
 631. Id. at pt. B. 
 632. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, §§ 3, 4 
(discussing methane hydrate hazards). 
 633. The only sense of enforcement of the MSF Directive would be in the sense 
that any Directive is enforceable within general EU mechanisms, but as the 
MSF Directive is aimed at Member State action and not private parties, civil 
liability rules would not be applicable for failure to develop policy and plans. 
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feasible means.634  A broad sense of cost/benefit analysis is found 
throughout the Directive. 
b.   Dangerous Substances Directive 
The Dangerous Substances Directive will not apply to the 
development of methane hydrate projects because it has been 
phased out and superseded by the MSF Directive.635  However, 
much of its guidance will survive within other sources 
incorporated into the corpus of material surrounding the MSF 
Directive, so a brief review is warranted.636 
The Directive provides, Member States are to take the 
appropriate steps to eliminate pollution.637  Pollution is defined 
similarly to the MSF Directive.638  States are required to develop 
and implement programs to address discharges into the waters; if 
the substances are listed in Annex I’s List II, then the substances 
need to be given prior authorization by the competent 
authorities.639 Technically, this suggests that such emissions 
would be permitted, and thus exempted from the ELD as 
permitted activities.640 
Of particular interest is the potential lack of methane from 
the listed substances under Annex I. List I of Annex I presents 
 
 634. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 1(2)(a)-(b); 
id. at art. 13(3). 
 635. Directive 2006/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
February 2006 on Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances 
Discharged into the Aquatic Environment of the Community, 2006 O.J. (L 64) 
52 [hereinafter Dangerous Substances Directive]. 
 636. The argument here is that it is reasonable that no lessening of 
environmental protections was intended by the adoption of the MSF Directive, 
and to the extent that the Dangerous Substances Directive provides ecological 
safety standards one could reasonably assume that such guidelines, for the most 
part, remain persuasive and effective. Directive 67/548, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 1967 on the Approximation of Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Classification, 
Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances, 1967 O.J. (L 196) 1. 
 637. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at art. 3; see id. at 
Annex I-II. 
 638. Compare id. at art. 2(e), with Marine Strategy Framework Directive, 
supra note 515, at Annex II, § 8. 
 639. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at art. 6(2). 
 640. See discussion on the Environmental Liability Directive, supra Part 
III(D)(3)(a).  
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“persistent mineral oils and hydrocarbons of petroleum origin,”641 
but methane is not a persistent hydrocarbon as it evaporates and 
dissipates rapidly if not explosively. List I also provides a listing 
for those substances that are carcinogenic, but methane is not 
generally thought to be carcinogenic.642 List II includes “non-
persistent mineral oils and hydrocarbons of petroleum origin,” 
but it is not clear from the combined usage of oils and petroleum, 
(i.e., literally “oil from rocks”), that gaseous methane would be 
included, whereas gasoline would surely be included.643  Also, 
List II includes substances that could affect the taste or smell of 
products derived from the waters for human consumption.644 It is 
unclear if vented or seeping methane in the water column would 
affect the taste or smell of seafood or other such products. Ergo, 
methane hydrate projects might have been regulated under List 
II of Annex I, but it is uncertain. 
c.   Water Framework Directive 
The WFD is very similar in intent and operations to the MSF 
Directive.645  Instead of a focus on marine and oceanic waters, the 
WFD places its focus on what might be called a river basin 
perspective because it focuses on inland waters, coastal waters, 
lakes, and rivers.646  Where rivers flow into coastal areas and 
have confluence with saline marine waters, those transitional 
waters are covered by the WFD.647  Due to this focus on waters 
inland and very near the coast, it is unlikely that methane 
hydrate deposits would be found in those waters, and thus it is 
 
 641. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at Annex I. List I, § 7. 
 642. Id. Annex I, List 1, § 4. See also N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCE FACT SHEET (2011), available at 
http://nj.gov/health/eoh/rtkweb/documents/fs/1202.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D6KP-L75X (for non-carcinogenic character of methane, see the 
health advisory on methane provided by the New Jersey Department of Health). 
 643. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at Annex I, List II, § 6. 
 644. Id. at Annex I, List II, § 3. 
 645. Directive 2000/60, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
October 2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of 
Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 [hereinafter Water Framework Directive]. 
 646. Id. at art. 2(13); see also id., at art. 3(1); id. at art. 4(1); id. at art. 2(1), (4)-
(6). 
 647. Water Framework Directive, supra note 645, at art. 2(1), (6). 
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unlikely that methane hydrate projects would be directly 
regulated by the WFD.648 
The WFD has a very similar definition of pollution to the one 
found in the MSF Directive.649  Similar goals of healthy aquatic 
ecosystems, found within the MSF Directive, can also be found 
within the WFD’s good ecological status, good ecological potential, 
quantitative status, and good quantitative status terms.650  The 
Member States are required to develop programs of measures 
that can achieve the ecological and environmental goals set out 
within the WFD.651  Thus, the SEA Directive also covers these 
programs, which is similar to the interface found within the MSF 
Directive.652 The WFD also requires coordination with other 
environmental oriented directives, including the EIA Directive.653 
7.   Greenhouse Gas Mechanism 
The EU has implemented the UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol.654 Once a year, the Commission compiles a EU 
greenhouse gas inventory.655  This inventory accounts for each 
 
 648. The caveat here is that the onshore facilities of a methane hydrate 
project, and those appurtenances in proximity to those installations in coastal 
waters, might be regulated under the WFD. 
 649. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 3(8); Water 
Framework Directive, supra note 645, at art. 2(33). 
 650. Water Framework Directive, supra note 645, at art. 2(22), (23), (26), (28). 
 651. Id. at arts. 11, 16, 17 (discussing the requirement to develop programs of 
measures); see also id. at art. 4 (discussing the overall environmental objectives 
of the Water Frameworks Directive). 
 652. See supra Part III(D)(2).   
 653. Water Framework Directive, supra note 645, at Annex VI, pt. A. See also 
id. at Annex VI, pt. A, § (v) (referencing the EIA Directive). 
 654. For adoption of the UNFCCC, see Council Decision 94/69, Council 
Decision of 15 December 1993 Concerning the Conclusion of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1994 O.J. (L 33) 11. For adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol, see Council Decision 2002/358, Council Decision of 25 April 
2002 Concerning the Approval, on Behalf of the European Community, of the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Joint Fulfilment of Commitments Thereunder, 2002 O.J. (L 
130) 1 [hereinafter Decision 2002/358]. See also Decision 280/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 Concerning a 
Mechanism for Monitoring Community Greenhouse Gas Emissions and for 
Implementing the Kyoto Protocol, 2004. O.J. (L 49) 1 [hereinafter Decision 
280/2004]. 
 655. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 4(1). 
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Member State’s greenhouse gas emissions and sinks.656  To assist 
in the coordination of the inventory, the Community and its 
Member States establish registries to ensure accurate accounting, 
tracking, and accrual of records and credits.657 
Decision 280/2004 provides for the monitoring mechanisms 
required under those agreements.658  The Commission Decision 
2010/778 finally set the targeted levels of emissions in 2010.659  
These two greenhouse gas decisions effectively coordinate the 
EU’s compliance efforts under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
a. Applicability to Offshore Methane 
Hydrates 
The development of methane hydrate projects potentially put 
at risk large reserves of methane, a listed greenhouse gas. 660  
Accidents, minor or major, could be considered greenhouse gas 
emission events. 
The Kyoto Protocol called for the monitoring of all 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrogen oxides, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur 
hexafluoride.661 
Decision 280/2004 set a mechanism to monitor all 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources and 
sinks.662 Decision 280/2004 provides an accounting for both the 
outward emission of greenhouse gases and an accounting of the 
capture and/or sequestration of greenhouse gases to provide a net 
 
 656. Id. at art. 4(2). 
 657. Id. at art. 6(1). 
 658. See Decision 280/2004, supra note 654. 
 659. Council Decision 2010/778, Commission Decision of 15 December 2010 
Amending Decision 2006/944/EC Determining the Respective Emission Levels 
Allocated to the Community and Each of its Member States Under the Kyoto 
Protocol Pursuant to Council Decision 2002/358/EC (notified under document 
C(2010) 9009), 2010 O.J. (L 332) 41 [hereinafter Decision 2010/778]. 
 660. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 3(1)(a). See also discussion on 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra Part III(A)(3).  
 661. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 3(1)(a). See also discussion on 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra Part III(A)(3).  
 662. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 1(a). 
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number emitted.663  Carbon dioxide and methane are both listed 
as greenhouse gases to be monitored under the program.664 
b. Governing Risk Within the Greenhouse 
Gas Mechanism 
The Greenhouse gas mechanism is regulatory in nature and 
does not contemplate civil liability matters. There are financial 
mechanisms to dissuade Member States from exceeding their 
obligatory emission limits. Routine emissions of methane or 
carbon dioxide would need to be contained within the emission 
targets; methane hydrate projects would need strategies that 
balanced emission permits for routine emissions, emission credits 
for sinking activities on-site, and potential penalties for 
unpermitted emissions.665  There does not appear to be a 
regulatory plan for cataclysmic levels of methane gas emissions. 
The EU has committed itself and its Member States to 
reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases.666  Member States 
are committed to specific reductions of their greenhouse gases.667  
Directives 2002/358, 280/2004 and 2010/778 require that each 
Member State, and the EU as a community, achieve targeted 
emissions level maximums, as listed and detailed in Directive 
2010/778.668 
The Directive provides that Member State emissions need to 
remain within a specified range; they can remain within a three-
year moving average and they can offset by five percent by 
borrowing from other year’s allotments.669  Member States can 
also consume Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and 
 
 663. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 3(1). 
 664. Id. at art. 3(1)(a). See also Decision 406/2009 at art. 2(1), discussed infra 
note 666. 
 665. With regards to potential penalties, see supra Part III(D)(5)(b). 
 666. Decision 406/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the Effort of Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction 
Commitments up to 2020, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 136 [hereinafter Decision 406/2009]. 
 667. Id. at art. 3(1). 
 668. Id. at art. 7(1). See generally Decision 2002/358, supra note 654; Decision 
280/2004, supra note 654; Decision 2010/778, supra note 659. 
 669. Decision 406/2009, supra note 666, at art. 3. 
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Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) to account for reductions in 
their overall emissions.670 
The EU provides financial incentives to remain on target for 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions. First, the EU can sanction 
a Member State by reducing their next year’s allotment by the 
amount overused in the current year, as multiplied by 1.08.671  
Next, the Member State can be required to develop a corrective 
action plan within three months of a notification of default.672  
Finally, the Member States ability to plan, trade, and coordinate 
with other states can be curtailed until the emission targets are 
met.673 
E.   Federal Laws of the U.S. 
The U.S. federal regulatory regime includes several major 
planks that might address harms from methane hydrate 
hazards.674 They include: 
i. the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)675 
ii. the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),676 
iii. the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),677 
iv. the Clean Water Act (CWA),678 
v. the U.S.’s adoption of the International Convention 
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969,679 
 
 670. Decision 406/2009, supra note 666, at art. 5(1). The Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) are established under 
Directive 2003/87, see supra Part III(D)(5)(b). 
 671. Decision 406/2009, supra note 666, at art. 7(1)(a). 
 672. Id. at art. 7(1)(b), 7(2). 
 673. Id. at art. 7(1)(c). 
 674. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 10-12. 
 675. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-70 (2012). 
 676. See Outer Continental Shelf Resource Management Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801-66, repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 507 (1990) (repealing §§ 
1813-24, the remainder of the Act is currently still in force). 
 677. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-62. 
 678. See Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1972 (Clean 
Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388. 
 679. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-87. 
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vi. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan,680 
vii.  the Clean Air Act (CAA),681 and 
viii. the Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act 
(MHRDA).682 
The federal laws of the U.S. read like a spoonful of alphabet 
soup. NEPA, OSCLA, OPA, and the CWA would be the primary 
federal laws applicable to the development of offshore methane 
hydrates in American jurisdictional waters.683 
The NEPA supports the function of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. de facto environmental 
ministry.684  All existing and future acts of legislation and 
substantially related regulations need review by the EPA under 
NEPA. After enactment, the EPA would steward the overall 
management and enforcement of those environmental rules.685 
Most importantly, the EPA would likely steward enforcement 
litigation in the case of environmental damages. Thus, the EPA is 
granted wide and substantive authority to determine the scope 
and requirements of future regulatory efforts related to offshore 
methane hydrates. 
The OSCLA provides the underlying access to licensing 
offshore federally administered minerals.686  Critically important, 
OSCLA splits responsibility for specifically mineral-related 
planning from the EPA to the Commerce Department. To the 
extent that precautionary regulations or standards relate to 
offshore methane hydrates themselves, they would need to be 
developed or approved. This approval would fall to the Secretary 
of Commerce to approve them. Thus, the environmental damages 
would be bifurcated into those directly related to offshore 
methane hydrate operations, and those only indirectly so 
damaged; one set of regulations would be developed primarily 
 
 680. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2014). 
 681. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671. 
 682. See Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act of 2000, 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 2001-06. 
 683. See infra the conclusions of Parts III(E)(1)-III(E)(8).  
 684. See infra Part III(E)(1).  
 685. See infra Part III(E)(1). 
 686. See infra Part III(E)(2).  
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from a commerce perspective, and the other from a primarily 
environmental perspective. In this result, the U.S. demonstrates 
that its approach to offshore methane hydrate planning would 
likely be commercially centered. Once the Commerce Department 
issues its safety regulations to protect the human, marine, and 
coastal environments, the Secretary, the Coast Guard, and the 
U.S. Army are required to enforce those safety and environmental 
regulations.687 
The OPA applies to incidents of crude oil spills into the 
marine environment.688  It has a very sophisticated strict liability 
rule alongside a system of liability assignment and of algorithmic 
liability caps based on tonnages, vessel types, and activities.689  It 
also provides two modes of liability caps for those operators 
acting non-grossly negligent and those acting grossly negligent. 
Yet, as it primarily addresses crude oil, if a methane hydrates 
accident does not co-produce oil into the ocean, then the OPA 
likely would not apply.690 
The CWA suffers from the same oil-focus as the OPA. As 
such, it would likely not apply to offshore methane hydrate 
accidents.691 However, again like the OPA, it provides a well-
developed regulatory system of negative incentives to punitively 
encourage operators to not spill oil.692  Daily fees or per-barrels-
spilt fees can be imposed, and the powers to bring tortfeasors to 
court are also provided under the CWA.693  It was these powers 
that first brought attention to the question of how many barrels 
were spilled at the BP Macondo incident, because the disparity in 
spillage estimates created billions of dollars in penalty 
differences. But again, while the CWA has a long and useful 
history of addressing crude oil and other hazardous substances in 
the ocean and other waterways, it does not currently have the 
ambit to cover oceanic methane emissions. 
 
 687. See infra Part II.  
 688. See infra Part III(E)(3).  
 689. See id. 
 690. See id. 
 691. See infra Part III(E)(4).  
 692. See id. 
 693. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7). 
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It is important to note, while the U.S. does not belong to 
UNCLOS, it does generally recognize similar legal notions 
developed within UNCLOS, thus the U.S. does claim an EEZ 
beyond its traditional coastal waters.694  Also, while some 
methane hydrates might be found within state jurisdictional 
waters, the majority of the methane hydrate deposits are 
expected to be located in federal waters. And finally, while the 
methane hydrates might lay offshore in federal waters, onshore 
damages might be spread across multiple state jurisdictions with 
distinguishable common law traditions on tortious damages and 
differing state codes on liabilities. Thus, the U.S. model would be 
more complicated than surveyed herein. 
Nevertheless, these federal laws as a whole comport well 
with the recommendations of Section 2 for a complementary 
implementation of both strict liability and public regulations. 
Additionally, the particular semantic structure of the federal laws 
might facilitate the adaption of those rules more readily than 
might be the case in other jurisdictions. Given that combination, 
it could be reasonably argued that the U.S. federal laws might be 
expanded to include the circumstances of offshore methane 
hydrates. Additionally, most of the federal laws have been in 
place for multiple decades and offer a sense of establishment and 
reliability that could be built upon. 
1.   National Environmental Protection Act 
Broadly stated, NEPA provides a wide base of authority to 
the EPA to enable deliberative efforts to be made to protect the 
environment of the U.S.695 
NEPA contains neither direct provisions to civil liabilities nor 
regulatory penalties; it resembles the afore-discussed EU EIA 
Directive in that manner.696  But its overall impact is to provide 
public information, which could very much impact both the 
development of regulations and the implementation of civil 
liability rules. 
 
 694. See infra Part III(E)(2).  
 695. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70. 
 696. See discussion on the EU’s EIA Directive, supra Part III(D)(1).  
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NEPA directs the EPA to handle a variety of executive and 
regulatory matters related to environmental legislation. One of 
its key duties under NEPA is the creation and administration of 
environmental reviews for bills of legislation.697  Such bills would 
include the laws on leasing methane hydrate resources, laws on 
the regulated operations of federally held methane hydrates, and 
whatever environmental and tort laws that would be enacted to 
protect the environment in the wake of methane hydrate 
development. 
Environmental reviews are not generally drafted within the 
EPA, but rather within the specified department or other 
governmental body proposing a particular piece of legislation or 
path of action. NEPA requires that the environmental reviews of 
the bills begin concurrently with the onset of the bill’s drafting, 
and not after the bill has already been drafted.698  These 
prospective reviews are designed to encourage the integration of 
environmental considerations throughout the drafting process. 
Environmental reviews can take one of three forms: a categorical 
exclusion (CE), an environmental assessment (EA), or an 
environmental impact statement (EIS).699  A CE is employed 
when the draft bill is expected to present no calculable 
environmental impact.700  An EA is undertaken if the draft bill 
presents potential environmental concerns; a positive finding 
under an EA leads to an exhaustive EIS.701  Finally, an EIS is a 
comprehensive report to address all of the identified 
environmental concerns once the EA has identified them.702  In 
general, federal agencies have institutionally been encouraged to 
tilt towards CEs and away from EAs, because they are cheaper to 
execute, and thus this leaves many environmental aspects of 
draft bills often unexplored.703 While the NEPA statute does not 
overtly require public access or participation to the review 
 
 697. KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20621, 
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA) 
REQUIREMENTS 2 (2008). 
 698. 40 C.F.R. § 1500(b) (2014). 
 699. See ALEXANDER, supra note 697, at 3. 
 700. Id. 
 701. See id. at 4. 
 702. See id. 
 703. Id. at 4-5. 
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process, the associated regulations do provide those rights to the 
general public.704 
Should methane hydrates approach commercial development, 
the NEPA will require both the drafting of rules and regulations 
to manage the overall impact to the American environment, and 
NEPA will require a process that is open to the general public. 
NEPA also clarifies that the drafting of such bills of law will not 
occur within the EPA, but within the departments or agencies 
previously appointed to oversee such areas of regulations. 
2.   Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 
OCSLA would regulate those methane hydrates within U.S. 
territorial waters. The OCSLA provides for the recognition of the 
mineral assets of the U.S. offshore in its territorial and EEZ 
waters. It also provides the regulatory framework to lease those 
minerals. 
The onset of methane hydrate development is also limited by 
previous efforts to prevent offshore development of oil and gas 
within the U.S. A variety of specific statutes banning offshore 
developments, e.g. the North Carolina Outer Banks Protection 
Act, and presidential executive moratoria have either directly 
prevented the leasing of areas offshore both the West and East 
Coasts or have prevented budget allocations from supporting the 
administrative costs of that licensing. Today, only the areas 
offshore Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas are active in 
development activities.705 
a. Applicability to Offshore Methane 
Hydrates 
OCSLA defines minerals to include both oil and gas,706 and 
thus methane hydrates.707 Likewise, OCSLA includes minerals, 
 
 704. Id. at 5. 
 705. See Areas Under Moratoria, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Areas-Under-
Moratoria.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KR8P-
DK3Q (maps of some of the moratoria areas). 
 706. OSCLA provides the legal definitions of oil and gas separately. See 30 
C.F.R. § 559.002 (2014) (“Gas means natural gas as defined by the Federal 
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and thus methane hydrates, within its definitions of “lease,”708 
“exploration,”709 “development,”710 “production,”711 and “fair 
market value.”712 As such, OCSLA provides the legal foundations 
for leasing and economically managing methane hydrates within 
the U.S.’s EEZ. 
What might not be expected though, is that OCSLA provides 
to the Secretary of Commerce, not the Department of the Interior 
or the EPA, the duties to perform EAs on prospective and on-
going methane hydrate leases and operations.713  Nevertheless, 
NEPA remains in application, as it applies to all federal 
agencies.714 
b.   Risk Governance Under OCSLA 
OCSLA calls for the implementation of a regulatory 
framework and an overseeing regulatory body. The Commerce 
Secretary is required to monitor the human, marine, and coastal 
 
Energy Regulatory Commission.”) (“Oil means a mixture of hydrocarbons that 
exists in a liquid or gaseous phase in an underground reservoir and which 
remains or becomes liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface 
separating facilities, including condensate recovered by means other than a 
manufacturing process.”) (emphasis added). 
 707. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(q) (2012) (“The term ‘minerals’ includes oil, gas, sulphur, 
geopressured-geothermal and associated resources, and all other minerals which 
are authorized by an Act of Congress to be produced from ‘public lands’ as 
defined in [§ 1702] of [this title].”). 
 708. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(c) (“The term ‘lease’ means any form of authorization 
which is issued under [§ 1337 of this title] or maintained under [§ 1335 of this 
title] and which authorizes exploration for, and development and production of, 
minerals.”). 
 709. Id. § 1331(k) (“The term ‘exploration’ means the process of searching for 
minerals.”). 
 710. Id. § 1331(l) (“The term ‘development’ means those activities which take 
place following discovery of minerals in paying quantities, including geophysical 
activity, drilling, platform construction, and operation of all onshore support 
facilities, and which are for the purpose of ultimately producing the minerals 
discovered.”). 
 711. Id. § 1331(m) (“The term ‘production’ means those activities which take 
place after the successful completion of any means for the removal of minerals, 
including such removal, field operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation 
monitoring, maintenance, and work-over drilling.”). 
 712. Id. § 1331(o). 
 713. Id. §§ 1346 (a)(1), (b). 
 714. See discussion on NEPA, supra Part III(E)(1).  
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environments of the outer Continental Shelf, and the coastal 
areas impacted by the development and production of methane 
hydrates.715  The Commerce Secretary, alongside the Coast 
Guard, “require[s], on all new drilling and production operations 
and, wherever practicable, on existing operations, the use of the 
best available and safest technologies which the Secretary 
determines to be economically feasible, wherever failure of 
equipment would have a significant effect on safety, health, or the 
environment.”716 
The Secretary is required to study any area included in an oil 
and gas lease sale in order to determine what information would 
be needed for the assessment and management of the 
environmental impacts on the human, marine, and coastal 
environments of the outer Continental Shelf and of the coastal 
areas which may be affected by oil and gas or other mineral 
development.717  The collection of that data should lead to 
regulations to protect the human, marine, and coastal 
environments; thereafter the Secretary, the Coast Guard, and the 
U.S. Army are required to enforce those safety and environmental 
regulations.718  The Act provides for both civil and criminal 
penalties and punishments for violations of those regulations. 
OCSLA does provide for both civil and criminal penalties,719 
and it allows citizen suits against both private and public 
parties,720 but generally under the Chevron doctrine, the 
Secretary of Commerce is given broad authority to interpret the 
statute and regulate accordingly. OCSLA provides no specific 
liability, remedy or punishment for environmental harms caused 
by the operation of the mineral leases assigned under its 
authority. 
 
 715. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). 
 716. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 
 717. Id. § 1346(a). 
 718. Id. § 1348(a). 
 719. Id. §§ 1350(b), (c). 
 720. Id. § 1349(a)(1). 
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3.   Oil Pollution Act 
The OPA is the major federal act for addressing hydrocarbon 
spills within the jurisdictional waters of the United States;721 
thus it extends beyond state waters into federal jurisdictions 
offshore. 
It was designed to consolidate federal regulatory authority 
and to clarify the liabilities attending oil spills in the wake of the 
Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska.722 
a. Inapplicability to Offshore Methane 
Hydrates 
OPA applies to oil and to hazardous substances that are 
released in an unpermitted manner into water, but it does not 
apply to certain hazardous chemicals as defined under other 
statutes. 723  So while methane emissions might be regulated 
elsewhere under federal law as a hazardous substance, it is not so 
for OPA. 
 
 721. While the U.S. has taken notice of UNCLOS, it has not ratified it. Its own 
notions of jurisdictional waters take note of the vocabulary of UNCLOS, but are 
enacted separately under federal law. Thus, OPA applies to the EEZ of the U.S., 
but the legal basis is not the international standard, per se. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2701(8) (“‘[E]xclusive economic zone’ means the zone established by 
Presidential Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983, including the 
ocean waters of the areas referred to as ‘eastern special areas’ in Article 3(1) of 
the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, signed June 1, 1990.”). The U.S. 
EEZ extends “200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured.”  See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 
(Mar. 10, 1983). 
 722. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 13. 
 723. See infra Part III(E)(4) for discussion of the CWA and the list of 
hazardous substances that apply to water. Methane is not currently listed under 
these laws; e.g., methane is sometimes regulated under the CAA, but as an air 
pollutant and not as a hazardous air pollutant, which is what was carved out 
under OPA. For the purposes of OPA, oil “does not include any substance which 
is specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under 
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of § 101(14) of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and which is subject 
to the provisions of that Act[.]”  33 U.S.C. § 2701(23). That subsequent definition 
refers to listings of hazardous substances under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1317(a), 1321(b)(2)(A), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921, the 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2606. 
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While technically methane could be included under 
petroleum, it would not appear to be so contemplated within 
OPA.724  There is not a singular reference to natural gas or 
methane within OPA. Section 2701(2) provides a standard 
definition for a volume measure of a barrel of crude oil, but 
nowhere in OPA is there a comparable definition of volume or 
mass for natural gas or methane, nor are there any conversion 
factors provided to convert them into barrels equivalent. On the 
whole, accidents primarily motivated by natural gas or methane 
events would appear to fall outside of the scope of OPA’s liability 
scheme. 
It is clear that the drafters of OPA were concerned with the 
particular ecological and community damages of the Exxon 
Valdez crude oil incident and focused on the impact of crude oil; 
the exclusion of natural gas and methane may have resulted from 
a lack of historical accidents that would have enabled popular 
political action. 
b.   Risk Governance Under the OPA 
OPA provides that the tortfeasor is to be held strictly liable 
for all public and private cleanup costs.725  It does not displace 
state-level jurisdiction, state-level rules of civil liability, or state 
regulations to the extent that such rules exist and to the extent 
that certain federalism issues, such as pre-emption, are not in 
conflict; thus liability for oil spills in general might fall 
concurrently under both federal and state laws, including OPA.726 
 
 724. Oil is defined as any kind of oil, but it is not explicitly stated that 
methane or methane hydrates would be included within that term; a reasonable 
reading suggests that natural gas and methane would be excluded from the 
definition of oil. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23) (“‘[O]il’ means oil of any kind or in any 
form, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes 
other than dredged spoil, but does not include any substance which is 
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs 
(A) through (F) of section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. § 9601) and which is 
subject to the provisions of that Act.”). 
 725. James E. NICHOLS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41266, OIL 
POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 (OPA): LIABILITY OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES 1 
(2010). See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32); see also RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 12. 
 726. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a), (c). 
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There are limits to the liability imposed by OPA. Liabilities 
are “capped,” or limited by the type of vessel from which the 
hydrocarbon escaped.727  The listings include vessels, ports, and 
rigs;728 (i) tank vessels,729 (ii) vessels,730 generally, (iii) onshore 
facilities and deepwater ports,731 (iv) offshore facilities (excluding 
deepwater ports),732 and (v) mobile offshore drilling units.733  
These five categories have limits imposed by tonnage, hulling, 
and character of activity.734  Those liability limits are set aside 
when the hydrocarbon spill results from acts of gross negligence 
or willful misconduct.735 
While OPA functions with strict liability, it is important to 
note that the overall liability is determined under a variant of a 
‘duty of care’ rule.736  The economic incentive is similar to that of 
routine strict liability for accidents under the scope of liability, 
but operators are effectively sheltered from more catastrophic 
liabilities, facilitating investment in the energy sector. All 
accidents result in liability. Unlike under a rule of negligence, 
due precaution will not completely shield the operator from 
damages. An OPA operator retains liability for damages even 
 
 727. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 13. 
 728. Listings, infra, derive from the liability limiting rules found within 33 
U.S.C. § 2704. 
 729. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1). 
 730. Id. § 2704(a)(2). See also id. § 2701(37) (“‘[V]essel’ means every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being 
used, as a means of transportation on water, other than a public vessel.”). 
 731. Id. § 2704(a)(3). See also id. § 2701(24) (“‘[O]nshore facility’ means any 
facility (including, but not limited to, motor vehicles and rolling stock) of any 
kind located in, on, or under, any land within the United States other than 
submerged land.”). “‘[D]eepwater port’ is a facility licensed under the Deepwater 
Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524),” which includes, for example, the 
crude oil offloading LOOP facility offshore Louisiana. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6). 
 732. Id. § 2704(a)(4). See also id. § 2701(22) (“‘[O]ffshore facility’ means any 
facility of any kind located in, on, or under any of the navigable waters of the 
United States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a 
vessel or a public vessel.”). 
 733. Id. §§ 2704(b)(1), (2). See also id. § 2701(18) (“‘[M]obile offshore drilling 
unit’ means a vessel (other than a self-elevating lift vessel) capable of use as an 
offshore facility.”). 
 734. Id. § 2704. 
 735. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 12. 
 736. 33 U.S.C. § 2702. 
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under demonstrable (e.g., non-reckless or grossly negligent 
behavior) precaution.737 
Additionally, it should be noted that OPA provides liability in 
complement to liabilities and penalty fines provided by other 
sources of law within the U.S. It would thus be misleading to 
suggest that the complete set of damages to be faced by a 
tortfeasant operator would be strictly limited to these particular 
limits; they are merely the liability limits under OPA. 
The statute refers to both “removal costs” and “damages,” 
reflecting that the statute pursues both the immediate and 
indirect notions of damages.738  Those costs may include injury to 
natural resources, loss of personal property and resultant 
economic losses, loss of subsistence use of resources, lost revenues 
resulting from injuries to property or natural resources, lost 
profits and earnings from injuries to property or natural 
resources, and the costs of providing additional public services 
during or after the hydrocarbon spill incident.739 
Certain damages are only recoverable by units of the federal 
or state government,740 in particular, certain environmental 
damages and wasting acts that impact governmental revenues.741 
4.   Clean Water Act 
The CWA would likely govern neither methane hydrates, nor 
their potential association with environmental harms. Methane 
 
 737. Id. § 2704. 
 738. For an example of such phrasing, see id. § 2702(a). See also id. § 2701(5) 
(“‘[D]amages’ means damages specified in § 1002(b) of this Act [33 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(b)], and includes the cost of assessing these damages.”). See also id. 
§ 2701(30) (“‘[R]emove’ or ‘removal’ means containment and removal of oil or a 
hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as 
may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or 
welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and 
private property, shorelines, and beaches.”). See also 33 U.S.C. § 2701(31) 
(“‘[R]emoval costs’ means the costs of removal that are incurred after a 
discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial 
threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil 
pollution from such an incident.”). 
 739. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 11-12. 
 740. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D). 
 741. Id. 
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has not been included within the more general oil spill and 
hazardous substances discharge rules. 
a. Inapplicability to Offshore Methane 
Hydrates 
Oil is defined as a viscous liquid and not as a gaseous 
substance.742  As such, methane and other natural gases would 
not qualify as oil. Similarly, crude oil, is volumetrically measured 
in “barrels,” but no such legal definition is provided for emitted 
gas within the CWA.743 
Methane from methane hydrates is not likely to qualify as 
chemical wastes, nor is it likely to fit any of the other enumerated 
items. It could be defined to be included under the term 
hazardous substances, but such would require explicit listing 
within the associated regulations.744  The current listing of 
hazardous substances includes no mention of natural gas, 
methane, ethane, or butane.745  Thus, as methane is neither oil 
nor a listed hazardous substance, its emission into water sans co-
produced oil is not covered by the CWA. 
Furthermore, oil and gas operations are specifically written 
about within this section; it excludes certain materials associated 
with oil and gas production.746  The CWA excludes “water, gas, or 
 
 742. Id. § 1321(a)(1) (“‘[O]il’ means oil of any kind or in any form, including, 
but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with 
wastes other than dredged spoil[.]”). 
 743. Id. § 1321(a)(13) (“‘[B]arrel’ means 42 United States gallons at 60 degrees 
Fahrenheit.”). 
 744. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(14) (directing the definition of hazardous 
substances to the rule of (b)(2)). See also id. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (“The Administrator 
shall develop, promulgate, and revise as may be appropriate, regulations 
designating as hazardous substances, other than oil as defined in this section, 
such elements and compounds which, when discharged in any quantity into or 
upon the navigable waters of the United States or adjoining shorelines or the 
waters of the contiguous zone or in connection with activities under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act or the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, or which may 
affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive 
management authority of the United States (including resources under the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976), present 
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, including, 
but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches.”). 
 745. 40 C.F.R. § 117.3 (2014). 
 746. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B). 
123
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
914 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
other material which is injected into a well to facilitate 
production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or 
gas production” from inclusion within the definition of 
pollutants.747  Thus, potential injectants into the hydrate 
deposits, such as carbon dioxide, would be exempt from the CWA 
(caveat: such injectants would need their own permitting as part 
of the operator’s licensing arrangement). 
b.   Risk Governance Under the CWA 
The CWA is a very broad grant of regulatory power that 
supports much of the EPA’s activity base. As such, it supports a 
regulatory body. 
The CWA does provide for both regulatory penalties and civil 
liabilities for oil spills and hazardous substances discharges. The 
regulatory penalties provide for an administrative hearing 
process and are limited to $125,000.748 
Should the Secretary opt to forego the administrative route 
for judicially enforced civil liabilities, the judgment can get much 
larger.749  The civil liabilities are based on both the volumes of oil 
spill and a determination of the character of causations. Polluters 
of spilt volumes are to be held liable under a rule of strict 
liability.750 
Spilling events not derivative of grossly negligent behavior 
face liabilities cum civil penalties in an amount up to $25,000 per 
day of violation, or an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil or 
unit of reportable quantity.751  If the accident follows from grossly 
negligent behavior, then the liabilities cum civil penalties 
increase to not less than $100,000, and not more than $3,000 per 
barrel of oil or unit of reportable quantity.752 
 
 747. Id. 
 748. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B)(ii). 
 749. Id. § 1321(b)(7)(F). 
 750. Id. § 1321(b)(7). 
 751. Id. § 1321(b)(7)(A). 
 752. Id. § 1321(b)(7)(D). 
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5. Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties 
Under the U.S.’s adoption of the International Convention 
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties, 1969, 753 offshore methane hydrates 
operations would not likely be regulated 
Oil is defined as “convention oil,” i.e., “crude oil, fuel oil, 
diesel oil, and lubricating oil.”754  Non-liquid gaseous volumes, 
such natural gas or methane, would not be seen as included 
within convention oil. Similarly, “a substance other than 
convention oil” is defined to mean “those oils, noxious substances, 
liquefied gases, and radioactive substances” specifically listed 
within the protocol or determined to be a hazard to human 
health, to harm living resources, to damage amenities, or to 
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.755 
Natural gas or methane is only listed if included within 
“liquified gases” or as an interference with legitimate usages of 
the sea that harms living resources.756  Methane as extracted 
from offshore deposits would not manifest as a liquefied gas until 
substantially downstream of the extraction process. Methane is 
rendered into LNG only when prepared for oceanic transport via 
boat; should the methane be transported onshore for processing 
and marketing no LNG would likely be produced. 
Similarly, methane does not generally find itself included 
within noxious gases, and it generally has no affinity with 
radioactivity. Thus, it would likely fail to be included under the 
listings of those “oils, noxious substances, liquefied gases, and 
radioactive substances” determined to be a hazard to human 
health, as methane would likely be qualified as one of the four 
categories.757 
 
 
 753. Id. §§ 1471-87. 
 754. 33 U.S.C. § 1471(3). 
 755. Id. § 1471(1). See 33 U.S.C. § 1471(1)(B), in reference to 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1473(a). 
 756. 33 U.S.C. § 1473. 
 757. Id. § 1471(a). See id. § 1473(a). 
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6. National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan 
For similar reasons, as seen in the U.S.’s Intervention on the 
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, the National Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan has not 
been applied to methane environmental hazard planning. 
Natural gas is usually not considered to be either oil or a 
hazardous substance. Also, most emergency response planners 
have not foreseen a need for “methane clean-up” in the same way 
that they need to plan for crude oil clean up operations. 
7. Clean Air Act 
The CAA could regulate methane emissions from crude oil 
and natural gas production operations, but so far methane has 
not been included. In a letter sent by New York Attorney General 
Eric T. Schneiderman to Lisa P. Jackson, the Administrator of 
the EPA, Schneiderman announced that the State of New York 
intended to sue the EPA to bring about changes in the CAA to 
include the regulation of methane emissions from oil and gas 
operations.758  New York was joined in the letter by the states of 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and Vermont. The letter explains that while the EPA issued 
preliminary regulations on methane emissions from oil and gas 
operations in 1985, those regulations were never made effective, 
contrary to the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(B).759  The 
states argue that the EPA needs to regulate methane emissions 
from existing sources of methane emissions, as well as from new 
and modified facilities, under 42 U.S.C. §7411(d)(1)(A).760  This 
case has not yet been brought to court, and it will be several years 
at least before a final decision is rendered. But, it is clear from 
 
 758. Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., George Jepsen, Conn. 
Att’y Gen., Joseph R. Biden II, Del. Att’y Gen., Douglas F. Gansler, Md. Att’y 
Gen., Martha Coakley, Mass. Att’y Gen., Peter Kilmartin, R.I. Att’y Gen., & 
William H. Sorrell, Vt. Att’y Gen., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (Dec. 11, 
2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ltr_NSPS_Methane_Notice.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/W6J5-MDPH. 
 759. Id. 
 760. Id. 
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the substantial efforts of these many states that the CAA is not 
currently regulating methane emissions, and thus the CAA is not 
currently applicable to potential methane hydrate events or 
accidents. 
8. Methane Hydrate Research and Development 
Act 
The MHRDA761 provided for the financing of research to 
develop technologies that could reduce the incidence and impact 
of damages from methane hydrate development, from methane 
“degassing” and from events related to drilling into methane 
hydrate deposits. But, the MHRDA makes no provisions for the 
development or use of regulations on environmental hazards from 
methane hydrate development. 
The MHRDA was originally passed in 2000, and was 
amended in 2005. Its design is to support the funding for research 
and development in methane hydrates; all of the research and 
development activities are to be coordinated by the Department of 
Energy.762  It provides for no civil liabilities and provides for little 
in the way of regulations beyond standard NEPA requirements. It 
does provide a research budget to ascertain if those items might 
become necessary. 
Intriguingly, nowhere in the Act are methane hydrates or gas 
hydrates defined; the only functional reference to their character 
is a statement that methane hydrates can offset the decline in 
America’s domestic natural gas assets.763 
a.   Risk Governance Under the MHRDA 
There is a requirement for the investment in projects that: 
(D)  assist in developing technologies required for efficient and 
environmentally sound development of methane hydrate 
resources; 
 
 761. 30 U.S.C. §§ 2001-06. 
 762. Id. § 2003(a)(3). 
 763. 33 U.S.C. § 2001(5) (“[M]ethane hydrate may have the potential to 
alleviate the projected shortfall in the natural gas supply[.]”). 
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(F)  conduct basic and applied research to assess and mitigate the 
environmental impact of hydrate degassing (including both 
natural degassing and degassing associated with commercial 
development); 
(G) develop technologies to reduce the risks of drilling through 
methane hydrates.764 
However, there is no regulatory language requiring the 
drafting or planning for the use of those technologies, nor for the 
drafting or development of regulations that would respond to the 
incident of environmental damages from methane hydrate 
development. 
But, at least there is official recognition that there is a 
technological problem that certain environmental harms could 
result, and technologies to mitigate those harms should be 
invested in. The listed hazards to the environment are: (i) the 
development of methane hydrates generally, (ii) methane hydrate 
venting (therein referenced as “degassing”), and (iii) the risks 
associated with drilling into methane hydrate deposits.765 
MHRDA does require the assembly of a “Methane Hydrates 
Advisory Committee” that should include members from 
environmental organizations alongside other members from 
“industrial enterprises, institutions of higher education, 
oceanographic institutions, [and] state agencies.”766  However, 
none of the listed reports from that committee and the associated 
research has focused on the environmental hazards and their 
mitigating technologies.767 
The Secretary of the Department of Energy is also directed to 
ensure that the “data and information developed through the 
 
 764. Id. § 2003(b)(1)(D)-(G). 
 765. Id. § 2003(b)(1). 
 766. 33 U.S.C. § 2003(c)(1). 
 767. See Methane Hydrates, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-
gas/FutureSupply/MethaneHydrates/MH_ReferenceShelf/RefShelf.html (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LV6T-D6JB. For a list of 
reports, see also Publications and Presentations of DOE Supported Methane 
Hydrate R&D 1999-2014, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/file%20library/research/oil-
gas/methane%20hydrates/MHBibliography.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M4DY-938M. 
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program are accessible and widely disseminated as needed and 
appropriate.”768 
Perhaps most interestingly, the MHRDA requires the 
Secretary to “ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, greater 
participation by the Department of Energy in international 
cooperative efforts.”769  It is unclear to what extent that request 
is aimed strictly at research and technology or to what extent it 
can be responsive to the aspirations of the Methane Hydrates 
Advisory Committee. 
IV.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   Emergent Need for Standards 
There is an emergent need to provide rules of civil liability 
and regulations for the development of offshore methane 
hydrates. Tremendous economic benefits are challenged by 
substantial accidental risks and hazards. The time to begin the 
studies for those rules and regulations should be soon, as the 
industry is likely to develop within the coming decade. The 
argument is that it is more likely than not that some investors or 
nations might begin the development of offshore methane 
hydrates in the very near future. As such, it would be advisable to 
develop the necessary norms and standards in advance of those 
programs and projects.770 
Offshore methane hydrates could provide new sources of 
natural gas and fresh water supplies. Importantly for the timing 
of its development, many countries that currently lack access to 
domestic energy supplies are expected to possess reserves of 
offshore methane hydrates. For some countries, that access to 
 
 768. 30 U.S.C. § 2003(e)(3). 
 769. Id. § 2003(e)(6). 
 770. To be clear, the argument presented is not an argument to stimulate 
investment to ensure earlier adoption of offshore methane hydrates. The 
argument is predicated on the recognition of several nations’ stated national 
agendas to begin the extraction of offshore methane hydrates and in recognition 
of the imminent technological feasibility of those agendas. Should any of those 
or other actors actually move forward with plans to develop offshore methane 
hydrates, it would be constructive to have the necessary standards in place 
ahead of those development efforts. 
129
5_Partain FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
920 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
local energy supplies within their political control could provide 
strategic stability and continuity of energy supplies critical for 
economic growth and development. Such policy concerns could 
motivate some countries to begin offshore methane hydrate 
production before it is commercially competitive with more 
conventional energy supplies. 
However, the commercial feasibility of developing offshore 
methane hydrates might arrive sooner than previously expected. 
The engineering technology of offshore methane hydrates is 
rapidly advancing, and the costs of methane hydrate extraction 
and production are dropping. It is a common view of methane 
hydrate researchers that offshore methane hydrates may become 
commercially viable within the next ten years.771  Japan and 
South Korea have both established national research programs to 
obtain that commercial capability by 2015.772 
If it becomes the case that the technologies and cost 
structures of offshore methane hydrates reach commercial or 
politically sufficient levels of advancement, it would be beneficial 
for both energy investors and for the general public to have 
already determined optimal standards. Once the economic 
motives of methane hydrate projects become more evident, it 
might become more difficult to negotiate the development of the 
necessary standards. 
At the present moment, the development of offshore methane 
hydrates finds a fairly united community of researchers 
supported by both private investment and government 
support.773  Once projects become commercial in nature, one 
might expect certain adversarial positions to be taken; public 
versus private, corporate versus academic.774  It might be best to 
attempt to find common ground on standards and on optimal 
precautions and optimal levels of offshore hydrate development 
before that competitive aspect of eventual development opens up. 
 
 771. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, §§ 2, 3. 
 772. See id. §§ 4.1, 4.2. 
 773. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 4. 
 774. For example, different energy corporations might try to gain proprietary 
advantages in technology by hiring key researchers. Also, governments might 
have alternative goals for national resources than commercial operators might 
have. 
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B. General Recommendations 
What the future of offshore methane hydrates needs is a 
clear and operational set of guidelines and incentives to ensure, 
both for the private operators and the general public, that such 
offshore operations will achieve the socially optimal safety level, 
so that both private profits and general welfare can be best 
obtained. The recommendations of this article are that a 
combined rule of strict liability for the resulting damages and the 
development of effective public regulations would best provide for 
the optimal level of safety.775 
In summary of section 3, supra, there are various laws that 
would be applicable as written, but many would need adjusting to 
better accommodate the circumstances of offshore methane 
hydrates. 
Those laws, such as the EIA and SEA Directives and the 
NEPA, but also those like OSCLA, that require EAs to be 
completed prior to the licensing and permitting of offshore 
activities, are most complete and less in need of revision or 
updating. Those specific laws focused on hydrocarbon accidents 
and similar industrial accidents are generally poorly suited to the 
specific circumstances of offshore methane hydrates as currently 
enacted. 
The EU has two directives, the Offshore Directive and the 
CCS Directive, that are so close to the nature and character of 
offshore methane hydrate operations that one wonders if it might 
be feasible to adjust those existing directives. 
First, the Offshore Directive reflects careful drafting to be 
inclusive of both known historical oil spill accidents and other 
potential types of offshore accidents; the generic phrases “major 
accident,” “major hazard,” and “environmental impact” are oft 
used in lieu of more specific forms of accidents. However, the 
historical bias of well-known oil spill events does lurk within the 
legal paradigm of the Offshore Directive. The Preamble connects 
the Offshore Directive to oil spills caused by ships.776  Additional 
language could be added to emphasize the potential for both 
 
 775. Supra Part II(C). For additional depth in those arguments, see supra 
notes 26, 27. 
 776. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl. 49. 
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crude oil and natural gas accidents within offshore extraction 
operations. Specific mention of the unique circumstances of 
methane hydrate accidents could buttress the application of the 
Offshore Directive to such events. 
In discussing the importance of the preservation of the 
Arctic’s environment, focus is put on Arctic marine oil pollution 
with no discussion of the harms of natural gas emissions, venting, 
or seepage.777  The definitions section of the Offshore Directive 
includes an “oil spill response effectiveness” term, but no analog 
for methane hazards.778  Such could be readily remedied by either 
providing parallel definitions and concerns for methane related 
events, or by expanding the current terms to be more inclusive 
and more clear. For example, the EMSA is charged with the duty 
to monitor to the extent of an “oil or gas spill,” but gases do not 
spill as such.779  The word choice reflects historical expectations 
of an “oil and gas spill” event, alike the 2010 Gulf of Mexico 
incident, wherein crude oil has been the dominant semantic 
concern.780  Consider the discussion on “[i]nternal emergency 
response plans,” in which there is a requirement for an analysis 
of the oil spill response effectiveness of the proposed plans.781  
The internal emergency response plan is required to include a list 
of necessary equipment including those for capping a spill; no 
requirement or analog terms are made for dealing with gaseous 
venting or seepages.782  There is a requirement for environmental 
factors to be considered in the estimate of the oil spill response 
effectiveness metric, but no symmetrical analysis is suggested for 
gaseous accident response plans.783 
Further, reference is made to dispersants, which only find 
use against crude oils.784  The external emergency response plan 
is required to address “oiled animals” that might reach the coast 
 
 777. Id. at pmbl. 52. 
 778. Id. at art. 2(32). 
 779. Id. at art. 10. 
 780. Id. at art. 10(2)(a). 
 781. Id. at art. 14(1). 
 782. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at Annex I, § 10(5). 
 783. Id. at Annex I, § 10(8). 
 784. Id. at Annex I, § 10(12). 
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in advance of the “actual spill.”785  Similarly, when well 
operations are to be undertaken, a similar requirement exists for 
an analysis of the oil spill response effectiveness of the proposed 
plans.786  Neither requires an analysis for response effectiveness 
to methane accidents. The same asymmetry is found in the 
requirements for the report on major hazards for operation of a 
production installation787 and for the report on major hazards for 
a non-production installation.788 
So, while the Offshore Directive can be read to include 
planning for major accidents and major hazards of the 
exploration and production of methane hydrates, the Offshore 
Directive retains a semantic bias for crude oil spills. By 
broadening its existing terms or by providing parallel details for 
events related to both conventional and methane hydrate related 
accidents, the Offshore Directive could be extended to better cover 
the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. 
As discussed earlier, the CCS Directive is a perfect fit for 
those aspects of offshore methane hydrate projects that do elect to 
engage in co-productive carbon dioxide injections back into the 
hydrate deposits. To that extent, the CCS Directive is well 
drafted for application to offshore methane hydrate projects. 
However, because of certain similarities between the CCS 
technologies and hydrate extraction technologies, they can be 
viewed as the reverse of each other. Some of the terms developed 
within the CCS Directive might be employable within a future 
Offshore Methane Hydrate Directive or as terms to assist in the 
redrafting of the current Offshore Directive. “Leakage” is defined 
in article 3.5 to include any release of carbon dioxide from the 
storage complex, and “storage complex” is defined in article 3.6 to 
include the storage site and the surrounding geological 
domain.789  The definition of “significant irregularity” in article 
3.17 parallels the concerns of deteriorating stability of methane 
hydrate fields; ‘“significant irregularity’ means any irregularity in 
the injection or storage operations or in the condition of the 
 
 785. Id. at Annex VII (h). 
 786. Id. at art. 15(1). 
 787. Id. at Annex I, § 2(5). 
 788. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at Annex I, § 3(5). 
 789. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 3(5)-(6). 
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storage complex itself, which implies the risk of a leakage or risk 
to the environment or human health.”790  Any efforts undertaken 
to correct significant irregularities or leakages are defined as 
“corrective measures” in article 3.19.791 
If these types of suggestions were implemented, then the 
conjoint application of strict liability with sophisticated public 
regulations could be readily affected within the EU and its 
Member States. 
The general trend of U.S. federal laws related to oil spills has 
focused on the assignment of liability based on rules of strict 
liability, liability caps, and penalties for lost volumes. As such, 
the American federal laws could also be readily amended if its 
current character were to be retained. Once that were 
accomplished, existing safety regulations could be updated; as the 
American Petroleum Industry (API) provides the bulk of such 
regulation privately within the API, one assumes that those 
materials could and would be updated as offshore methane 
hydrate projects approached early development. 
OCSLA primarily addresses the leasing of minerals, and was 
found to be effectively applicable to offshore methane hydrates in 
its current form. OCSLA could be expanded with substantially 
minor edits to bring attention to the need to provide oversight for 
methane safety in addition to the existing language on crude oil 
and on minerals in general. OCSLA already provides a grant of 
administrative powers to the Commerce Secretary to provide 
regulatory guidance to ensure the best available practices and 
safest technologies; these regulatory powers could be used to 
support development of the appropriate standards and rules for 
the development of offshore methane hydrates. 
OPA at large has a strict liability rule that could be readily 
adjusted to include methane hydrate accidents. OPA could have 
accidents and operators redefined to include the circumstances 
related to offshore methane hydrate accidents. Specifically, OPA 
could be amended to explicitly provide for the inclusion of marine-
based methane emission accidents to parallel its current 
definition for oil spills. OPA could also include volumetric 
 
 790. Id. at art. 3(17). 
 791. Id. at art. 3(19). 
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standards for methane to parallel with its crude oil barrel 
standards. OPA currently provides a taxonomy of vessel and 
facilities in defining the liability caps for oil spills; methane 
hydrates operations might deserve a similar, but separate listing 
of facility types if liability caps were to be retained for methane 
hydrate operations.792  To better address particular concerns 
related uniquely to offshore methane hydrate accidents, there 
might be several enumerations of particular acts or omissions 
that would substantiate gross negligence for offshore methane 
hydrate operators. 
The CWA enables fines and penalties for marine pollution. 
The CWA could be amended more simply than OPA by including 
methane as a marine pollutant for the purposes of the CWA. Once 
included as a marine pollutant, volumetric standards for emitted, 
seeped, or vented methane should also be developed and included 
in measures parallel to the existing volumetric provided for 
barrels of crude oil. Finally, the penalty areas of the CWA could 
be amended to include both barrels of crude oil leaked or volumes 
of methane emitted. 
There are existing organizations in place that could assist 
with the development of private regulations for offshore methane 
hydrates. For example, the API provides over 600 standards for 
the oil and gas industry.793  Additionally, there are other research 
groups and environmental groups that maintain research related 
to the development of offshore methane hydrates. These groups 
could be encouraged to begin drafting suggested private 
regulations. Those draft regulations could also serve to inform 
public regulatory bodies in the development of their own 
regulations, or in the coordinated development of integrated 
regulatory mechanisms. 
 
 792. For example, offshore methane hydrate extraction facilities might be 
onboard a drilling and producing vessel or they might attached to a moored or 
connected structure. 
 793. For example, the American Petroleum Institute (API) maintains an 
“inventory of over 600 standards and recommended practices.”  See Publications, 
Standards, and Statistics Overview, AM. PETROLEUM INST., available at 
http://www.api.org/publications-standards-and-statistics (last visited Nov. 30, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GP3P-RUCD. 
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V.   FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
Offshore methane hydrates provide a cornucopia of potential 
benefits and hazards. Because the effects of these benefits and 
hazards would engage far beyond a private cluster of individuals, 
a public law response is needed. 
This article has also found that the technological hurdles are 
being reduced, that the costs of extracting and producing offshore 
methane hydrate are dropping, and that several nations have 
explicitly stated that they intend to produce offshore methane 
hydrates within this decade. As such, the timing to develop the 
necessary rules of civil liability and regulations is pressing. 
The theory of law and economics has provided a means of 
evaluating alternative rules of civil liabilities and of alternate 
public regulations. It is the result of this article that a rule of 
strict liability should be implemented in a complementary fashion 
with public and private regulations. That combination would 
provide a more complete set of precautionary incentives to the 
relevant actors, a more complete set of information to all parties, 
and the combination would reinforce the effectiveness of both 
systems of risk governance. 
There are existing and functional rules to address 
hydrocarbon accidents. The basic paradigm for spilt crude oil is 
broadly in alignment with the recommendations of this article. 
The rules generally display a preference for the rule of strict 
liability. The rules often call for extensive amounts of public 
regulations in parallel to the assignment of strict liability. 
Where problems were found it was found that they were 
usually a result of the simple problem that accidents predicated 
upon methane leakages were not explicitly included in the 
drafting of oil spill laws and conventions. Even when broader 
terms of hazardous substances were included within such 
frameworks, it appeared that water-borne methane was not 
included. Thus, water-born methane has fallen between the 
cracks, so to speak, of otherwise sound and useful laws and 
regulations. 
This article concludes that such oversight could and should 
be readily remedied. The fundamental frameworks that already 
exist could and should be extended to include the potential for the 
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commercial development of offshore methane hydrates. Such 
efforts could be dove-tailed into existing regulatory frameworks 
and case law histories by amending the existing laws to be more 
inclusive. 
Such a process, although perhaps the efficient choice from a 
transaction cost perspective, would still require extensive 
discussion and commentary. Changes to EU Directives would 
likely engage mechanisms under the EIA and SEA Directives. 
Changes to U.S. federal laws would require both administrative 
and public processes under NEPA. These procedural reviews 
would not be quick and should not be unsafely expedited. To 
provide sufficient time to ensure safety and public support, these 
reviews should be started sooner rather than later. 
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